The status of Kosova debated: the 1967–1974 internal constitutional and political debates in Kosova by Asllani, Gani
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Status of Kosova Debated 
The 1967–1974 internal constitutional and political debates in Kosova 
 
 
 
 
Candidate Gani Asllani 
 
 
Mentors: Dejan Jović PhD & Professor Graham Timmins PhD. 
 
MPhil dissertation 
Department of Politics 
University of Stirling 
2 
 
CONTENTS 
 
Map of Kosova                                                                                                             3 
Map of Yugoslavia’s ethnic composition                                                                     4 
Abstract                                                                                                                         5 
Introduction                                                                                                                 7 
Literary Review                                                                                                            15 
Methodology                                                                                                                 21 
Chapter One  
Kosova in Yugoslavia: Historical Overview                                                                  24 
Chapter Two 
Yugoslavia seen from Kosova                                                                                       65 
Chapter Three  
Debates and Reactions in and about Kosova                                                                 107 
Chapter Four 
The Approval of the 1974 Constitution and its Aftermath                                            140 
Conclusion                                                                                                                    160 
Interviews and Newspapers Consulted                                                                          168 
Archival Material                                                                                                           169 
Bibliography                                                                                                                  171 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
www.kosova.org/al/qytetet/citymap/index.asp 
 
4 
 
 
 
www.commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yugoslavia_ethnic_map.jpg 
5 
 
ABSTRACT 
The 1968-74 period is a very important time in the history of the former Yugoslavia. In 
addition to ground-breaking political, social, economic and cultural changes, legal, ethnic 
and constitutional changes were at the forefront of developments in the federation. This 
thesis examines the currents of political debate among intellectuals, workers, party 
activists and politicians in Kosova, an autonomous province of Yugoslavia, prior and 
during this period. It is important to consider such debates, which in many instances 
penetrated deep into the ideology and political thought of the system and the party, 
sometimes even questioning the existing system.  
Only by considering such developments can one understand why Yugoslavia was 
perceived as the most liberal society amongst the countries of the communist block, and 
why such intense debate was allowed in Kosova, a small and not especially important 
unit of the federation.  
This thesis emphasises the role of these debates in the internal and external political 
perception of Kosova and the Albanian population regarding their constitutional place in 
the body politic of Yugoslavia; it also explores the impact of these debates on the 
constitutional change that marked this period. 
Using interviews, original archive material of new states that emerged from Yugoslavia, 
documents and other primary sources, this thesis suggests that Yugoslav communism, 
despite its internal problems, fostered a relatively free society. Based on the authoritarian 
regime of Tito, its sole and powerful leader, Yugoslav communism underwent changes in 
response to an ideological rift with the Soviet Union and a loose association with the 
Western world, which viewed Yugoslavia as a potential ally against the challenge from 
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the formidable Eastern Block.  
The thesis also suggests that political changes from the 1968-74 period, although not 
satisfying everyone and especially ethnic-based political demands, worked as a 
temporary measure that unlocked further political potential. However, it is argued that 
such changes could have not worked in the long term in view of the substantial number of 
problems that the communist state never truly resolved.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 The aim of this thesis is to venture into the troubled not-so-distant past of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, using it as a case study. The central focus of 
the dissertation is the status of Kosova, a province of Yugoslavia that underwent many 
political, structural and constitutional changes since annexation by the Kingdom of Serbia 
following the Ottoman armies’ retreat during the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913.  
The main period of interest for this project is from 1967 until 1974, when Yugoslavia 
experienced radical change to the internal structure of the federation. This was a time of 
great political change, first with the now-famous 1966 Plenum of the Communist Party at 
Brioni Island, followed by the removal of the hardliner and federal security chief 
Aleksandar Ranković, and then a change of constitution for federal and individual units 
in 1968. Such a development was a prelude to the 1974 constitution that introduced 
changes in the form of decentralisation and equalisation for various ethnic groups.  
However, the test for such important changes is not merely their entry into the statute 
book, but the degree to which they were implemented. The specific case of Kosova is a 
permanent reminder that the province did not enjoy all the promised freedoms, not only 
because Kosova represented a specific case of history antagonism, but also because in the 
pan-Slavic nationalism into which that the province was thrown (Yugoslavia was 
dominated by Slavic nations), Albanians simply did not fit as a community. They were 
not part of the projected Yugoslav society. 
The reason to debate such an issue and period is that Yugoslavia acted as an experimental 
field where many ethnic groups of Slavic and non-Slavic origins were amalgamated to 
create a federalised structure. It was supposed to be a positive example for the world 
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stage of how a dictatorship of the proletariat could create a harmonious coexistence of 
many ethnic groups. Such a conceptual idea, which chose federalism as a structure, had at 
its centre ethnic dissemblance and alienation of smaller ethnic groups or those groups that 
were not involved in the central core of the structure, i.e. Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
Although much had changed for the better under the communist stewardship with the 
rebranding of Yugoslavia after the end of the Second World War, ethnic groups that were 
not of the original core were still subjected to harsher and often unfair treatment in the 
federation. Amongst those groups were the Albanians, an ethnic autochthonous grouping, 
which despite their contribution to the war effort against the Nazi and Fascist occupations 
were treated as subjects of a different stratum.  Significantly, this thesis proposes to 
analyse and explain why smaller ethnic groups were maltreated, and why there was no 
real and suitably powerful objection by the federal and republican political leadership 
about such behaviour. Was the reason behind the verbal and rhetorical persistence of the 
Serb political leadership that Kosova was to be treated as an extended part of Serbia, and 
thus Albanians as subdued subjects, or was the newly formed communist society unable 
to find a model appropriate for Kosova and the Albanians? Finally, were Albanians 
obliged to accept what they were given, or was it necessary for them to demand political 
changes so their status could be equalised with that of the other nations of the union?  
Part of the proposed concept is also the argument that Yugoslavia ended up being a state 
that could survive only through temporary political changes, and thus its existence was 
permanently in doubt, for it is extremely difficult to create a state that in the long term 
satisfies everything and everyone. 
Consideration of such developments lead to the central argument of this thesis: debates in 
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and around Kosova about the political status of the province in the body politic of Serbia 
and Yugoslavia were concentrated on federalism as a political structure of  society and 
decentralisation as a means to achieve and realise political aims of holding power at 
individual unit level. Analysing the current state of affairs within the territory that federal 
Yugoslavia occupied, it becomes apparent that ethnicities, federalism, and devolution 
may have been the factors that shaped the development of Yugoslavia, shaking the 
foundations throughout its existence, and for some observers contributing to its ultimate 
demise. For such factors not only proved critical to the wellbeing of the state and people, 
but they were also to determine the internal political configuration and constitutional 
framework that existed in Yugoslavia for several decades  
Such an issue can be placed in a broader political field, especially where communist 
societies and states such as the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and others were concerned, 
for they too had internal structural problems of an ethnic nature. Nonetheless, the 
problems of Yugoslavia, in general, and Kosova or the Albanian population in 
Yugoslavia in particular, are peculiar for a number of reasons.  
The hypothesis for this thesis proposes that the debate caused in and around Kosova was 
not only necessary but also unavoidable. The political developments from the end of the 
Second World War, at least, had dictated a period of necessary argumentation, of various 
political, social, ethnic and economic groups that forwarded ideas in the political arena 
which was subject to frequent change. In other words, the debate about political and 
constitutional developments in Kosova occurred, because the circumstances in the 
international and national scene (i.e. Yugoslav) made it necessary. Considering the 
situation of different ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, a debate on where one particular group 
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stood was critical, because it was tied to two important factors that shaped the federation: 
political and constitutional ties, and decentralisation and federalism. These relate to 
Kosova as a subject of political, historical, social, cultural, geostrategic and economic 
importance as part of Serbia’s body politic; and to Kosova as part of the federal structure 
through which decentralisation was sought. Hence, the debate, which tended to overlap at 
provincial, republican, and federal levels, represented more than a period of liberalisation 
in political expression. In many communist dictatorships of the time, such a debate would 
have been unthinkable, but in this case it represented an amalgam of constitutional and 
political actions, coupled with economic and welfare demands that argued the national 
position of Albanians in Yugoslavia. Of course, this was performed with great caution to 
avoid alarming the political authorities.  
This argument had two sides: the first argued that Kosova and Albanians in Yugoslavia 
were happy to live in this state as long as political concessions for further decentralisation 
through extension of federalism could be made; and the second argued for a complete 
secession of Albanian territories from Yugoslavia and for their political union with the 
mother country, Albania.  
As far as the hypothesis of this thesis is concerned, political debates in any given country 
are important for the future shaping of its structure. However, when political debates 
occur in a communist and totalitarian society, composed of many different ethnicities, 
and especially when one of the ethnicities is directly involved, they become a compelling 
case study. They represent an interesting field of research because of the difficult 
frictions and specifics of that particular ethnic group, as well as  the interaction with the 
other ethnic groups that comprise the union.  
11 
 
The primary beneficiaries of this project, therefore, are not only those people interested in 
the internal structure of Yugoslavia, internal debates and the issues of ethnicities, but also 
any lay person seeking information about the political regulation and extensions of 
freedom, democracy, decentralisation and federalism in former Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslavia as a case study has been of particular interest amongst academics, media, and 
intellectual and diplomatic circles, since it started to disintegrate with the bloody wars of 
the 1990s. Many of the most contested issues have already been discussed, though little is 
known about the internal political debates, especially in and around Kosova during the 
period from 1967 until 1974. This period generally had other issues of concern, mainly 
the Brioni plenum of the Communist Party and its ripple effects in the internal politics of 
Yugoslavia. Therefore, debates about constitutional change in Kosova are of  particular 
importance, for they show firstly that there was an opportunity for citizens and people to 
add their voice to the political events, and secondly that many people in Kosova and 
Yugoslavia were pleased to live where they were. Many people truly experienced 
Yugoslavia as a country of their own, and many argued for change but always inside the 
existing political framework.  
Another factor in this dissertation is that the period before 1967 is generally known for 
state consolidation following the Second World War. It was also characterised by great 
economic and political difficulties and the rebellion of Milovan ðilas, a highly respected 
party and state official who criticised the system for materialism and favouritism. In such 
a climate, the political debate in and around Kosova, although never far from the agenda 
since it played a very important part in ethnic debates, became demoted to a less 
important issue, because a rebellion by the Speaker of the Parliament against the system 
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he was serving sounded more attractive. Accordingly, this is where the internal political 
debate truly started, and it is here that Yugoslavia – for the first time since its creation 
based on KAÇKJ1 principles – was shaken to its foundations by internal issues that the 
system did not resolve. The debate about the ethnic groups and their needs and wants in 
the new Yugoslavia commenced in this period.  
It developed further with open street protests in Kosova in late-1968, the political and 
constitutional clash in the Croatian spring of 1971, and a constitutional overhaul in 1974 
that initiated the most important changes in peacetime Yugoslavia. 
In addition to the many secondary sources used in this dissertation, primary sources are 
of considerable importance, and for many of them this represents the first time they have 
emerged from the archives. The significance of using such documents is that they were 
written in Albanian, Serbo-Croat Latin, and Serbian Cyrillic script, and through this work 
they are offered to the wider English language readership for the first time. 
Supplementing the archival documents, the author contacted a range of individuals on a 
one-to-one basis, involving e-mail and telephone interviews, so that their first-hand 
experiences could be properly recorded and presented.  
The secondary sources will be analysed and structured to allow the main argument of the 
thesis to be properly articulated. The dissertation achieves this objective by using Kosova 
and the Albanian populations in Yugoslavia as a case study, considering their situation in 
this particular period of history by using comparative elements, such as the position of 
                                                 
1
 KAÇKJ.  Këshilli Antifashisht Çlirimtarë Kombëtarë i Jugosllavisë. (The National Anti-fascist Council 
for Liberation of Yugoslavia)  
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other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, large and small, and the position of ethnic minorities 
in other Communist states, especially in those countries neighbouring Yugoslavia. The 
research will attempt to describe accurately the interaction between the instrument 
(nationalism, federalism and decentralization) and the entities being observed. 
Accordingly, the empirical research will base its findings on direct and/or indirect 
observations offered by the collected data. 
The main constraints in undertaking such a project include, (as far as available literature 
is concerned), the biased writing that often portrays one side or the other in a dubious 
manner. To a reader from the region with knowledge of the realities, these texts are 
transparent in their aim to mislead with distorted facts and propaganda observations.  
Also of  relevance is the fact that at the present time Yugoslavia no longer exists as a 
political entity, and it is difficult to find information in archives of the now-independent 
states that used to comprise Yugoslavia. This relates not only to bureaucratic constraints, 
but also to the negative association of Yugoslavia as an oppressor.  
Finally, with regard to limitations on this dissertation, people such as former high-party 
and state officials, who had a negative attitude and exhibited oppressive behaviour 
towards the people they were suppose to serve, are nowadays not particularly willing to 
share their past memories, precisely because they fear that their opinions could be 
misused by those who suffered whilst they were in power.  
In summary, the main objectives of this dissertation are to discuss the internal political, 
constitutional, social, and economic debates in and around Kosova for the period between 
1967-1974, to explore the various ideas, beliefs and constraints that existed within this 
period, and to analyze different political and behavioural attitudes of important political 
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players and the ways that their opinions were manifested in practice. An additional 
question is to consider whether Yugoslavia could have survived in the political 
framework that was established, or, considering all the problems, whether its long-term 
existence was impossible.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The problem of Yugoslavia has received considerable academic attention, especially 
since the dismemberment and the bloody wars that followed in that region. Historians, 
analysts and other academics have sought to provide an explanation for the break-up of 
the federation that seemed the most open, liberal and libertarian amongst the communist 
countries of Europe. A general pattern of observations focuses on ethnic nationalism as 
the central factor that brought down Yugoslavia; other works  acknowledge the fact that 
communism in Yugoslavia went through several stages of development that saw it 
change its base and interpretation but retain the expected nucleus of ‘socialist principle’ 
and ‘peoples democracies’. The objective of this literature review is to discuss these 
points as fundamental factors in creating the correlated subject matter. The idea of ethnic 
nationalism and the relationship between communism and nationalism prevails in many 
books about the former Yugoslavia. As an emotional factor, nationalism is identified as 
the main pillar of study, with varied points on whether communist ideology can 
supersede national identification, and whether communism produces or overcomes 
nationalistic attitudes.  Alongside such an idea, there is also the belief that communism in 
Yugoslavia changed often, with some spells of liberal freedom. This is the view in 
Kosovo: A Short History by Noel Malcolm, The Albanians: A Modern History by 
Miranda Vickers, The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History and Politics by 
Ivo Banac, Identiteti kombëtarë Shqipetarë dhe çështje të tjera (Albanian National 
Identity and other matters) by Kristo Frashëri, The Contested Country. Yugoslav Unity 
and Communist Revolution 1919-1953 by Aleksa Djilas, Ko je tražio Republiku Kosovo. 
1945 – 1985 by Miloš Mišović etc.  
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All these works identify nationalism as the main factor of destruction in Yugoslavia, but 
dwell principally on different ethnic groups and their tendencies. They attempt to provide 
a definition of nationalism in Yugoslavia, incited or hampered by the different factors 
that prevailed in society, such as the communist idea of proletarianism, the new ‘socialist 
man’ and internationalism. Most of them explore different stages of nationalistic 
development and the creation of national consciences amongst the nations of Yugoslavia. 
In particular, Djilas and Banac’s books concentrate extensively on the creation of 
Yugoslavia as a kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the way that the people 
perceived such a development, and the political frictions that immediately followed. They 
contend with the argument that a national affiliation existed prior to creating the 
communist federation, and that this affiliation never really faded during Yugoslavia’s 
existence. Malcolm’s and Vickers‘s books concentrate more on the Albanian national 
awakening and development, but they are intertwined with the fact that part of the 
Albanian nation lived in Yugoslavia. Both of these authors view the federalism debate as 
crucial in the political and national development in Kosova, and they present the case for 
an all-Albanian entity in the federation as the building block for, and means of preserving 
and encouraging, Albanian national identity.  In comparison, Frashëri’s narrative is that 
nationalism amongst Albanians was never aggressive or oppressive, but defensive and 
oriented to strengthen the sense of belonging to one national group, whereas Mišović 
emphasises the fact that Albanians as a collectivity had a state in Albania, thus their 
demand for a republican status in Yugoslavia was ‘intolerable‘.  He identifies the 
Albanian, Serb and Croatian nationalisms as possible dangers to the existence of 
Yugoslavia on the basis that they all have individual agendas.  
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These books also identify the fact that a kind of liberalism existed in Yugoslavia, 
especially in the freedom of expression and movement. Such freedoms were further 
extended with constitutional changes in 1968 and 1974 that made Yugoslavia a near-
confederation in political terms. On this issue, most books comply with the main 
argument of this thesis: that individual freedom in Yugoslavia was relatively higher that 
in other communist states (Bataković in Yugoslavie: Nations, Religions, Iidéologies 
1904-1980, L’Age d’Homme, Bilandžić in Historija SFRJ, (The History of SFRY), and 
Neal in Titoism in Action). The reforms in Yugoslavia say precisely that communism in 
Yugoslavia, after winning the struggle with centralist and old conservative powers, 
increased the liberties of the major nations and allowed some liberties for nationalities 
and smaller ethnic groups. Kosova is also mentioned as a federal entity, although briefly, 
by these authors, with some examples in political and other developments in the 
province, while the context of federalism is viewed as the way the internationalist agenda 
of the Communist Party could be maintained.  
 
However, not all the consulted books have the same opinion or support such a position. 
For example, Wes in Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Vukas in Etničke manjine 
i meñunarodni odnosi (Ethnic Minorities and International Relations), Shehu and Shehu 
in Pastrimet etnike të trojeve shqiptare 1953-1957 (Ethnic Cleansing of Albanian 
Regions, 1953-1957), and Stambolić in Rasprave o SR Srbiji (Debates about SR of 
Serbia) have a different view, leaning towards a manifestation of internationalism and 
proletarianism in their works. For example, West argues about the need for political 
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changes to happen because the time was right, Stambolić and Vukas argue that the 
Communist League of Yugoslavia had ‘a big heart’ that allowed such developments to 
take place, while Shehu and Shehu argue that liberalism in Yugoslavia was false, 
especially where smaller nations were concerned, for they were simply treated as second-
class citizens. These authors cited the example of forced Albanian deportation from 
Yugoslavia after the Second Word War, for the purpose of colonising Kosova, as their 
most convincing historical argument.  
 
Aside from these texts for and against nationalism and liberalism in the former 
Yugoslavia, there are other divergent viewpoints on the same topic. Some authors (from 
the thesis bibliography) argue that nationalism was inevitable in Yugoslavia, for the 
supranational identity never truly took hold for the majority of the people. Others argue 
that, being a federal structure, Yugoslavia allowed nationalism to exist, since all the 
federal entities retained their national awareness and consciences all the time, and they 
had no real need to identify with supranational identities. Other authors argue that 
personal liberties were relaxed because historically the time for change had arrived, or 
alternatively that, since the schism with the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia had no 
alternative other than to relax the system, because the only other option would have been 
to return to Stalinism. Šuvar, in Sociološki Presjek Jugoslavenskog Društva (Sociological 
Understanding of Yugoslav Society), Tanner in Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, and 
Schrenk, Ardalan and Tatawy in Yugoslav Self-Management, Socialism Challenges and 
Development, tend to lean towards the alternative viewpoints presented above. Šuvar 
attributes development of more liberal attitudes to the positive changes that the state and 
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party officials of Yugoslavia adopted in their own country, while Tanner argues that 
freedoms existed in different proportions in Yugoslavia. The primary nations tended to be 
better off in political and economic development, but this was a consequence of the 
increasing self-management doctrine adopted in the country. With regard to Kosova’s 
experience in federalism, the above-mentioned authors present the case that federalism in 
Kosova was always shifting, was never equal in status and grandeur, and suffered from a 
lack of effectiveness, hampered by republican and federal institutions. Such a position 
leads to debates of whether federalism is the same in liberal democracies as in people’s 
democracies, and it presents various challenges related to the constraints and affinities of 
a regime that controlled multiethnic complexity such as in Yugoslavia.  
The economic debate is supported by different authors, amongst whom Schrenk, Ardalan 
and  Tatawy present the relationship between economic development and economic 
conditions as a consequence of internal, social, political and ethnic regulation in 
Yugoslavia; while  Ćosić, in Piščevi Zapisi (Literary Chronicles) 1951- 1968 and 1969-
1980, and Bulatović, in Kosovo, Ne Dam Te Zaboravu (Kosovo, we will not forget you) 
argue that economic development only increased the nationalistic upsurge in Kosova, 
Croatia and Slovenia, and as such it played a significant role in nationalism.  
 
The overall impact of these books in studies of former Yugoslavia is considerable. They 
represent a positive factor in understanding interethnic relations in the federal, social, 
political, cultural and economic constructs, as well as the national and geostrategic 
positioning of the participants.  
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In discussing Kosova, every researcher must consider Malcolm’s, Vicker’s and Frashëri’s 
books for the positive benefits they bring. The first two authors write from a historian’s 
perspective, and accordingly their works are not congested with political and ethnic 
tendencies. They have both consulted historical documents, and archival authenticities, 
and their main objectives are to present the Albanian question released from one-sided 
communist perspectives and nationalist dogma. In the third case, the author, as a 
distinguished member of the Albanian Academy of Sciences, fulfils his duty – to 
document history as it really happened.  In his work, he proposes some interesting 
variables that were not easy to conduct in academic terms. When they were published, 
each of these books stimulated polemics mainly focused on their boldness and truism. 
Their debates about the national identity of Albanians (and other neighbour nations), 
communist architecture adopted both in Yugoslavia and Albania, and acknowledging that 
positive developments occurred in these countries, including the freedom and liberties of 
post-1968 Yugoslavia, make a valuable contribution to the thesis.     
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METHODOLOGY 
Preparation of this thesis involved extensive research, reading, document-collecting and 
interviews. It is important to note that it was difficult to find information in the national 
archives, since in the region of the former Yugoslavia there is still a tendency to view 
Yugoslavia as the source of all problems (understandable, amongst people who have 
experienced war) and that it is unnecessary to study this era, because the central focus 
throughout the region in political and academic debates remains on Euro-Atlantic 
integration. In addition, archival documents have changed hands, and instead of dealing 
with one national archive office, researchers must visit or contact all the archives of the 
seven states that emerged from the former Yugoslavia, in order to complete the mosaic. 
The national archive of Serbia (www.arhiv.sv.gov.yu) and the archive of Kosova hold 
most of the documents; hence they are of particular importance.  Another source of 
consultation was the archive of radio ‘Free Europe’. This international institution 
followed the political history and developments in Yugoslavia very closely and has an 
extensive array of documents on this subject. Newspaper articles and interviews 
published in Prishtina, Tirana and Belgrade were also of primary importance, as well as 
one-to-one interviews by the author.  
A combination of scientific and historical research methods was utilised.  Scientific-
method hypothesis is used to make predictions that can be tested by observing the 
outcome, and it is applied here since the outcome is consistent with the hypothesis, i.e. 
supports the hypothesis. The historical method is used as it comprises techniques and 
guidelines by which historians use historical sources and other evidence to research and 
write history. This thesis deals with substantial historical evidence, and so it applies 
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concepts that are usually part of formal historical research such as identification of 
original date, evidence of localization, recognition of authorship and analysis of data. 
Within this format, exploratory research was conducted in order to structure and identify 
new problems.  
It is recognized that alternative hypotheses may also be consistent with the observations 
and therefore the thesis is supported by rounds of scientific testing. The aim is that the 
hypothesis will allow prediction and, within accurate observation of the time, the 
prediction will be verified. 
For various reasons, certain variables were avoided during this research. For instance, 
extending the research to encompass historical and political developments in other 
federal units of Yugoslavia (Kosova and Serbia excluded) would have made the thesis 
congested, and therefore cases of historical importance from other federal units are used 
sparingly to prove a valuable point. The same point refers to historical developments in 
communist Albania. Since the Tirana regime was of a different dogmatic interpretation, 
comparisons of Albanian populace in former Yugoslavia and in Albania are made only 
when discussing national or general political developments.  
Finally, by using the ethnic Albanian populace in Yugoslavia in general, and the 
Albanian populace in Kosova in particular, as a case study oriented in the period of 
political, economic, social and constitutional developments of 1967-1974, the author 
aims to produce new insights into this little-studied period to the general reader (as 
historical accounts about Yugoslavia mostly concern the period immediately prior to the 
federation’s destruction and the reasons that led to such a development). Historical 
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developments that occurred with the dawn of the new millennium have made such a 
study possible, as the mentality imbued with nationalism and communism in the Balkans 
started to change.  Nevertheless, it presented a considerable challenge.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
KOSOVA IN YUGOSLAVIA: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
                                                                                             
The territory at the centre of this study is that of south-eastern Europe, not far from the 
Adriatic, Ionian and the Black seas, which is characterised by high mountains, low-level 
fertile plains, numerous rivers and lakes, and many different nations. The mainly 
Albanian-dominated region of Kosova2 is the central focus. Kosova’s borders today 
cover a region of nearly eleven thousand square kilometres with around two million 
people. Throughout history, this territory was marred by violent wars. Various powerful 
empires went through and occupied it, thus changing and determining much of its 
character and make-up. Due to its striking geographical position, as a crossroads of the 
major routes that linked southern and central Europe, Asia and beyond, Kosova has had 
and continues to have considerable regional importance (Krasniqi. M. 1963, p3-4).  
Nevertheless, prior to a historic overview, since “modern societies are best understood as 
particular mixtures of past and present” (Weber M. 2005, p21), it is imperative to connect 
to the aim of this project. The debates in Yugoslavia and in Kosova about internal 
political and constitutional arrangements explanations and evaluations about theories of 
nationalism which is prescribed as one of the driving factors of all major conflicts that 
stem from the region.   
                                                 
2
 The name Kosova is used in Albanian language, while the term Kosovo was adopted after constitutional 
changes in 1968 as a middle ground that would not upset the Serbs who disliked the removal of Metohija 
from the official use and thus has negative linguistic connotations in Albanian. 
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Nationalism was always part of the political vocabulary, even during the communist 
times. Then, it was used as a political and ideological construct with special emphasis on 
the dangers that it could bring to the federation’s existence.  
Theoretically, nationalism is a form of universalism when it makes universal claims 
about how the world should be organized, but it is particularistic with regard to individual 
nations. The combination of both is characteristic for the ideology, for instance in 
assertions such as in a nation-state the language of the nation should be the official 
language, and all citizens should speak it.  
The main factor attributed to the existence of nationalism is the existence of nations, 
which are seen as entities or groups with a long history that can be identified as a point of 
association for the entire group. Indeed, most nationalists do not believe a nation can be 
created artificially by geographic or political separations, but are a product of a long and 
proud ancestry. However, some theories of nationalism imply the reverse order – that the 
nationalist movements created the sense of national identity and then a political unit 
corresponding to it, or that an existing state promoted a 'national' identity for itself. 
Nationalists see nations as an inclusive categorization of human beings - assigning every 
individual to one specific nation by using the concept of the political individual. 
Nationalism sees most human activity as national in character, action and behaviour. 
Nations have national symbols, a national culture, a national music and national 
literature, national folklore, a national mythology and - in some cases - a national 
religion, though the latter concept is much debated, as post-modernism and globalization 
has made the movement of people much easier, so that today no state in the world can 
claim that all its citizens have only one religion. Membership in a nation is usually 
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involuntary and determined by birth. 
Nationalism has a strong territorial component, with an inclusive categorization of 
territory corresponding to the categorization of individuals. For each nation, there is a 
territory that is uniquely associated with it, the national homeland, undivided and 
exclusive. From this geopolitical claim, nationalism seeks to order the world as a series of 
nation-states, each based on the national homeland of its respective nation, under the 
dogma ‘the borders of the state should be the borders of the nation’.  
In the nationalist view, only a certain group identified by the pillars of nationalism is able 
to create a joint sense of solidarity among those who are members of that particular 
ethnic group, excluding and at times directed against those who are not (Smith. 
A.D.1991, p21).  The struggles of early nationalist movements were often directed 
against non-national states, specifically multi-ethnic empires such as Austria-Hungary in 
the case of Croats and Slovenes of the former Yugoslavia, and the Ottoman Empire in the 
case of Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Serbs.  
Thus, nationalism as a term refers to a doctrine or political movement which holds that a 
nation usually defined in terms of ethnicity or culture has the right to constitute an 
independent political community based on a shared history and common destiny.  
Therefore, nations are groups united by real and imagined markers such as history, 
language and tradition, as argued by Benedict Anderson:  
Nations are basically a cause of the decline of other imagined communities such as local, 
regional, or religious, brought by the process of industrialisation which enforces the idea 
for a broader and more susceptible formation (Anderson B. 1991, p37-39).  
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Ernest Gellner’s work links nationalism to the homogenizing imperatives of industrial 
society and the reactions of minority cultures to those imperatives. He argues that 
industrialization needed fixed communities where the forces of the market could be 
organized in a defined and compact way (Gellner. E. 1983, p 41-5). 
Anthony D. Smith, following the Hegelian dialectic of thesis, proposed a synthesis of 
primordialist and modernist views, known as an ethno-symbolism. According to Smith, 
the preconditions for the formation of a nation are: a fixed homeland (current or 
historical), high autonomy within the territory, hostile surroundings that will only enforce 
the sense of community, sacred centres, memories of glorified battles, common languages 
and scripts, special customs easily drawn out or identifiable in comparison to others, as 
well as historical records and thinking. Those preconditions may create a powerful, 
common mythology. Therefore, the mythic homeland is in reality more important for the 
national identity than the actual territory occupied by the nation (Smith A. 1986. p17-39).  
In the 1987 edition of the Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought, nationalism is 
described as: Nation as the basis for governing people. People of the nation are members 
of historically and culturally distinct groups. The frontiers of states and of nations should 
coincide with one another to achieve uniformity (Miller. D. et al. 1987 eds). Therefore, 
“national identity is not a substance, but a cluster of tendencies neither fixed nor alterable 
at will and periodically redefined” (Bhikhu. P.1995. p255-68). In other words, national 
belonging has a lot to do with a host of beliefs and values that any given community 
holds close and dear, which may be altered according to the intervention of the time.  
The state derives political legitimacy from its status as homeland of the ethnic group and 
from its function to protect the national group and facilitate its cultural and social life. 
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Very often, such attributes to the rights of the state, and the right of the nation in that 
state, become misinterpreted, which consequently triggers hardship and terror for 
communities that do not fit the concept of the nation and happen to be geographically, 
historically, confessionaly, or ethnically different, and thus on the receiving end of 
troubles. And it is precisely because of nationalism that in the twentieth century the death 
toll caused by murderous actions of regimes, resulting not only from bombing technology 
but also through deliberate targeting of entire peoples as enemies, reached more than 
twenty million people (Markusen. E. and Kopf. D. 1995. p27-34).  
Unfortunately, such a situation is also the case in this study.  Following the end of the 
Second World War, Kosova had become the news-producing region for violation of 
human rights and street riots in relatively peaceful and calm Yugoslavia. The historian 
Theodore Hsi-en Chen3 has argued that in the fight to stave off nationalistic tendencies, 
which in their states were present in various shapes and forms, the authorities launched a 
campaign to create homogenous Communist Yugoslavism, the so-called ’new socialist 
man’. This dogmatised creation was used for party policies and actions.  
With the apparent knowledge of Tito, Aleksandar Ranković , soon after he had become 
the federal minister of the interior, managed to impose a brutal regime during the years 
between 1948 and 1966, which is generally referred to by all the countries of former 
Yugoslavia as ‘the Ranković era’. The importance of studying such a period is based on 
several pragmatic, historical, geostrategic and academic factors: first of all, to examine, 
                                                 
3
 ‘The New Socialist Man’. Theodore Hsi-en Chen. Comparative Education Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Feb., 
1969), pp. 88-95. The University of Chicago Press 
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evaluate and comprehend the complex political structure that was put in place by the 
communists following the end of the Second World War; secondly to explain and 
evaluate the position of various nations that were to compose federal Yugoslavia; and 
thirdly, to see whether the much-proclaimed equality of the people existed in reality. Did 
the system accommodate all the political, cultural, economic, linguistic and national 
demands that were made?  If so, to what extent were such demands met, or if not, why 
did they not happen? Were they impossible to achieve, or did the cynicism of 
internationalist propaganda undermine them? 
From spring 1997 until spring 1999, this region experienced a bloody violent war 
between the ethnic Albanian population and Serb and Montenegrin military and security 
forces who were determined to keep the territory in their possession even through use of 
force. Subsequently referred to as the last major war of the twentieth century, the war in 
Kosova does not have a clear date of commencement per se, but the root cause of the 
conflict can be traced to the emergence of Kosova as a separate entity from the other 
Albanian regions and its inclusion in Yugoslavia. If history is able to understand the 
world (Goldstein S.J. 2003, p36), the root of the problem is often called historical.  
Historically, Kosova was the epicentre of the Dardania kingdom during the Illyrian era. 
The border changed considerably during the twentieth century, but the Kosova of today 
was always a component part of Kosova, thus the direct historic connection. During the 
seventh and fifth centuries AD, the region faced a wave of migration from Slavic tribes 
coming from the north of Europe (Wilkies J. 1995 p 17-34). Then it fell under the Roman 
Empire and became part of the Eastern Empire after the split of 395, producing the 
greatest reformer of the judiciary system in the ancient world, the Emperor Justinian. 
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Soon after, the region succumbed to the Ottoman forces during their drive to conquer 
Europe. This period is one of the most significant for not-so-distant history, for as the 
Romans did when they conquered the Mediterranean, forcing Christianity onto the 
mainly benevolent pagan people, the Seljuk empire also forced conversion to Islam either 
through sword or through heavy taxes. The region remained part of the Sublime Port for 
over five centuries. Kosova as well as the entire Balkan Peninsula managed to escape 
Turkish domination following a strengthening of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian 
Empires and a keener interest in the region by Great Britain and France, as other global 
superpowers in the resolution of the Eastern Question. The Albanians made a first 
attempt for Albanian autonomy in 1878, when representatives from the town of Prizren 
sent a memorandum to the great powers, but their demands were ignored (Glenny M 
2001, p 174-195). It is exactly this point in Albanian history that inspired complete 
independence for the country, as well as freedom from occupiers in political activity in 
Kosova even during the communist era and beyond. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire was in crisis, caused by 
the archaic prevailing order. Hence, all the nations under its yoke initiated organised 
uprisings for independence. By 1912-1913, when the first and second Balkan wars 
started, the Ottoman Empire had been reduced to merely a strip of land in continental 
Europe surrounding the city of Istanbul. By then, the revolt-stricken Kosova was 
conquered along with Macedonia by Serbia (Mazower M 2000, p 37-99).  
After the 1914 events in Sarajevo, where Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated, 
the ever-growing tensions between the Dual Empire with its ally Germany on one side, 
and Serbia and its ally Russia on the other, erupted on a catastrophic scale that became 
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the Great War. This war ended the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the 
Russian Empire, where the Bolsheviks become the domineering force in the country after 
the civil war. Bearing in mind the outcome of the war, and the victorious position in 
which Serbia emerged, combined with its territorial expansion into Kosova and 
Macedonia, the Slovene and Croat intelligentsia were openly in support of a federation of 
Croatia with Serbia and Slovenia (John Lampe. 2006. p31). Such a union was achieved 
on 1 December 1918, when the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was declared in a 
territory that not so long ago had been part of two different superpowers, with its main 
aim to consider and care for the needs of its three prime nations as the name suggested. 
The kingdom merged all three Croat regions, a long-time dream of Croat patriots, and it  
abolished the small principality of Montenegro by merging its territory into the new 
regional framework. Politically, this framework created a classic example of a two-tier 
system whereby the principal actors of the state were the three nations named in the title 
of the state, while various other nations were suppressed. Albanians in the new kingdom 
of twelve million inhabitants numbered a population of over five hundred thousand 
people (Islami H. 1996, p, 51-3), and, as had happened some five centuries before, they 
were once more becoming part of another kingdom against their will. From 1929, the 
state changed its name to Yugoslavia, but regarded the rump Albania - recognised as an 
independent state during 1913 - as an unnecessary entity that deprived it of territory in 
the much-coveted southern Adriatic (Vickers. M. 1995. p93). 
After various problems that Yugoslavia faced, including the assassination of the king in 
1934 and a four-year occupation by the Axis powers, the Federal Peoples Republic of 
Yugoslavia was declared on 29 November 1945. Its main principle was a constitutional 
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model similar to that of the Soviet Union (with a federation of many peoples at its core, 
and dictatorship of the proletariat as the leading political doctrine). This however posed a 
military and ideological challenge (Burwell G.F and Daalder I.H. 1999, p179), for it 
advocated an ideological process of uniting in a state many historical antagonisms. The 
federation was divided into six constitutional republics equal to each other, but with the 
Serbs in a superior position by the virtue of being the largest nation. Since Serbs 
represented viable communities in most of the federation’s entities, the long-time dream 
of ‘all Serbs in one state’ was achieved: even though they were not all in Serbia, they 
were in a federation that Serbia dominated. However, political representation at the 
federal level, albeit ideologically based, resulted in uneven support for south Slav unity, 
and a bad omen for political stability in the Balkans (Cohen. L. 1995. p12).  
The federation recognised Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro as 
separate equal members for the first time.  However, there was palpable dissatisfaction 
amongst many ethnic, political and social groups, because all these areas were claimed as 
part of a motherland of neighbouring regions.4  The constitution also made provisions for 
Vojvodina to become a province of Serbia, while within the political framework of Serbia 
Kosova was given the status of a region, the lowest political organisation before a 
municipality, in complete contrast to the two historical promises made by the communists 
                                                 
4
 The highest level of dissatisfaction was amongst Serbs who claimed all three regions as part of their 
historic land.  On Bosnia, they argued that the Serb motherland extends beyond the Drina river, the natural 
border invoked by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. According to the same idea, Montenegro was also part of 
the Serbian nationhood, while Macedonia represented the southern part of Serbia, with the archbishopric of 
Ohrid as part of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Croats argued for extension of Croatia deeper into 
Herzegovina, while Albanians - after they had realized that a single united Albanian state was out of the 
question - were at least hoping for an Albanian united region in Yugoslavia, the so-called little Albania as 
Shaban Polluzha (a partisan commander) called it.   
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for self-determination. The first such promise was made at the fourth party congress in 
1928 in Dresden (Germany), and the second was made at the1940 Communist Party 
plenum in Zagreb (Borba’ 14 January 1969)5 – “The delegates agreed that Kosova should 
join Albania after the war had ended” (Vickers. M.1995. p153).  
 
Actually, the issue of the national question was a perpetual abrasion for the communist 
regime, as none of the nations was satisfied with its position. Grievances ranged from 
economic underdevelopment to territorial, ethnic and political annihilation.  Nevertheless, 
the issue of the national question was regulated (it was claimed) by the basic principles of 
Marxism and self-management:  
The national question for the people of Yugoslavia is one of secondary relevance. The 
primary factor for our perpetual struggle in the road towards developing true socialism is 
freedom of the proletariat as the driving force of international Marxism. The nations and 
nationalities are socio political factors that represent the basis of formation of 
Yugoslavia, who in any given territory possess and enjoy cultural, economic, political 
and social rights guaranteed by the laws of the country.  
 
 In this context, the rights of nationalities are such that they represent the affirmation of 
cultural, social and linguistic freedom as guaranteed by the laws of the SPRY, republics 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5
 Vreme velikih izazova. Mi smo znali o Zagrebsku rezuluciju. Xhevdet Pula član Narodne Skupštine 
Republike Srbija  nagoveštava reforme u saveznom ureñaju. (Time of great challenges. We knew about the 
Zagreb resolution. Xhevdet Pula, member of Serbian Peoples Assembly, advocates reforms in federal 
construct).  
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or the autonomous provinces where they live (Tito J.B. 1984, p 97-114 book I). In other 
words, the Marxist ideology is the basis of the political activity, where nations find 
themselves somewhat reduced in their importance by the internationalism that self-
management professes. Nationalities6 (i.e. ethnic minorities) are groups of citizens whose 
cultural and social problems are recognised not as a constructed ethnic group, but as a 
formal citizens union. The individuality of nations was to be preserved in the federation, 
but there was to be a high degree of communication and solidarity among the nations of 
Yugoslavia, combined with a primary loyalty to Yugoslavia and a sense of belonging to 
one community. Yugoslavism was to be something higher than the ‘old national 
consciences’, representing a changed form from the old national affiliations (Djilas. 
A.1991, p179-180). Regarding this issue, Fadil Hoxha, a partisan and the former 
communist leader of Kosova, argued that during the Peoples Liberation War partisan and 
communist leaders had justified the union of Kosova with Albania, since the majority of 
the population in the region was Albanian.7 This shows that even at the height of the war, 
debates about the future status of Kosova had begun in earnest.  
The 1946 constitution defined Kosova as “a socio-political and territorial entity, formed 
in respect of the will of the people of Kosova, who through their political representatives, 
chose to live in a union which ensures an equal treatment for the nations and 
nationalities”.  However, the borders of Kosova were drawn up with no regard for ethnic 
                                                 
6
 The concept of nationalities used in the constitutional framework of the federation treated every national 
group which already had a state i.e. Albanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Italians and Slovaks as a 
nationality. 
7
 Fadil Hoxha jep pershtypjet e tij. Klubi i Intelektualve të Gjakovës “URA” 16 Nëntor 1994. ( Personal 
impressions by Fadil Hoxha. A meeting at “URA” city of Gjakova club of intellectuals). 16 Nov 1994.   
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elements. To the Albanian majority, such actions would have looked tragic, considering 
that many nationalistic and partisan forces at that time were in favour of a union with 
Albania. A conference of communist and nationalistic forces was organised at the town 
of Bujan in the Albanian Alps on 1 and 2 January 1944, where the delegates (including 
Serb and Montenegrin) reiterated such a desire.8  The new Kosova border did not include 
all other regions dominated by a majority Albanian population, but instead they were 
divided between the surrounding federal units. The eastern part of Kosova, the region of 
Presheva valley9 with over 85% Albanian population, was adjoined to Serbia, as it was 
the strategic point through which the Salonika to Munich railway passes. The western 
part of Macedonia10, also with an overwhelming Albanian population amounting to 100% 
in many regions, was not included. This was the case with the ethnic Albanian alpine and 
Adriatic towns in the present-day state of Montenegro.11 However, the regions of Zubin 
Potok and Leposavić on the south face of  Mount Kopaonik, which were dominated by 
Serbs, were adjoined to Kosova with a sinister idea: to change the ethnic composition of 
Kosova. In fact, Serbs in these regions thought until 1974 that Kosova was unified to 
Serbia, because that was how it felt to them (Douccette S & Thaqi H. 2004 p 44). 
                                                 
8
 Serbia ka njohur të drejtën e Shqiptarëve për vetvendosje. Konferenca e Bujanit dhe ndikimi i sajë.(Serbia 
recognised the right of Albanians for self determination. The Bujan conference and her 
effects) http://ngarkovideo.com/media/document/137.doc.  
 
9
 http://www.presheva.com/histori. Roli i trevës së Preshevës, Bujanocit dhe Medvegjës në lëvizjen 
shqiptare. (The role of the Presheva, Bujanoc and Medvegja region in the Albanian national movement) 
 
10
 100% të popullates jan Shqipëtarë. Zonat Shqipëtare të Maqedonisë perendimore pas Luftës së dytë 
Botrore. (100% of the population is Albanians. Albanian regions of western Macedonia after the Second 
World War). Archive of research in Albanian geo-history. Tetova University. Macedonia. 
www.unite.edu.mk 
 
11
 Ulqini the people and history. http://www.ulqini.de/shqip.htm. 
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However, such grievances were not exclusive to Kosova. Serbia and Croatia also argued 
for their own ethnic borders, but Tito and his circle of friends would not consider such 
demands. Using the justification that internal borders of the member units were only 
administrative, and since the state was based on the logic of international proletarianism, 
ethnic borders were not acceptable. 
From a nationalist point of view, the three ’losers’ of the new ’socialist’ Yugoslavia were 
Serbia, Croatia and the Albanians. In addition to the three republics of Slovenia, Croatia 
and Serbia of the former monarchist Yugoslavia, Titoism conglomerated Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, which belonged to Serbia. The two provinces 
of Kosovo (Albanian) and Vojvodina (with a strong Hungarian minority) acquired 
autonomy. Croatia lost Bosnia-Herzegovina, which it had annexed since 1941, as well as 
a part of the southern Adriatic littoral that was adjoined to Montenegro. The Albanians 
did not achieve their dream of creating a national state for all Albanians.   
 
The constitution offered a revolutionary commitment for complete nationalisation of the 
economy, and it used the concept of redistributive justice derived from a philosophical 
principle, which aims to allocate resources to members of the community and adjudicate 
conflicting claims (Knowels D. 2001, p51). Direct extension of state regulations left 
Kosova in constitutional terms as a region with few competences in executive and 
legislative power. Such attributes were exclusive to the Serbian parliament, the institution 
that by decree had created the region of Kosova and Metohija, and to the federal 
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parliament to whom the regional institutions were bound, for at this point in time 
Yugoslavia was very centralised. Kosova’s incorporation into the new federal Yugoslavia 
was accompanied by a siege of violence and organised military intervention. The 
conditions on the ground were more or less the same when Kosovo was forced into the 
Serbian kingdom in 1912, into the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, and, 
more recently, into the federal union of Serbia and Montenegro in 1992. 
From a relatively weak formation composed of volunteers and a few regular army 
officers, the fortunes of the Yugoslav Communists during the Second World War 
changed when in 1943 the British Premier, Winston Churchill, proposed that the allied 
forces should supply arms to local patriots fighting the Nazis (Pelling. H. 1974. p506).  
This occurred after the belligerent forces had decided that supporting the royal 
government troops inside Yugoslavia, which were notorious for their treatment of 
enemies and civilians (Crnobrnja. M. 1994. p66) was no longer viable. This made the 
communists the most powerful force in Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, they feared 
nationalistic elements, but there was never an effective challenge to the political and 
economic domination of the ruling party (Thomas.R.1999.p25).  
At the beginning of their rise to power, the communist authorities faced popular 
discontent caused by brutality, the violent nature of the regime and nationalisation. It was 
a characteristic of the post-war government in Yugoslavia that it was very hard to 
distinguish whether they were the occupiers or the liberators, because tens of thousands 
of people that in one way or another had collaborated with the previous regimes were 
subjugated to violent barbarity. Countless numbers of Croat ustaša, Serb četniks and 
other national movement supporters left never to return, their properties were confiscated, 
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and families were subjected to appalling treatment, which often meant hangings and 
shootings. The Royal Family was prevented from returning to the country, and the king 
was declared persona non grata.  
 
At the beginning, the campaign in Kosova had been directed against few Albanians, but it 
soon degenerated into the prosecution of many. Between 29 November 1944 and end of 
May 1945, over thirty thousand Yugoslav troops marched into Kosova to ‘pacify’ the 
region, which was heaving from a popular revolt against the military directorate (Vickers. 
M. 1995. p161). The communists looked rather similar to their predecessors in the way 
they combined repression, violence and assimilation in the name of the state (Mazower. 
M. 2000. p138). This kind of reaction has its definition in academic terms. Eric Gordy 
refers to it as ’nationalist authoritarianism’, comprising a “specific set of circumstances in 
which an authoritarian regime seeks to justify its confirmation in power by means of 
nationalistic feelings of parts of the populace so it can secure its future” (Gordy. E 1999, 
p8). In the Gjilan municipality alone, 7845 Albanians were eliminated; in the region of 
Drenicë, 4820 were murdered in a short space of time (arhiv.sv.gov.yu).12  
Confiscation of property for public usage was a feature of the new system. Regardless of 
the owners’ opposition, large areas of fertile ground were seized to make way for 
’socialist programs of development’. Since the occupying forces belonged to these 
nations, the Hungarian, German and Italian regions in Vojvodina and the Adriatic littoral 
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 Refer to: Beograd (Državna Arhiva. . tajno. Generalni raport 1 ( 1 - 6 1945 ), ostali dokumenti ( K. D. 
kratko 93 ( 19-64, K - 25 )  (Belgrade. The state archive, secret General raport. Other documents) 
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were particular targets. The irony is that, while major landowners were being removed in 
other parts of Yugoslavia, major landowners were being created in Kosova through 
confiscation of land and re-disposition for non-Albanian colonisers that were being sent 
to the province (Judah. T. 1997. p174). One of the harshest laws promulgated by the new 
communist regime to impact on the population in Yugoslavia was the plan for 
compulsory delivery quotas (otkup), which ordered the forceful collection of grain, 
maize, barley and serials from peasants. Following the gross mismanagement of agrarian 
policy immediately after the war, the government, using the threat of violence and 
imprisonment, collected grain to distribute in the regions where mismanagement was at 
its worst (Ćirković.S. 2004. p277). Although the same action was introduced in many 
parts of Yugoslavia, in Kosova the campaign also had political and ethnic connotations, 
since most of the officials in charge of the seizure were either Serb or Montenegrin by 
ethnicity. In view of the complete disregard for the needs of large Albanian families 
whose food was being confiscated, a famine of large proportions hit the region in the 
winter of 1947-48. Statistical information about such events is unfortunately very scarce 
for several reasons. However, it is estimated that over twelve thousand people, mainly in 
vulnerable age groups, died during that period in the region of Dukagjini in the western 
plateau of Kosova alone (www.arhiv.sv.gov.yu).13  
 
At this point in time, using all the force they possessed against the nationalistic, liberally 
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 Nezgode u Metohijskoj regiji. Načelnik Opštine Peć u poseti regionalnih organa vlasti u Prištini. 
(Troubles in Metohija region. Mayor of Peja visits the regional government in Prishtina. 1-4. 32. 
14.06.1950) 
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minded and progressive groups, the communists organised many trials, some of which 
were based on fictitious allegations, across Kosova. Large numbers of people perished 
through hanging and public executions, many simply because they wished to incorporate 
Kosova into Albania (Kola. P 2003, p317).  In one such case at the Pejë district court, 
thirty-eight people were tried.  These included Professor Marije Shllaku and Professor 
Gjergj Camaj, alongside fifteen others, all of whom were hanged in public, while others 
received long-term sentences. This was where the debate about Kosova and Albanians in 
the new Yugoslavia truly began. The journalist and poet Ramiz Këlmendi14, one of those 
sentenced at the age of fifteen, recalls how the district prosecutor and a former partisan 
Ali Shukriu called for the death sentence in a purely Stalinist practice which made 
citizens irrelevant to the prevailing idea of the party:  In the minds of these dangerous 
individuals lurks a destructive force… a force that aims to overthrow the people’s 
governance and create a capitalist state that will suck the blood of our citizens. An idea so 
dangerous which if achieved will see Kosova, much of Montenegro and Macedonia 
united in an all-Albanian state.  
In her defence, according to Këlmendi, Marije Shllaku exclaimed: The people of Kosova 
are part of the Albanian political and spiritual body. They are Albanians, and the most 
natural thing for them to do, is to enter into the state with the rest of their 
nation...Freedom and self-determination were the values promised all the time during the 
war by partisans and Communists alike…It is immoral to eat one’s words.  
                                                 
14
 Një kafe me Labin. Interviste me Ramiz Këlmendin. (“A coffee with Labi” show. Interview with Ramiz 
Këlmendi) TV channel 21. Prishtina.  
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Powerless to change the decision of the court, she professes that her and their sentencing 
“will not vanquish the issue of Albanian unity, for to all Albanians their heart beats about 
Albania, but on the contrary it will make people think deeply about what kind of freedom 
they have been given if they are to remain in Yugoslavia”. In fact, such an idea was 
widely propagated during the war all over Kosova. In a pamphlet published by Kosova’s 
Regional Communist Committee in May 1943, which subsequently became an official 
directive for the communist cells of Kosova, the ’peoples governance’ expressed the new 
political approach on the issue of the national question. It stated that self-determination 
was “not only a right for Albanians of Kosova, but also a universal right that will be 
rigorously respected”. The document also claimed that “At the present time we must all 
fight the common enemy15 (the Nazi occupation) but in times of peace, all will rejoice to 
the individual and national freedom after the liberation”.16 Needles to say, such ideas 
were an important factor in the debates that took place afterwards in Kosova. They served 
as a tool of enticement to disillusioned Albanians who were still wary of communists. 
One such political development was the nationalist uprising of former communists who 
felt betrayed by the Yugoslav Communists and their incorporation of Kosova and other 
Albanian lands in Yugoslavia. The troubles exploded into a full-scale war, and Shaban 
Polluzha, one of the most prominent former commander of a partisan brigade, lead the 
disillusioned fighters who had believed in the communist dogma for a national state. At a 
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 Kumtesë nga Profesor Muharrem Dezhgiu. Mbi dimensionin politik të Fadil Hoxhës gjatë Luftës së Dytë 
Botërore. Gjakovë 21 Prill 2006. (Paper by Professor Muharrem Dezhgiu. About the political dimension of 
Fadil Hoxha during the Second World War. Gjakove 21 April 2006).  
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meeting in central Kosova in 1946, alongside three former political commissars of 
partisan brigades and a few other military commanders, he conveyed to the men “the 
news that we have feared… we have been betrayed. The communists want Kosova for 
themselves, they don’t want Albania, they only want Kosova as part of Yugoslavia …Our 
fight then shows to have been in vain, but we will not throw down our guns until Kosova 
is free”. Polluzha pours scorn on the rest of the Albanian Communist and partisan 
leadership for having “sunk the true calling of our nation in the hour of need”. Such 
reckless behaviour by the Albanian Communists, Polluzha claimed, “has only one sinister 
motive: grabbing power after the war”.17  
 
The National Democrats, the first Albanian opposition party in Kosova created during the 
time of the German occupation, were of the same opinion. As a political group, they 
argued “that the place for the occupying Nazis was Germany, and not Balkans”, hence 
their call to arms for their members and supporters. Their greatest concern was that”the 
political body of the Albanian nation is being truncated only for the wishes of a few”. 
The central national council of the party adopted a resolution that urged for “freedom of 
choice to all nations who fight the Rome, Berlin, Tokyo axis. Self-determination, to all 
nations about the political system they want to live, considering that in amicable fashion 
the political system should be chosen by popular referenda”. In the light of the December 
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1943 Teheran conference, the official agenda of which ignored the Albanian lands, the 
party calls for “all peace-loving nations not to undermine the war effort of the Albanians, 
and not to step on the blood of their best sons and daughters who are martyring 
themselves every day for the universal freedom and defeat of the Nazi doom”.  
Finally, the declaration calls for “the union of all Albanians in one state, as a measure that 
will forever solve the high-pitched relations of the Balkan nations and the great 
powers”.18 Dr Ali Sokoli, the party’s international affairs person de charge, produced the 
first meticulous strategy for the resolution of the national questions in the Balkans. In this 
document, he argues for “a joint war-effort against the Nazi and Fascist occupation of all 
peoples of the Balkans”. The question of national borders, he claims, will be solved as 
soon as the rays of freedom arrive, and in the spirit of newly acquired liberation, the 
nations of the Balkans will draw natural borders of their states with peaceful intentions. 
Natural borders will mean a region belonging to the state that the majority of that 
population are as a prelude to long lasting peace in liberal democracies of the future.19  
 
The communist authorities, feared political and ideological implications, and hastily 
annihilated such a daring challenge. The National Democratic Party was extinguished in 
1949. During a meeting of the central committee; the UDB arrested and charged all 45 
members for “destructive political activity against the people’s government”.20   
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On the other side, the communists were adamant that joining Yugoslavia was the best 
possible option, because “economic and social conditions of our predominantly agrarian 
society will improve with lightning speed, and educational and cultural emancipation will 
proceed with great leaps forward. We plan many good things for our desperate, forgotten, 
and abandoned peasant… all we need is collaboration.” So argued Mehmet Hoxha, the 
Serbian government minister of education, thus indicating that plans were being drawn 
by the state, to buy the silence of the people.21  Sinan Hasani22 states that “we have often 
been given guarantees that the people’s governance will further our cause, and Albanians 
in Yugoslavia will go from strength to strength in education, agriculture, welfare, social 
and domestic provisions, economy and culture” (Hasani S. 1989, p 57-9). Ali Shukriu’s 
account at the sentencing of Professor Shllaku is very similar. He maintains that “only 
Yugoslavia can bring about the much-needed peace, freedom and discipline in these 
regions,”23as if the national state of Albanians that was sought could somehow not 
achieve the needs of its people.  
 
With regard to the reaction of Albanians outside political Kosova, the Dibra, Struga and 
Shkupi regions were voicing their concerns about “not only remaining out of Albania, but 
also remaining out of the Albanian republic in Yugoslavia”. For “Albanians of the 
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southern regions of the Sharr Mountain have never belonged to Macedonia… If we are to 
remain part of Macedonia, aren’t we extending the life of the Bulgarian24 occupation?”25 
However, something more sinister was at stake in Kosova. “Yugoslav Communists gave 
Kosova to Serbia, to compensate her for not including all Serb lands in Serbia, and for 
winning the Serb acceptance for the new political order” (Magaš B. 1993, p34).  
On 10 July 1945, a meeting of 43 partisan commanders and former brigade commissars, 
of whom seventeen were Albanians, the rest being Serbs and Montenegrins, voted at the 
city of Prizren on the union of Kosova with Serbia (Kola P.2003 p63). From then until 
1968, when the constitutional changes were made to the political status of Kosova, Serbs 
and Montenegrins dominated the province in all walks of life. As Siniša Stanković, the 
President of the People's Assembly of Serbia, remarked, the province was considered “a 
mechanism primarily set up to help the existence of Serb and Montenegrin factors in the 
province”.26 Kosova never became an equal member in Serbia or Yugoslavia until the 
1974 constitution, because the range of competences that Kosova lacked, and Vojvodina 
possessed, defied common sense (Garde P,1992, p237). For instance, during the second 
legislature 1950-54, the Regional Peoples Assembly of Kosova and Metohija had only 36 
Albanian members in the 124 seat assembly, and five out of seven members, including 
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the chairman, in the regional executive council were either Serb or Montenegrin, even 
though under communism the people’s representatives were supposedly to remain loyal 
to the party ideology, not ethnic identity.  
 
Another problem of a political nature existed in the capitals of Albania and Yugoslavia, 
eclipsing Kosova even further in the military and security forces. The idea of an all-
encompassing Balkan federation was very attractive to communist groups of Albania 
after the war. The Albanian Communist Party was firmly set against ‘Greater Albania’. 
(Hadri A. 2003, p 52.). Their leader, Enver Hoxha, saw himself through such a political 
entity accessing a much wider international platform, by becoming part of Yugoslavia 
and most probably the deputy president of a strong communist state (Plasari A and 
Malltezi L 1996 p 121-5). Hoxha wanted to be as close as possible to Tito, with whom he 
believed he had developed a strong bond through letters of correspondence and personal 
meetings.  Tito on the other hand was of the opinion that Hoxha was a shabby peasant 
inclined to folly (arhiv.sv.gov.yu).27 The paranoid Hoxha also wanted to maintain close 
relations with the victorious Soviet Union, though the fear of Albanian Communists from 
Kosova challenging his authority plagued him. Coming from a southern Albania, he 
feared that groups from the north of Albania including Kosova would be encouraged by 
the federal regime. There were signs that the former commander of the Yugoslav ninth 
offensive brigade, Fadil Hoxha (born in western Kosova with no relation to Enver 
Hoxha), was winning representation into the most important Yugoslav.   
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To the Yugoslav Communists, the idea of a Balkan federation was relatively appealing, 
not only because of the obvious ideological internationalism, but also due to territorial 
extension. Such a country would have been able to control the mouth of the Adriatic gulf 
at the Otranto canal, where the Ionian and the Adriatic seas are separated, and the tip of 
the eastern Adriatic at Trieste. Therefore, by adding Albania to their territory, the 
Yugoslav Communists thought that they could encircle the Apennine peninsula, thus 
preventing future aggression.  
Apart from Albania, the Yugoslav Communists invited Bulgaria and Greece to join the 
federation.  The politics of ethnic elements aside (i.e. the similar Slavic background of 
Bulgarians), the Yugoslavs wanted to include Bulgaria in the federation, because its 
territory would have facilitated an overall geographical dominance in the Balkan 
Peninsula. Bulgaria would guarantee access to the Black Sea with geo-strategic proximity 
to Asia and the Soviet Union, and therefore create every precondition for Yugoslavia to 
become a regional superpower. However, Joseph Stalin, although assured on a number of 
occasions that the new federation would be along the same ideological lines as the USSR, 
disliked the idea of another strong, multi-national federation in south-eastern Europe. 
Apart from wanting to avoid upsetting the USA and the UK with such a creation that 
would have reduced their sphere of influence in the region, Stalin was also concerned that 
such a union could become an international power base and challenge his dominance 
(Evans D. 2005, p34-6). Yugoslavia’s refusal to grant special privileges to USSR also 
played a role as this would have eventually led to the complete economic and political 
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subordination of Yugoslavia. (Heppel. M and Singleton. F.B. 1966, p192).  
The territorial issue was also important. Many in Yugoslavia were demanding that 
Bulgaria seized the region of Pirin gained during the Balkan Wars, so it could join the 
newly created Peoples Republic of Macedonia and discontinue demands based on the 
actual number of the Bulgarian populace to make the Bulgarian language a parallel 
official state language to Serbo-Croat.  
Smaller nations such as Croats or Slovenes also feared possible alliances between Serbs 
and Bulgarians in the federation, since they were both orthodox nations, had a Cyrillic 
script, and even though there was a lot of animosity from the Balkan wars, they were part 
of the Turkish Empire which meant they held common values. This contrasted with the 
Croats and Slovenes, who were mainly catholic nations and had been part of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, and thus had different mentalities (Ziga W. 1997, p 127). 
 
Greece was in a more difficult position at this time, in terms of being invited to the 
federation. The reasons included the raging civil war and the strong interest in that 
country shown by the British Prime Minister Churchill, who had argued at the Teheran 
conference that Greece should fall under western influence.   
 
The failure of a Balkanic Yugoslavia, marred by problems of ideological nature between 
Tirana and Belgrade, initiated a crisis. This was precipitated by the mobilisation of 
several units of the regular Yugoslav army waiting for orders to invade Albania in 1948.  
Later in the year, Stalin intervened and called the actions of the federal government in 
Belgrade “in complete discord with external policies, and of a non-Marxist nature”. The 
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soviet Politburo also accused the Yugoslav authorities of having “betrayed socialism” 
and “leaning towards bourgeois nationalism” (Pollo S & Puto A. 1981. p263).  This was 
the point when the great schism between Moscow and Belgrade began, with Yugoslavia 
expelled from Comecon and later Comintern. Simultaneously, Albania also broke what 
had been very close bonds with Yugoslavia, in complete disregard for the Albanians 
living there, who were never consulted about their future by Tirana or Belgrade. From 
then on, until the fall of communism in 1992, Tirana strictly followed Stalinism. 
 
The break-down of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was manifested in 
Kosova with the closure of fortress-like borders between Albania and Yugoslavia, plus 
the termination of all political, economic, and cultural relations, and a campaign to 
disgrace and humiliate Albania’s communist elite who in turn were doing exactly the 
same whenever an opportunity arose to discredit Yugoslav communists. 
The schism with Moscow opened the doors for an immense campaign of purges in 
Yugoslavia, with a widespread hunt for cominformists (i.e. pro-Soviet elements). Enver 
Hoxha’s open criticism directed at Belgrade did not help matters. From 1949 until the 
final break-up of Yugoslavia, accusations were made continuously against Albanians for 
being ‘agents of Tirana’. Such an accusation guaranteed long prison sentences to 
whoever had the bad luck to be labelled as such. From the Yugoslav standpoint, the threat 
was not so much what Albania did as a state, but what such a state represented to 
Albanians of Yugoslavia (Biberaj E 1990, p112).  
Due to the fact that Kosova was a region with a non-Slavic majority, the security services 
treated the province with additional suspicion. Derrick Bell’s ethical perspective calls 
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such a state a culture of hypocrisy (equality of all was promised but not observed) with 
legalised damaging practices (the state was ready to use its utmost power only so the 
’enemies of the state’ could be found) (Bell D 2003, p19). Instead of helping them, after 
it had abandoned the people and their cause, the Tirana regime only worsened the life of 
Albanians in Yugoslavia with provocative actions.  
 The 1952 congress of the Albanian Communist Party approved a resolution which 
declared that “the country’s main danger stemmed from Yugoslav Communism” 
(Logoreci A. 1977. p109). Now Yugoslav security had reasons to believe that Tirana was 
meddling in Yugoslavia’s affairs.  
 
At this time in Kosova, the partisan revenge that continued relentlessly into the 1950s 
carried out bloody purges of all perspectives, often on imaginary enemies, in order to 
consolidate power (Stephen. G. 1993. p 358). The notorious, powerful and ubiquitous 
security police, the Uprava državne bezbednosti (UDB), began all over Kosova to 
demand arms in a well-coordinated campaign, which in reality meant night raids and 
assassinations, even involving religious leaders. After a spate of violent activities that 
happened during 1955 martial law, in ‘a classical case of totalitarian justice’ (Kushner B 
2004, p22) with particularly flimsy evidence, a group of Shiite religious leaders were 
tried in the city of Prizren in southern Kosova in 1956. Alongside them in the dock was a 
group of high-ranking party officials, including Njazi Maloku, the first-ever Albanian 
secretary of the Kosova Regional Communist Party. In fact, Maloku was similar to 
Marije Shllaku as a pioneer in debating the position of Albanians in Kosova. At a 
meeting of the Regional Central Committee of the Communist Party in late-1954, 
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Maloku questioned Serb domination of UDB in Kosova and urged recruitment of other 
nationalities to the organisation, since “Kosova and Metohija was a region of all nations 
and ethnicities in it”. He also called for “economic development to be distributed 
according to the needs of the people not the wishes of the party”, and he urged a spread 
of medical services into rural areas. In arguing his position, Maloku also exclaimed that 
“the situation in education is not desirable, we can count the number of Albanian 
secondary schools on fingers, while primary schools have not spread to many corners of 
the region” (Rilindja 16 October. 1954).28  
At the trial, the Shiite leader of the Prizren shrine called accusations against him “a 
deviation from God’s truth” and argued that “tending one’s flock in its own language and 
using prayers from Qerbela29 did not challenge the state”. He went on to conclude that “a 
situation like this is only remembered during the time of the first Serbia”30 and that “we 
did not expect a treatment like this from partisans, many of whom we ourselves have fed 
and helped in their hour of need, and alongside whom we have fought” (Rilindja 12 
November.1956).31 In practice, a social numbness caused by the utter disbelief of those 
who were enlisted as partisans, or helped them directly or indirectly during the war, 
persisted after the wave of terror and brutality that was unleashed in Kosova. Such a 
situation was a consequence of the prevailing idea amongst Albanians that their war 
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contribution was of no importance, since many accusations had been fabricated against 
them. The speech given at the Prizren district court by the Shiite leader stipulates just 
such a position. In relation to the accusations, the sentences ranged from fifteen years for 
high-ranking officials to three years for ordinary peasants.  
 
Kosova was a target of violence for the security services, because the UDB was 
constantly suspicious of the non-Slavonic population, believing that the current political 
order could be preserved if such elements were to distance themselves from their mother 
countries. This climate was further precipitated because many Albanians in Yugoslavia 
were genuinely unhappy with the existing political, social, cultural and economic 
situation.32 There was also the interference from the conservative forces, especially the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, which maintained the general line towards Kosova, which 
views the region as a part of historic Serbia, and thus only Serbian and Montenegrin 
elements should be advanced.  
Unfortunately, these events were not exclusive to Kosova. A relentless campaign of 
persecution and police terror was also taking place against other non-Slavic minorities in 
Yugoslavia, in particular against the Italian, German and Hungarian communities that 
lived in Istria, Slavonia and Panonia, which had no form of political autonomy. They 
were thrown into the ideological melting pot after the Second World War. Many were 
alarmed because their lands and properties were being systematically confiscated; plus 
                                                 
32
 Asllan Pushka. Situata pas luftes ishte e ndere. Bujku 14 Tetor 1995. (Asllan Pushka Historical clonicle. 
Situation after the war was grave. “Bujku” 14 October 1995) 
 
53 
 
prominent intellectual, community and religious leaders were being harassed and 
subjected to violence. The maxim of the Titoist regime was that to build an ‘ethnically 
Yugoslav’ country, the ‘republics’ should practise ethnic cleansing. In 1945 in Slovenia 
and Istria, thousands of Italians were victims of this policy, and Italian bodies were 
disposed of in dolines (foibe) (infoibati, to speak Italian). Tens of thousands had to leave 
their houses before 1954, the date of the regulation of the conflict about Trieste. In 
Vojvodina, the army ‘purified’ ethnically. More than 400,000 Germans were expelled 
from their lands and finally from Yugoslavia, although there were German partisans 
(Thälmann brigade) in Tito’s army. By a hair’s breadth the Hungarians did undergo the 
same fate. (Bataković D. 1994, p51-69). 
The regime also subjected the Slavs to the actions of the security apparatus. Although a 
Croat himself, Tito did not prevent the head of the Catholic Church in Croatia, 
Archbishop Stepinac, from being sentenced. All over Yugoslavia, former collaborators of 
the occupying regimes were suffering in prisons. During 1956 alone, in the central 
Serbian region of Šumadija, “over one hundred people were sentenced to seventy-five 
years combined, for organising a meeting of commemoration for the twentieth 
anniversary of the death of the king Aleksandar Karañorñević”.33 The arrests and trials 
were hastily organized, for in Serbia there was still considerable admiration and support 
for the former royal dynasty.  The majority of non-communist groups had a rough time 
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from the ‘people’s government’. As former US President Richard Nixon observed, Tito 
thought that the leadership could not step back from its responsibilities, and that leading 
and governing people should be seen as a destiny on its own (Kissinger. H.1995. p704).  
Nonetheless, the problem of mistreatment of ethnic minorities was also hindering other 
communist states in the Balkans. In Romania, for example, forced assimilation policies 
were pursued on the Transylvanian Hungarian minority, especially after 1952, as the 
Communist Party adopted a more nationalist tendency and a self-styled communism. 
Bulgarian campaigns against the country’s Turkish minority forced thousands to flee in 
1950 and 1968, while in the early 1970s Muslim villagers were forced publicly to 
abandon their Turkish or Islamic names for names with Bulgarian endings (Mazower. M. 
2000. p138), while Soviet policies regarding gulags, political dissidents and members of 
ethnic minorities are part of global folklore of how distressing assimilations could be.    
In parallel with this aggressive policy, there were some relative successes on the ground. 
The process of recovery from the war had begun, with great improvements not only in 
social capital, housing, hospitals, schools and transport, but also clearly in industrial 
development. Infant mortality rates had been reduced by providing better and quicker 
access to newly built hospitals, and a plan of general popular vaccination had reduced 
infectious illnesses such as mumps, rubella, poliomyelitis, tuberculosis, and measles, 
combined with better nourishment for people.  
At the federal level, Yugoslavia was a ‘work front’. Relatively small towns were facing 
unprecedented developments and becoming large, urbanised centres. The capital cities of 
the federal units were increasing by between twelve to twenty-five percent more people 
each decade, due to growing economic opportunities, better education, and closer access 
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to jobs and services. Hundreds and thousands of miles of asphalt, and hundreds of miles 
of railway line were laid, and ports and airports were built, introducing an edge of 
westernised capitalist development to the country. Telecommunications networking was 
provided in many areas outside the major urban centres for the first time, with Belgrade 
progressing from only 1500 in 1937 to over 86000 domestic phone numbers installed by 
1960 (www.posta.co.yu). Yugoslavia was becoming a forward-looking, modernised 
country, very different from the one that Lady Edith Durham had witnessed in her visit to 
Serbia. While passing Šumadija in 1906, she wrote: 
I thank the Lord for coming to a dwelling of people. After three days of travelling on a, 
through a muddy road and dense forests we finally reached a hamlet… The presence of 
people rejuvenates my spirit.” (Durham. E.1908. Vol 8. Number 1. www.jstor.org)34  
 
Increasing economic productivity and industrial output had played a major role in 
policymaking in Yugoslavia. As Edvard Kardelj remarked during the 1957 joint meeting 
of the world’s communist parties and states held in Moscow, “Unlike some others here, 
we don’t want conflict” (Chang J & Halliday J p 2005. 428). 
  
The economic recovery was also gathering pace in Kosova. Exploitation of mineral 
riches, service industries and urban planning had formed the focus of economic 
development. Within fifteen years, the number of people employed in these sectors had 
quadrupled. To cater for high demand, several new mines were opened, producing natural 
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riches and a corresponding strengthening of the economic capacity of the region. Within 
ten years, following its study for the first major development plan launched in 1951, the 
Trepça complex, one of the biggest enterprises in Yugoslavia had opened four major 
mines and a foundry whose mineral product accounted for seventy percent of 
Yugoslavia’s mineral wealth.35  
Other service-providing enterprises began to spring up in the major cities of Kosova, but 
the focus of economic activity remained limited to mining and textiles, services, 
administration and housing. The reason for this selective economic development was that 
the policymakers in Belgrade had oriented their funding towards those particular sectors 
needing developed in Serbia. 
Due to its vast concentration of lignite, a power plant was built not far from Prishtina in 
1962, and for a time – although power cuts in Prishtina were routine – it satisfied all the 
demand for electricity in Kosova and parts of southern Serbia and north-western 
Macedonia (Motes. M. 1998, p53).   
In an interview with the author, the economist Riza Sapunxhiu36 argued that the selective 
development in the province was a consequence of Serbia’s development plans. In effect, 
Serbia developed in Kosova only those sectors that it needed for economic recovery, 
although they were not priorities in Kosova. Nonetheless, such developments were 
welcome in the province, for they were the only ones that took place. 
Funding was also oriented towards developing agriculture, trade and transport. There 
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were also improvements in the social sphere. A number of secondary schools in the 
urbanised centres teaching exclusively in Serbo-Croat were opened in Kosova, whereas 
in rural areas primary education was organised in short-term courses and resulted in the 
acquisition of very basic skills. During the school year 1950-51, there were sixty-seven 
primary schools in Kosova that only taught two years. A further course that provided two 
more years of education was established in nineteen such schools, mainly in the 
urbanised centres.37 By 1950, there were 357 classes that taught lessons only in Serbo-
Croat, and 279 mixed or Albanian-only classes in the cities (Malcolm N. 1998. p318). 
 
Meanwhile, in ideological terms, after the somewhat successful Soviet rapprochement 
with the Khrushchev visit to Belgrade in 1955, Yugoslavia adopted a ‘softly-softly’ 
approach to communism, characterised by several factors different from other Eastern 
Block regimes. The Yugoslav Communists adopted Lenin’s dictum that Marxism was not 
a finished and inviolable body of doctrine, and consequently considerable civic freedom 
flourished. For example, not many people behind the Iron Curtain could claim that they 
had the freedom of movement in and out of their own country as did Yugoslavia. This 
factor, along with political persecution and high unemployment, form the main factors 
leading to so many ‘Gastarbeiter’ from Yugoslavia arriving in Western Europe. Over 
40% of Croats, nearly 40% of Albanians from Yugoslavia, and over 21% of Serbs live 
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outside their mother countries mainly in western states (www.osce.org).38  
Public information and communication also made giant leaps forward. A regional radio 
station (something that had never existed before), with mixed slots for Serbian and 
Albanian language programs, was launched in 1946.  However, most of the material it 
transmitted supported communist indoctrination, as was the case all over the communist 
states.   With a small number of staff and considerably dependent on help from Serb and 
Yugoslav journalists and technicians, an Albanian language daily newspaper, Rilindja 
(Renaissance), started circulation in February 1945, alongside a publishing house 
established in the region’s capital, primarily catering for school textbooks and authors  of 
indoctrinated propaganda.  
 
On the constitutional terrain, Kosova obtained its regional assembly in 1946, as well as a 
severely limited regional executive committee. The Communist Party of Kosova (KCP), 
though created in 1941, was formally recognised as a branch of the mother Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) in 1948.  However, the authority of the KCP was limited as it 
remained completely integrated into the Communist Party of Serbia and the CPY. Its 
primary task was to facilitate communist activities in the region. Nevertheless, the 
authority of the KCP was due to individual dominance of its members in high state and 
security services, economic, and cultural enterprises as well as other sectors of public life. 
In fact, as a membership policy, the KCP had sanctioned that any person in a leading 
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position in political or economic life had to become a member of the party. So rigorous 
was this directive that, in 1972, the eleven-member chairmanship of the KCP branch in 
the city of Gjakovë, was composed of seven managers of the major city enterprises, two 
secondary-school headmasters, the director of the regional hospital, and the director of 
the city’s bus station.39  But, despite developments, the feeling of dependency on Serbia 
still remained a major source of dissatisfaction in Kosova. (Repishti. S. 1986.p255).  
  
Following tensions with Moscow, Tito positioned Yugoslavia in ‘the third way’. This 
referred to a policy of international neutrality with the help of Indonesia’s President 
Sukarno, India’s Prime Minister Nehru, and Egypt’s President Naser, the principal 
signatories of the Organization of Non-Aligned Countries in 1955. With no military or 
economic muscle, the Non-Aligned movement was a union that suited countries 
emerging from colonial rule. It brought together some of the most fearsome modern-day 
dictators/tyrants of the world, who saw the Soviet Union as the domineering big brother 
and the Western World as not to be associated with for it demanded human rights 
standards. In domestic policy, the organization helped Tito’s vanity, it made him look 
important on the world stage, and it helped him to consolidate his authority over party 
and state. The organization’s membership also helped Yugoslavia develop economically, 
for it created new jobs and helped the arms trade. Overall, non-alignment was a useful 
policy in avoiding commitment to either side in Europe and in gaining prestige and 
diplomatic support from the Third World. (Rubinstein A.Z 1970, p8). 
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 Kryesia e Lidhjes së Komunistëve të Kosovës dega në Gjakovë. 1972. Arkiva e Partisë. (The 
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Communist activities were also concentrated in the slogan vëllazërim bashkimi 
(brotherhood and unity), the leitmotif of Yugoslav Communism, which was designed to 
propagate and supposedly cement many ethnicities of Yugoslavia living in concord with 
each other. Such a wartime slogan was not intended to counter fratricidal war and 
disunity. It symbolized the policy of pan-Yugoslav solidarity, cooperation among the 
nations, Yugoslav integration and ultimately the creation of a Yugoslav national 
consciousness (Ðaković S. 1984. p,164). To some, such an idea might seem a fallacy, for 
it portrayed loving and caring for everything that lived and existed within the borders of 
Yugoslavia, as one would love oneself.  The vëllazërim bashkimi verbs had become a 
customary coin in propagating internationalism and solidarity amongst the nations and 
nationalities of Yugoslavia. However, brotherhood and unity was never truly forged in 
Yugoslavia. Slovenes and Croats looked down on Bosnian and Macedonian peasants who 
had travelled to their republics, either as volunteers or to find a job, as the French looked 
down upon Algerians, or Germans at Turks (Brkič. C. A. 2005. p 290).  Albanians, 
meanwhile, “were that class of citizens who were there to be used only to carry the heavy 
loads, as workers who will embellish the gardens of the Ušće neighbourhood40, and as 
human agents ready to give blood when needed” (Bulatović Lj. 1999, p 63-4). 
Undeterred by either federal or constitutive members of Yugoslavia, the government in 
Belgrade reactivated the policy of forced Albanian migration by an international treaty 
signed with Turkey on 28 February 1953. According to the points of the treaty, the 
Yugoslav Government was to pay substantial amounts of money to the Turkish executive 
                                                                                                                                                 
chairmanship of the Kosova Communist Party branch in Gjakove. 1972. The party archives) 
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just to accept the Albanians. The federal government did not consider investing that 
money in Kosova to improve the lives of its citizens.  
Albanians in Turkey were to have no ethnic or national right, and they were eligible for 
state and linguistic assimilation. In an unprecedented action, the federal government and 
party had responded to the Serbian demands to ‘pacify the region’ with a treaty that had 
pure political, ethnic and geostrategic ramifications. By removing large parts of the 
Albanian population from Kosova, plans for intensification of Serb and Montenegrin 
settlements could go ahead. Many Albanian families were enlisted for expulsion because 
during the post-war census they had been registered as Turks, i.e. those who practise 
Islam, not properly grasping the concept of nationality. In Turkey, they were abused and 
their civil liberties violated, and they were even used at the beginning of their settlement 
as a buffer line between the Turks and the Kurds.41  
Expatriation of Albanians, 1952-1965 
  
Year No. of persons Year No. of persons 
1952 37000 1959 32000 
1953 17300 1960 27980 
1954 17500 1961 31910 
1955 51000 1962 15910 
1956 54000 1963 25720 
1957 57710 1964 21530 
1958 41300 1965 19821 
 Shehu F & Shehu S. Pastrimet etnike të trojeve shqiptare 1953-1957 (Ethnic Cleansing 
of Albanian Regions, 1953-1957), Prishtina, 1994, p. 24.  
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 An affluent area of Belgrade. 
41
 Expulsions of Albanians and colonisation of Kosova. The Institute of History , Prishtina 
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Due to land confiscation and repression, more than 235000 Albanians of Yugoslavia 
were forced to vacate their lands between 1954 and 1966 (Vickers. M. p180-8. 1995; see 
also Vjesnik u srijedu, Zagreb, 7/VI/1971).  
Brutality and the reign of terror were unabated especially if they were directed against the 
so-called cells of irredentism and nationalism. During 1956, for example, over sixty 
thousand Albanians were tortured and terrorised by the UDB and the police (Ramet. S. 
2002. p313).  The erudite Albanian writer and historian, Rexhep Qosja, summarised such 
a desperate situation for many Albanians in Yugoslavia in one sentence: “Albanian 
peasants were beaten up by Serb and Montenegrin police whether they said good 
morning sir, or whether they didn’t, often only because they were Albanians.” Following 
an appraisal of their security policy for the 1949-59 period in Kosova, even the federal 
authorities accepted that in dealing with Kosova they had used a heavier hand than was 
necessary (Crampton. R.J. 2002. p115).  
  
Yugoslavia, “a country that emphasised learned socialism as common social, economic, 
territorial and political union of the working people and the root of all state and social 
structure” (Tuñman F 1960. p 195), had created a system whereby constitutionally the 
form of state organisation that existed in Kosova was primarily designed to accommodate 
the needs of the Serb population (Šuvar, S, 1970. p71). Thanks to a mixture of deliberate 
state (i.e. Serbian republic) policy of Albanian exclusion, and a low level of educated 
people in specialised fields, the state and party administration remained almost exclusive 
to the minority ethnic groups of the province. The Serbian and Montenegrin populace, 
which according to the 1953 census formed only 23% of population in Kosova, were in 
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over 75% of the cases leaders of the administrative, economic and political offices.  For 
example, in the Istog municipality in north-eastern Kosova in 1968, only 24 of 119 
people employed to work at the local council were Albanian, despite the fact that 
Montenegrins and Serbs in the commune comprised only 13.7% of the population.42  
 
The common descent of any ethnicity larger than a clan or a lineage inhabiting a small 
area such as Serbs is largely mythical (Guibernau. M & Hutchinson. J. 2001. p208). 
Based on this idea, they kept a tight-fisted control over Kosova. Due to such imbalance, 
to the ordinary Albanians, the autonomous institutions seamed alien and non inclusive 
resulting in harsh poverty. The squalid conditions especially in rural areas, were the same 
as they had been during the time of the Ottomans. Even by 1968, there were only 417 
physicians for nearly one and a quarter million people (Motes. M. 1998, p35).  People 
were dying regularly from minor infections long eradicated elsewhere. Life expectancy in 
Albanian regions of Yugoslavia was disproportionate by over twenty years of a 
difference. For example, during 1967 the regional hospital at Pejë registered two 
thousand and thirty cases of malaria in a region with over one hundred thousand people, 
while the entire province of Vojvodina for the same year registered only four such cases 
(Pushkolli F. 1980, p 136). The infant mortality rates and deaths of mothers in labour 
remained alarmingly high.  The public health services in the 1961 Yugoslav statistical 
records show a disparity within the health provisions. For example, the Croat peninsula 
of Istria, with a population of about one hundred thousand people, had five general 
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 Kuvendi Komunal i Istogut. Raporti vjetore i punes 1968, p23. (Istog municipality annual report) 
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hospitals, including a major specialised centre at the region’s capital Pula. In comparison, 
Kosova by this time had a population of well over one million, but with only four 
hospitals in the largest cities of the region. None of them had a record of specialised 
wards apart from general surgery units and midwife run gynaecology wards 
(www.arhiv.sv.gov.yu).43 In fact, only after the creation of the medical faculty at 
Prishtina University in 1975 was the first and only specialised medical centre opened.  
  
Despite the relaxed measures in the sixties, there was still a general dissatisfaction with 
the air of complacency that had swamped political quarters. Therefore, Yugoslavia could 
not stem the tide of protest in Europe of the late sixties, which heralded new, more radical 
and much-needed changes in all fields.  These changes and the preconditions that led to 
them are a theme of debate in the next chapter. 
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 Izveštaj zdravstvenog sistema naše domovine, p15 (Report about the health system of our homeland). 
December 1969 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
 YUGOSLAVIA SEEN FROM KOSOVA, AND KOSOVA SEEN FROM SERBIA 
AND YUGOSLAVIA 
  
The period between 1966 and 1968 proved to be important for political reform in 
Yugoslavia. Prompted by a chain of political, social, economic and ethnically inspired 
events, and with Tito’s tacit approval, they were implemented as urgent and necessary 
accommodations. The motives behind such impulsive reforms were the relative economic 
success that Yugoslavia had achieved and the associated need for further devolution, not 
only from the federal structure to the individual units, but also from individual units to 
the local authorities. During this period, Tito incited an era of constructive ethnic 
collaboration and independence from foreign interventions. 
 
In Kosova, demands for greater autonomy (even a republic if possible) could not have 
been ignored for much longer. These demands represented the embodiment of self-
determination and equality amongst the nations. They were aimed at addressing the 
problems of economic development in the province and the free use of national symbols 
of Albanians as the largest ethnicity. However, such a nationalistic demand had the 
power to provoke friction in the common state, and thus it was ignored until it surfaced in 
the form of violent demonstrations.  
 
In terms of local politics, the collectivisation implemented in nearly all the arable land of 
Kosova had proved a disaster because of mismanagement and human failure. The 
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average income in Kosova was five times smaller than in Slovenia. By 1960, the 
economy of the northern republic had achieved the same level of economic development 
as Italy, while economic development in Kosova remained at a level similar to Thailand, 
a Third World country. Archaic modes of life still existed in Kosova, such as the sturdy 
Balkan pony, water buffalo and donkeys pulling carts, lopsided mud-plastered walls of 
brick and straw...with one room homes, wrecked by poverty (Motes M. 1998. p116). 
This crisis was caused by over-investment in non-profitable industries. Building factories 
in towns with an adequate labour force, but no raw materials, and wage rises without 
concomitant increases in production seriously hampered development.  The decrease in 
agricultural products caused by a hastily forced collectivization, while demand for such 
products was in reality going up, and an increase on imports based on short-term credits 
increased popular dissatisfaction.  This was paralleled by unfavourable international 
loans and short-term loans taken between 1965-7 with excruciating interest.44 Due to 
such problems, the five-year economic plan was shelved by 1962, for it achieved nothing 
that improved the life of ordinary citizens.45 This was matched by a lack of companies, 
enterprise, and all-round economic activities. By the 1960s, Yugoslavia had consumed 
more than $2 billion worth of non-payable western aid, but with little impact on the 
economy. In comparison, Slovenia (in Koper) and Montenegro (in Tivat) had developed 
their own ports to promote self-sufficiency, but the existing ports in Croatia were easily 
handling all of Yugoslavia’s sea trade (Bennett. C. 1995. pp59 & 75).  
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 For the purpose of rail transport development, the World Bank in March 1966 loaned to Yugoslavia 
$19.4 million with a five-year term and 12.8% interest. (Savezno Izvršno Veće. Stanje financiskih prihoda 
The Federal Executive Council. Situation of financial incomings.  1965-6. pb41.pc42.pd43. Beograd 1967.) 
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In a study by ‘Riinvest’, Prishtina’s institute for development research, before the end of 
1960s the Yugoslav economy is assessed to have been at “a point of almost stagnation 
with Kosova, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and southern regions of 
Serbia in a blockade of economic profits”.46 The study suggests that unequal 
development in the federation was caused by political centralisation that oriented 
investments and economic capability towards the north for personal, practical and 
political reasons. One reason was localism, because both Tito and Kardelj were from the 
northern republics, where they travelled the most.  Practical reasons were more concerned 
with Slovenia and Croatia being geographically closer to Italy and Austria, whose 
markets provided a window to western markets, since Yugoslavia had now encouraged 
trade. Finally, political reasons included possible political troubles that could emerge 
from the northern republics with potentially severe consequences. In Serbia meanwhile, 
an unprecedented level of development had commenced in Belgrade and a few other 
major industrial cities, which created the impression amongst Serbs that their own 
republic was developing significantly.  
In Kosova, the rigid manifestation of self-management brought other problems. These 
included high level of unemployment and administrative and fiscal incompetence, 
combined with a low level of education and the policy of leaving highly skilled workers 
unemployed if they had a ‘suspicious biography’ that made them untrustworthy.47  
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 Izveštaj Saveznog Izveršnog veča. (Report by the Federal Executive Council).12.10.1966. p 55-7.  
46
 www.riinvestinstitute.org. Gjendja ekonomike në Republiken Socialiste Federative të Jugosllavisë gjat 
dekades 1961 – 1971, p 17-32. (The economic situation in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 
1961-71 decade) 
47
 The concept of ‘suspicious biography’ was applied in all cases when the state and party officials had 
reason to believe that the person applying for employment, or someone from their immediate family, had in 
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In fact, the only thing that made Kosova notable was the blood spilled on its soil. 
(Campbell. G. 2000, p148).   
In such an atmosphere, voices were raised concerning the ongoing problems, but they 
were weak due to the fear of a reaction by security services. In 1958, Adem Demaçi, an 
energetic Albanian student, spoke against the regime, for which he was persecuted. In 
that year, he was subjected to the first of a series of imprisonments whereby he spent 
nearly twenty-nine years behind bars, most of the time on the notorious prison island of 
Goli Otok. Demaçi was the leader of an underground group that challenged the regime’s 
official ideology, as well as policies towards nationalities, that derived right and wrong 
from the party’s definitions (Getty & Naumov 2000. p503). In Kosova, he enlisted some 
three hundred members onto his group (Malcolm N. 1998. p322). Early in his life, he 
published a short novel called ‘Serpents of Blood’, which quickly became popular and 
consequently was banned by the state.48  This gave Demaçi a platform from which he 
could speak authoritatively as a member of the intellectual elite on behalf of the 
oppressed people. And speak he did, calling for a republic of all Albanians in Yugoslavia, 
equal status for the Albanian language and national flag, economic development, and 
curbing the terror against Albanians. In his underground activity, he and his followers 
printed and distributed propaganda pamphlets and organised secret activities.49  However, 
                                                                                                                                                 
any way worked against the state. In Kosova, this meant any kind of pro-national Albanian activity and had 
dire consequences. 
 
48
 Serpents of Blood is the novel where Demaçi idyllically portrays life in the countryside of Kosova. At 
the centre of the novel is a forbidden love story. Two teenagers meet accidentally in a field while their 
cattle are grazing. She however is promised to someone else, while he falls in love with her immediately.  
In the novel, Demaçi paints a picture of real economic desperation amongst extended Albanian families. He 
also condones the old archaic mentality that organised life in Kosova. 
49
 Adem Demaçi. Kërkesat tona ishin deshirat e popullit. në “Njëzet e tetë vjet - as i gjallë, as i vdekur” 
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his views were not very relevant for two reasons: first, because he did not have 
nationwide support, as his views were muted by official propaganda; and secondly 
because many Albanians were by this point growing to like communism and federation, 
and perceived Tito as “somebody who has done more for us in a short period of time, 
than anybody did since history began” (Borba 16 October 1963).50 
 
The pre-1968 position of Kosova in general and that of Albanians in particular was 
considered by many as ‘the period of greatest deformation’ (www.rferl.org).51 This view 
was held not only by those who distanced themselves politically, but even by individuals 
ranked amongst the highest officials, such as Fadil Hoxha.  His reaction reflects a sense 
of dissatisfaction and anger that was observed all over Kosova.  As late as 1970, Kosova 
was still a vastly rural society, characterised by stagnation of the industrial sector and 
with very few financial resources actually reaching where they were needed. Only seven 
localities were developed enough to be called cities, while other municipalities were 
simply large villages. Cultural development was barely noticeable due to the lack of 
educational infrastructure. Ordinary people were still working in primitive manual 
conditions, mainly in forestry and agriculture, preoccupied with concerns about 
producing enough food to last the year. The striking disparity in the province’s economic 
                                                                                                                                                 
(intevistoi M. Hanzhek), “Lumi”, Lubjanë, 1990. (Our demads were the will of the people. In “Twenty 
eight years neither dead nor alive” Lubiana Slovenia). 
 
50
  Zemljoradnici i seljaci u Pomoravlju zahvaljuju drugu Tita. (Farmers and peasants of Pomoravlje thank 
comrade Tito)  
51
 Refer to Fadil Hoxha’s speech held on 21 April 1981 called: “Yugoslavia is a world example of the 
successful solution of nationality issue”. (The speech was made as a response to demands from official 
Tirana to further the rights of Albanian nationality soon after 1981 demonstrations).   
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levels compared with the rest of Yugoslavia has been one of the main reasons why many 
young and intellectual Kosovars were disillusioned with the prevailing political and 
economic system (www.rferl.org).52   
 
The Communist party in Kosova was also experiencing difficulties. Its non-Serb 
membership was low, recruiting new members into the party, even though presented as 
an imperative after the 1955 plenum of the Kosova League of Communists, had not 
proved successful since many Albanians viewed the party as a new tool of oppression.  
 
Membership of the Communist Party of Kosova by ethnicity 
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The Serbian-dominated UDB was causing havoc amongst people. Whenever the party 
needed to avoid embarrassment from a looming scandal, ‘enemy groups’ within the 
population were always found as scapegoats. Although it was not a complete totalitarian 
state like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia nevertheless had more political prisoners per 
capita than the USSR (Crampton. R.J. 2002).  
The Secret Service had over one million files on Croats alone, which meant that over a 
quarter of the population were seen as suspicious (Tanner M 1997. p189), and “even 
saints were not left unstained by communism” (Qosja R. 2005. p134). 
As colonists, the Serb and Montenegrin population of Kosova began to grow rapidly. 
They were given large portions of arable land in order to make it possible to stay 
permanently where they were sent.  Through a state-managed plan called “The 
colonisation of the southern Serbian region”, which was masterminded by the Agrarian 
minister, Vasa Čubrilović, they were placed there officially as economic emigrants, but 
soon gained the rights to land previously owned by the indigenous population. In 1945, 
with a desire ‘to retain the cradle of Serbdom’, 1054 Serb and Montenegrin families 
applied to go to Kosova, where they would receive up to 5 hectares of land belonging to 
Albanian farmers53 (Obradović. M, 1987, p. 249-250). Those who did not volunteer for 
such a program were sent to Kosova supposedly because their homes in their native 
villages had been destroyed during the war.  Such arguments made no sense ethically, 
because people who have had their property destroyed generally do not seek to take over 
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 Fadil Hoxha described a situation whereby almost every morning while going to work he read examples 
of Albanian forced land confiscation.  The only thing he could do was to tear up the newspaper. Meeting 
with the “URA” association. 14 October 1996.  
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somebody else’s livelihood, least of all hundreds of miles away.  
Arriving from arid or swamp-infested parts of Yugoslavia, such as Lika, Kordun, 
Semberija Herzegovina, central Serbia and mountainous Montenegro, they had to adapt 
to a new environment, new culture and an alien language, which Albanian was to them. 
The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) reacted with haste to accommodate the Serb and 
Montenegrin population by beginning in earnest to build churches in places of new 
settlements.  This is in line with the mythical belief of the Serbian populace, encouraged 
by the SOC, that Kosovo was the cradle of the Serbian nation.54 Thus in villages where 
more than forty Serb and Montenegrin families (Montenegrins being under the 
ecumenical order of the SOC) had settled, a new church or chapel was erected by the 
SOC.  Six such churches were built after 1953 within a 47-kilometre radius of the 
Morava region of eastern Kosova; no new Islamic mosques or Catholic churches were 
built to cater for the Albanians in this region during the same period.55  
Myth is generally attributed to play a major role in the creation of ethnic and national 
identities. It is the most influential heritage point of a group of people who construct their 
collectivity around common historical events, signs, norms, dates or insignia, religion or 
language. It is the factor that binds groups together in a past that they consider glorious 
(Hudson K. 1981:1).  Myth is a defective understanding of scientific causes, but because 
man finds it necessary to explain phenomena, theories are put forward in the absence of 
scientific knowledge (Rogerson, J.W.1984. p 62-71). 
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 The ‘Great Serbia’ Ideology. 
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 The Provincial Peoples Council. Annual report 1965, refer to the part about: Serb and Montenegrin 
citizens continue to strengthen the socialist society of Kosovo and Metohija 
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The new colonists regarded the native Albanians with mistrust (Lalaj A. 2000. p144). 
This reaction was a consequence of instrumentalisation by Belgrade politicians, who 
played the Gordian knot of nationality in Kosova. In fact, the Serbs still harboured the 
idea that whoever solved the Serbian question ‘would achieve an everlasting deed for the 
nation. As enemies of Serbdom, Albanians were worse than Turks (Hadri A. 2003, p311).  
As a policy of republican and provincial governments, to help their long-term settlement 
in Kosova, authorities prioritised the needs of the Serbian and Montenegrin population56 
over those of Albanians.57  In 1964, the colonists who had found employment in the city 
of Prishtina and the towns of Fushë Kosovë, Lipjan, Podujevë and Obiliq represented 
93.7% of applicants. The number of Albanians finding work varied from only 16% in 
Podujevë to 43% in Prishtina the capital city of the province.58   Membership of the YLC, 
a precondition for anybody wishing to work in the public sector, accounted for the large 
number of non-Albanians working in Kosova’s public sector, as well as educational 
policies. Most secondary schools in Kosova taught only Serbo-Croat, and since many 
Albanians did not speak the language, this meant unemployment.   
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 Such is the case of (Montenegrin by nationality) Momčilo Pavićević. He was given a choice to work as a 
manager of a textile industry or as a manager in a juice processing plant in the city of Gjakovë in western 
Kosova, but decided instead to take a manager’s job in the chromium processing plant ‘Devë’ , because he 
explained that he liked the rural location of the factory setting. Arkiva e minieres së kromit Deva. Mbledhja 
e këshillit të punetorve dhe e drejtorisë. Prill 1985. (Archive of the chromium mine Deva. Meeting of the 
workers council and the directorate. April 1985) 
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 The Serb populated village of Graçanicë in the jurisdiction of Prishtina commune had a primary and 
secondary school from 1950, and in 1956 had an asphalted road that linked it with the capital. By 1963, it 
had telephone connections and underground sanitation. At the same time, the nearby village of Hajvali, 
with four times more inhabitants but all of them Albanians, never had a secondary school, sanitation or 
telephone line until 2002. (Archives of the Prishtina commune pp1950, 1956, 1963.) 
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 Këshilli Populluer Krahinuer. Raporti vjetuer i punes. (The Provincial Peoples Council. Annual report 
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Although over twenty years had passed since the Second World War, by 1966 there were 
only 49 secondary schools in Kosova (Jeta e Re. 1977. Issue 4) and more than half of the 
curriculum was devoted to Yugoslav history and literature 59 (Rilindja 23 November 
1968). Albanian history was observed as an undesirable subject and “the ultimate sin that 
can lead to disturbing ideas” (Përparimi. 1967. Number 11-12, p1269).   
 
Meanwhile, on the political front, there were always people who believed that the Party 
would use the Marxist argument that national tensions would disappear when the 
economic grounds for them were eliminated. However, such a concept appeared utopian, 
for the real situation proved otherwise. In fact, the Croatian high official, Vladimir 
Bakarić, warned of the dangers of nationalism in spring 1966. He said that “nationalism 
will become the country’s number one issue if the battle for reform is not won soon” 
(Rusinow. D. 1977. p245).   
Such a warning echoed feelings that already prevailed in political circles, that the “centre 
of resistance against reforms was in Serbia, and that nationalistic showings in that 
republic were developing for some time” (Komunisti. 5 March. 1966). Therefore, the 
source of discontent was the issue tied inextricably with political order. If Kosova was 
equal, as the constitutional arrangements made it look, and if the nationalities were equal, 
why then was the territory not a republic?   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1965, refer to the part titled: Great strides are made to find jobs for the people). 
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 The issue here is with ’over emphasizing’ the history of Albanians as an ethnic minority in Yugoslavia 
(or any other minorities for that matter), because it would have been unimaginable to prevent Serb, Croat, 
or Slovene history for example from being emphasised, since they were nations, and their political entities 
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Alongside the national issue, there were calls for further liberalisation. During the 1960s, 
the federal executive council amidst intense political debate approved a proposal for a 
special fund to help the underdeveloped regions. This was to alleviate poverty and realise 
“the true meaning of Yugoslavia” (Rilindja 16 June 1967). The debate was between two 
interest groups, those who were eager to receive funds, and those who were unwilling to 
provide funds.  As always, the federal centre thought that such a fund was about “the 
necessary methods of achieving an equal Yugoslavia, where all her citizens would feel 
socially, politically, culturally, and economically equal” (Borba. 11 April 1966).60  As 
Ymer Pula put it, the debate was also “about showing to every citizen and peasant of our 
country that the hand of the state is there and it will be felt… It is about strengthening the 
bond between nations and nationalities, and it is a perfect example of fully exercising 
brotherhood and unity”. (Rilindja. 23 September 1966).61  
 
On the other hand, opponents of the fund argued that “the federal institutions can aid the 
development of federal units, but not finance it” (www.arhiv.sv.gov.yu62), and that 
“vested money should remain in the vested interest of the each federal unit” (Ibid63). 
Nevertheless, more pragmatic voices were heard. The Slovenian member of the Yugoslav 
assembly, Vinko Hafner, aware of the economic backwardness in the southern regions, 
complained about: a two-tier system. It cannot be allowed because we live in a socialist 
                                                                                                                                                 
represented a vital cog in the existence of the federation. 
60
 Veliki razvojni projekat da se rastvori. (A great developmental project to come to life) 
61
 Nga fjalimi i shokut Ymer Pula para Komitetit Krahinuer. (From the speech by comrade Ymer Pula 
before the provincial council. 23 September 1966) 
 
62
 Rudolf Zajc. Addressing the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. 12 April 1965. 
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state…We are not America where in New York some eat with the golden spoon, while in 
Chicago some die of hunger…Development of each federal unit is a duty, and as such it 
should be supported. (Borba.14.04. 196364). 
 
Here it is worth noting Serbia’s precarious position. The republic on one hand was a 
contributor to the fund, whilst on the other it was also a benefactor.  Being a benefactor 
was a positive step for the Serb government. Apart from having to deal with large 
problems of developing the southern part of Serbia, sometimes the republic had to 
subsidise the badly performing enterprises in Kosova. Serbia was also often placed in a 
difficult position when asked to help with the economic recovery of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Montenegro, where the Serbian populace constituted about 38% in the 
former and in the latter case about 27% of the population. With the development fund, 
the burden was to fall upon all four developed regions (Ðaković S. 1984, p53).  
 
Despite contradictions, the fund was approved. Its primary aim was to help economic 
activity in Kosova, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, representing 
the least-developed units of the federation. This action by the federal institutions 
undoubtedly shows a better awareness of the situation.  Four other considerably more 
developed regions of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina were to contribute 1.85% 
of their gross domestic product annually to the fund. This shows that despite the many 
arguments about vast amounts of money going from north to south that was not really the 
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case. In the period between 1945 and 1990, Kosova received roughly 3% of the annual 
federal investment funds from the federal authorities (Verli. M. 2007. p307-8).  
However, the opposition made Croatia and Slovenia look as if they were resisting the 
development of other less fortunate regions. This, along with the problem of national 
question, made Croats the first nation to voice concerns about the internal structure of the 
party and the state. By 1967, they were urging more meaningful decentralisation and 
democratisation not just in state power but in political authority too. Such demands were 
seen from two conflicting perspectives. The first current argued that giving in to such 
demands would only weaken the state, which in time would present a problem with dire 
consequences for the system. The second current, from the party membership (not only 
supporters from Croatia, but also a handful of other liberal-minded individuals in other 
regional capitals including Belgrade and Prishtina), argued that further decentralisation of 
power would loosen the difficult situation that the country faced. The latter group was 
more in tune with reality, for in Yugoslavia lack of investment, mismanagement of the 
economy, and high levels of corruption had produced an 8% annual increase in the index 
for the cost of living by the end of 1968 compared to the previous year.65 The balance of 
payments grew to $434 million during the same year, and the number of unemployed 
leaving the country for jobs abroad increased to 22% of the total work force (Rusinow. D 
1977. p251). In Kosova, for example, annual accounts on earning per head of population 
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were only a third of the average earnings in Serbia (Lalaj A 2000, p315). 
The stagnant federal administration was in charge of the turnover and capital taxes, as 
well as large bank investment funds, and that meant a real paralysis of the state funds 
since these banks did not want to issue money for appropriate use (www.szp.org.yu).66  
 
To resolve the deadlock, the central committee of the Yugoslav Communist party called 
the party plenum on 26 February 1966, followed by another one on 11March, since the 
previous one had not managed to reach conclusions. The stagnant position continued, but 
Tito decided to break the deadlock. He called the fourth plenum at the holiday retreat 
island of Brioni on the Adriatic coast. All the delegates were ready to meet Tito, as the 
‘Sun King was summoning his barons to his court’ (Rusinow. D. 1977, p259). The result 
was cautious reforms and dismissal of Ranković. He had allegedly ordered the bugging of 
homes and offices of high communist officials including even Tito.67 In better times, 
Ranković had been a professional revolutionary apparatchik, held in high esteem not only 
by Tito but also by other Yugoslav leaders because of his workers background. He was 
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even seen as the natural replacement for Tito.   In his policy implementation, Ranković 
had fallen into the ‘ethical trap’ of the revolution, because he was unable to determine for 
how long and to what extent ‘revolutionary violence’ should be used. 
Ranković’s departure was a consequence not only of the bugging scandal, but also off his 
position at the forefront of the group that persisted in centralisation.  They argued that, “if 
power rests in the hands of few, then problems are more manageable because decision for 
any action is possible faster”.  
Such claims represented a serious hurdle for the decentralising forces, who were finally 
convinced that change must occur if the state and party were to start moving again. In the 
Yugoslav political dogma, the ‘key concept’ was used, which determined the distribution 
of certain positions by ethnic identity according to the proportion of each group in the 
individual unit’s population. A demand for further centralisation was a direct threat to 
smaller nations of the federation that feared the spread of Serbian hegemony.  
Kosova also had its arguments. Ranković’s removal had ended what Slobodan Stanković 
calls ‘the Stalinist behaviour’68 illustrated in his dealings with Albanians, whom he 
treated in the same cruel manner that Stalin did some of the national minorities in the 
Soviet Union. His dismissal finally ended the massive wave of Albanian deportations to 
Turkey (Islami H.1990, p159-64).  
 
With Tito's support, reformists in the Yugoslav party leadership began a radical 
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restructuring of the Yugoslav political and economic system. At the micro level, the 1965 
reform was a direct attack on party bureaucrats in enterprises, as well as those in local 
administrative positions (Borba, October 6, 1966).69  The reforms also involved a 
loosening of party control over society, including some tolerance towards more open 
expression of national sentiment. Political reform came in the shape of a radical 
restructuring of party relations at the local level, with the goal of undermining the 
position of the conservative party bureaucrats by bringing rank-and- file party members 
into the decision-making, dismantling the institutional bases of bureaucratic power at the 
local level, including the local and regional party organizations.70 
At the macro level, reform decentralized the federation. Almost all decision-making was 
given to the republics. This allowed the leadership to bypass the conservatives who 
dominated the central bureaucracy and to rely instead upon the republic-level leaders and 
central committees, composed of younger reformists.  
For these dogmatic and ideological reasons, many groups of dissatisfied communists felt 
that true Marxism was becoming defunct in Yugoslavia, hence a period of relative 
instability followed, manifested with open demonstrations.  
The first of those occurred during 1963, when new amendments were added to the federal 
constitution. The changes of that year expanded the concept of self-management beyond 
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the economic sphere into social activity. 71  This was achieved by creating local councils 
for education and culture, social welfare, public health and political administration. The 
composition of the Federal Assembly was altered, simultaneously holding office in the 
party and government was outlawed (except for Tito), and government tenure was limited 
and dispersed accordingly by the introduction of a regular rotation system.  
The constitutional status of Kosova was upgraded from a region to a province, which was 
more than simple geographical symbolism. However, Kosova remained authoritatively 
part of the Republic of Serbia (Wilson. D. 1979, p24). This significant step was 
politically and constitutionally important for Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosova. First of all, 
Yugoslavia was made a political unit organised with republican and provincial statuses 
where Kosova (not in reality, but at least on paper) was equal with Vojvodina, thus 
dismantling the existing three-tier system of republics, province and region. To Serbia, 
Kosova’s upgrade represented a higher political form and one that required greater 
autonomy and decentralisation. For Kosova, it was important not only to be made equal 
with Vojvodina, but also because many believed that this paved the road for the next 
natural step of Kosova becoming a republic (Rilindja 19.03.1964).72  
Demands by conservative forces were strong. They believed that ‘too much too soon’ 
was happening, even though the political status of Kosova was reduced to its bare 
minimum (Wolff S. 2006, p63).  From the perspective of political developments, such 
actions were achieved by separating Kosova and Vojvodina almost entirely from the 
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political framework of Yugoslavia, pushing them towards Serbia with only superficial 
association to the federation. The only true federal institution in Yugoslavia with which 
Kosova and Vojvodina were equal was the CPY. These changes “brought Kosova to 
virtually a near-colonial dependency, ruled, neglected and exploited by Serbia” 
(Russinow . D. 1980. p13). 
Regarding these changes, Radosin Rajović argues that: “decentralisation was the word, 
despite strong objections from conservative forces…the experiment that opted to make 
Yugoslavia more flexible was only to include republics of the federation… Kosova 
nonetheless got her bit of the constitutional change… for the first time it was to be called 
a province” (Rajović R. 1985 p 71-6). 
Between 1964 and 1967, the federal assembly reduced the role of the state in economic 
management and created the legislative foundation of market socialism. Reform also 
included external trade measures: Yugoslavia devalued its currency, obtained foreign 
loans, and joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The period immediately 
following this set of reforms brought stagnation: rising unemployment, price increases, 
illiquidity, and increases in income disparity. Many Yugoslav workers sought 
employment by emigrating to Western Europe. Leaders in Serbia, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and elsewhere scrambled to stave off efforts to close unprofitable enterprises 
in their areas. Political elites at all levels enjoyed perks of the system, for it allowed them 
access to stylish new apartments, better jobs, vacation sites and other major benefits 
(Cohen. L. 1989. p15).  On a few occasions, as was the case with Xhavit Nimani, a 
member of Kosova’s CC of the communist party, voices were raised about “the 
interesting models of living provided by some of the comrades of the party” (Rilindja 19 
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June 1965).73  This justifies Slavenka Drakulić’s concept of feudal communism, used in 
her book  Café Europa. Life after Communism. She argues that the leading class of the 
communist elite at central and local level created nearly aristocratic living conditions for 
themselves and their families, while the rest of the people, namely the working class, 
lived below minimum standards. Such a phenomenon very much resembled the bourgeois 
that the communists were supposed to fight, hence the name feudal communism.  
 
At the beginning of 1968, attention moved back to foreign policy. Student unrest 
subsided, and Yugoslav-Soviet relations again sagged after the Warsaw Pact invaded 
Czechoslovakia in August. Tito had travelled to Prague before the invasion to lend 
support to Alexander Dubcek's program of ‘socialism with a human face’.  The 
Yugoslavs warned that they would resist a Soviet invasion, and Tito established a civil 
defence organization capable of mobilizing the country in such an event. 
 
In Kosova, meanwhile, the provincial executive council at the end of 1966 had produced 
its annual report about the performance of the state and the economy. “Temporality is an 
organ of sight” (Sartre J.P 1943, p228). The document talks about things that had not 
been done and that should be done. With a subdued tone, the council provides a catalogue 
of failures, misjudgements, errors and difficulties that the province was facing. It was the 
first time that a general agreement existed amongst all the members of the council on 
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slow development.74 Even more significantly, it was the first auto-critique of those state 
organs. Consequently, during his first visit to Kosova in March 1967, Tito criticised the 
mismanagement of the economy, welfare and social provisions and ethnic and 
community relations. His long speech, addressed to the deputies of the provisional 
assembly, started with the words, “What we see on the ground and what we hear from 
personal accounts, one cannot talk about equal rights in Kosova” (West. R. 1994. p342). 
His words were directed against over-representation of the Serb and Montenegrin 
minorities in most of the institutions of Kosova. While addressing a rally at the 
‘Brotherhood and Unity’ square in Prishtina, Tito expressed the party line about the need 
to eliminate ethnic prejudices by saying: “It is a mistake to speak of national 
minorities…We in Yugoslavia must give an example, and that is not 
impossible…Majorities and minorities no, but workers and equal citizens”. (Komunisti. 
April 1967).75 These remarks by the most important political authority in Yugoslavia, 
also the final arbiter, signalled changes towards a better situation in Kosova, as long as 
people were ready and willing to follow the party line.   
Herbert Marcuse famously called on all fellow Marxist theorists “to place the art of 
politics at the service of social change”. Although, arguably many leaders were no longer 
followers of the Marxist cause, since the system of socialist self-management had strayed 
from the Communist Manifesto; if the principle ‘for the benefit of social change’ had 
been applied in Yugoslavia in general and in Kosova in particular at that time, things 
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would have moved towards a real positivism. Nevertheless, in a Machiavellian maxim 
‘when reforms against repression begin, repression itself becomes less tolerable, for then 
people can see what the all-inclusive liberty really is’, so change was needed and it had to 
happen if not by political means, then by the way of demonstrations. 
By 1968, the Albanian population in Kosova and western Macedonia (Albanians in 
Macedonia received worse treatment at the hands of Skopje authorities than Albanians in 
Kosova) (Glenny M 1996, p261), rose up in demonstrations. They protested against slow 
reforms aimed at them: “since the old conservatives had been removed, no real 
improvement was happening on the ground, at least for Albanians”.76  
But not only Albanians felt that way. Students from Belgrade University demonstrated 
against ‘materialistic tendencies of the regime’. Students from Skopje, Sarajevo and 
Zagreb universities soon joined them, using different methods in the process of affluence 
(North R.C. 1990, p31). Protests were now a problem for more than one federal unit.  
 
In Kosova, students protested with demands different from those of their colleagues in 
other Universities of Yugoslavia. Their demands included a further loosening of the 
security activities that were encroaching freedom and liberalization of education in the 
Albanian language. The centre of political organisation was the Belgrade University 
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branch in Prishtina and higher schools of Kosova, where students and other activists 
prepared plans for action. Their conceptual approach to the problems in Kosova and other 
Albanian regions in Yugoslavia (by 1965, the Macedonian authorities had desecrated the 
Tetova city graveyard by building a road through it) (Pettifer. J.1999. p138) was 
manifested by pragmatic demands, which would guarantee the most basic human rights. 
They advocated free use of the Albanian national flag that was banned in Yugoslavia, 
Albanian self-determination, equal status in the federation, a supreme court for Kosova, 
Albanian as an official language in Yugoslavia, opening a university in Albanian 
language, the right to return to their homeland, and removal of the offensive noun 
Šiptari77 used to refer to Albanians in the federal constitution. (Rilindja 19/11/1968).78  
In Prishtina, over eight thousand people joined the group of students who had started the 
peaceful march from the university campus to the provincial party headquarters (Zëri i 
Kosovës. 1988, p8).79 In a short article that appeared on 30 November, and a longer one 
on 2 December 1968, the newspaper Rilindja reported that, “demonstrations in the streets 
of Kosova were organised by students, high school pupils and workers who chanted for 
political, social and economic improvement in the province”.  
The nationalistic protests in Prishtina were organised on 27 November 1968 to coincide 
with the 28 November national day of Albania and the 25th anniversary of the Jajce 
declaration. Apart from the capital, demonstrations were also held in Ferizaj, Gjilan, 
Podujevë, Prizren and Pejë, while attempts blocked by the police before they happened 
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were reported in Gjakovë, Vuçitern, and Suharekë, amongst others. Similar 
demonstrations were organised in the city of Tetovë in Macedonia. Apart from exposing 
the Albanian national banner, demands for the union of all Albanian regions with Kosova 
in Yugoslavia were the loudest, which of course was particularly problematic, as it raised 
concern about a possible spillover of unrest into Macedonia. 
Reaction by the security services was brutal, as predicted. Veli Deva, the head of the 
Provincial Communist Party, ordered “energetic steps against those who had dared to 
incite wrong-doing and national hatred” (Rilindja. 28 November 1968).80  
Professor Mark Krasniqi, the former chairman of Kosova’s Academy of Science and 
Arts, recalls that “because of the ferocity of police reaction and activity in the streets of 
Prishtina, there were profound fears that a massive catastrophe could take place” (Zëri. 
26 January.1991).81 Such fears materialised on 30 November, when Rilindja reported “in 
yesterday’s protests, Murat Mehmeti, a teenager, was killed by a close-range bullet fired 
by the cordon of police in Prishtina’s Josip Broz Tito Street”.  
Demonstrators were arrested and sentenced to years of imprisonment. According to 
Tanjug, the Yugoslav news agency, by 14 February 1969, 327 protestors were jailed in 
Prishtina, Podujevë and Prizren communes. Both Kuzhnini and Novosella (see footnote 
79) suffered such fates. In fact, Novosella recalls that, within a few weeks of being 
transferred to serve his term at the Niš prison, he met over one hundred mainly young 
students that had participated in protests. Furthermore, since the state never published any 
official account of how many people were sentenced, and considering that some trials 
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continued for months, he assumes that there were many other young Albanians in other 
Yugoslav jails just as they were in Niš prison (Kosova Sot. 5 December 2003).82  
Demonstrations were labelled by officials as “dangerous, nationalistic and secessionist”. 
They were lead by the National Forum, an underground nationalistic organisation of 
lecturers, intellectuals and progressive students wanting to further the national question of 
Albanians in Yugoslavia. The foreboding of the Albanian flag in Yugoslavia was the 
spark that triggered the events. This, along with the issues of the language, economic 
development, and security forces were the main demands by protestors.  
The greatest achievement was the use during the demonstrations of the Albanian national 
flag without the star that Albania used. To them, this represented a spiritual national link. 
With the slogan, “Under you I was born, under you I was reared, and with you I shall 
die”, the small groups of lecturers, students and high school pupils were soon joined by 
ordinary passers-by who even kissed the flag with emotion.83  
Inspiration for such actions was drawn from the 10 June 1878 meeting of the Prizren 
League, when demands of a similar nature by Albanian intellectuals of the time were 
presented to the world powers and the Sublime Port. These demands were of course of a 
nationalistic tendency, as they epitomised everything that the term ‘nationalism’ 
encompasses, i.e. the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about 
their national identity and the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to 
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achieve (or sustain) self-determination.  
In fact, the protestors’ actions raised questions about whether self-determination must be 
understood as having full statehood with complete authority over domestic and 
international affairs, or something less.  
 
In viewing the situation created after the protests, it is easy to see that the Yugoslav 
authorities were very apprehensive about a possible involvement of the Soviet Army in 
redirecting their communism. Nonetheless, one cannot fail to notice that accusations 
addressed to some of the protesters, that they might have been manipulated by the 
Soviets, hold no strength, because none of the protestors (even those in older age groups) 
had ever visited the USSR. They were living in a part of Yugoslavia which to any 
foreigner looked abandoned and hopeless even in economic development, let alone in 
political matters. If the Soviets would have wanted to incite the situation, they would 
probably have started with the most obvious cases where dissatisfaction was present, not 
Kosova, which was the smallest and least-developed region of Yugoslavia. However, 
some of the demonstrators had aroused suspicion when calling for the establishment of 
‘true Marxism’, which they believed was practiced in Albania.   
 
Although the demonstrations that swept Kosova during 1968 failed to ensure the 
campaigners’ demands for republican status, they nonetheless played a vital part in 
alerting the federal authorities to the seriousness of the situation, and this was followed 
by symbolic but psychologically important constitutional concessions.  During his visit to 
the province in 1967, Tito was certainly made aware of the grievances of Albanians. With 
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his famous phrase at the Brotherhood and Unity square in Prishtina, “it is not right to 
have a situation like this…equality is guaranteed by the constitution and as such it should 
be implemented entirely”, he raised the hopes of Albanians for a consideration of their 
plight after a general trend of decentralisation had started. However, in hindsight Tito 
made such a speech simply so he could please the gathered crowd. He also bore a grudge 
against the Albanians, who in his judgment, by demonstrating openly on the streets, had 
nearly brought a full-on military and politic Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia, and had 
blackened his good name on the international stage, where he had boasted on many 
occasions that the national issue of the Yugoslav people was entirely resolved.         
In assessing the protests, and their importance, it is easy to notice that the number of 
people who took part in them is not so substantial; in fact, relative to the number of the 
population84, the number of protesters appears rather small. But the significance is the 
fact that, for the first time in communist Yugoslavia, the surreal propaganda that 
everyone had a beautiful life, where rights and freedoms of all no matter what social 
stratum or nationality they belonged to, was deformed. The protests also showed that not 
everyone agreed with the official line of state and party. 
 
The following political remarks, in line with the main argument of this thesis, show 
conclusively that debate in Yugoslavia was fairly uncensored and even encouraged. 
In response to demonstrations, the fairly liberal-minded Marko Nikezić, president of the 
Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, declared that recent leniency 
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had increased the appetite of Albanian nationalists (Borba. 2 December. 1968).85  
To this situation, the highest political authority in the country added his voice. Reacting 
to the slogans for Albanian unification, Tito declared, “the objective of the demonstrators 
was to threaten and endanger Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity” (Rilindja. 13 June. 
1969).86  Such an outburst by Tito was an overreaction, considering the fact that there 
were at most twenty thousand protestors in the streets of Kosova, which meant that only 
about 2.7% of the population in the province had rebelled, thus the number of protestors 
was not detrimental. Also considering the powerful security service and army that he had 
built, those unarmed people in the streets of Kosova did not present any serious threat.  
From trans-border interest, such protests were a powerful awakening for the ideological 
concept of self-management, for the vast majority of the protesters were openly 
advocating a different brand of communism, one based on universal values of the 
international proletariat that Lenin professed, Stalin invoked, and Enver Hoxha lamented 
in Albania - the so-called true Marxism Leninism.   
 
For the first time, the citizens of Yugoslavia were witnessing something that they had 
been led to believe could never have happened. The state and party propaganda had tried 
to convince people that the ‘federal society’ had no quarrels, no problems or open 
questions, and that everything was smooth and well under brotherhood and unity. Yet, 
these demonstrations held in Kosova, which seemed irrelevant to many people in other 
parts of Yugoslavia, were small but very daring. They directly challenged the political 
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establishment and proved that something very different was going on, something that 
people were talking about in private but were not yet ready to express openly. They all 
knew that Yugoslavia as a system was stagnating and had no other choice but to change 
in political and constitutional terms.   
 
Using the expansion of the provinces’ autonomy (Rilindja 27 August 196887) and 
following the Brioni plenum conclusions, various groups began to organize discussion 
meetings across Yugoslavia. Noticing the changing climate, such meetings were to 
become very important for those who were hoping to air their views about the changes to 
the political order. Meetings in Croatia and Slovenia, for example, had almost one 
common theme: they argued for further financial decentralization of the federation.  
Debates in Vojvodina centred on the issue of maze, sunflower and sugar cane production, 
since the province was considered the breadbasket of Yugoslavia. 
In Montenegro, economic development of the impoverished north and extension of 
tourist packages were amongst the issues discussed. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedonia, the discussion was about domination or subordination of various ethnic 
groups, coupled with economic demands, particularly in Macedonia, where arguments 
were aired about increasing the production of electricity threefold to gain independence 
from Serbia’s and Kosova’s power plants (Borba. 14 September 1968).88  
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After debating delicate issues in other federal units, Kosova also organized such 
meetings. The first was held on 18 and 20 August 1968 in the city of Gjakovë.  Incredibly 
daring demands voiced there were echoed in meetings organised subsequently in other 
towns of Kosova such as Pejë, Gjilan, Podujevë, Lipjan, Gllogovc, Prizren, Mitrovicë e 
Titos, Viti and Deçan. The participants embraced the need “that the federal constitution 
should by law guarantee the right for self-determination for Albanians as it had done for 
other nations of Yugoslavia” (Radio Belgrade. 17 July 1968).89  
Demands by ordinary citizens, local activists of the Communist Party, the Socialist 
League of the Working People, the Law and Economy chambers of Kosova, as well as 
delegates to the provincial, republican and federal governments were: for Kosova to be a 
fully fledged federal unit, i.e. a republic; that the core law in the province should no 
longer be the provincial status but the constitution of Kosova; that the use of national 
symbols in Kosova should not only be free, but should be official and transparent for all 
constituent ethnic groups; that Kosova should have its supreme court and other necessary 
courts at provincial level to deal with internal legal matters; that equality of languages 
should be sanctioned by law and present discriminatory practices towards the Albanian 
language should cease to exist; that by law all the citizens who had left Yugoslavia before 
and after the Second World War should have the right to return;90 that the security service 
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Turkey and Albania. Unlike members of other nationalities, Albanians had no right to return to their home 
country.  A federal law passed in 1956 prohibited the return of people who had left under the assumption 
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should be made accessible to all the nationalities in order to stop selective persecutions of 
Albanians;  that economic development and urbanisation should be organised so that the 
majority of the people could benefit; and that the health service should be extended 
beyond the city and town centres (Rilindja. 19 August 1968).91  
 
Serbs also organised meetings of their own where they discussed such sensitive issues. At 
a meeting held in Zubin Potok, where Serbs were a majority, they called for 
regionalisation of Serbia with Kosmet as one of the component regions, for a brand new 
draft of the constitution of Serbia, and even for reconsideration of Kosova’s political 
framework in Serbia (Jedinstvo 1 September 1968).92 Serbs described participants of 
meetings held in Albanian-dominated cities of Kosova as ‘nationalists’, ‘chauvinists’, 
Albanofiles’, and agents of the fifth column (Politika 22 September 1968 & Rilindja 24 
September.1968). A few went even further by threatening ‘severe disciplinary actions’ 
(Rilindja. 17 Septembar 1968).93  On this issue, Raif Dizdarević94 argues that: The 
remnants of conservative bureaucratic and nationalistic forces in Serbia have never 
                                                                                                                                                 
that such an action would upset relations with Turkey. 
 
91
 Pa vetëvendosje ska barabarësi. (Without self determination there is no equality) 
 
92
 Drug Veljko Pandurović o reakcionarne glasove poslednjih dana u Kosmetu.  
(Comrade Veljko Pandurović on reactionary voices hurled in Kosmet) 
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 Të mbajnë gojen ose të denohen. (Be careful or face prison) 
94
 Raif Dizdarević is a Yugoslav politician of Bosniak ethnicity. During World War II he participated in the 
armed resistance as a Partisan. After the war, as a member of the Communist Party and collaborator of 
Josip Broz Tito, he was elevated into high political functions; diplomat, serving on embassies in 
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Chairman of Federal Assembly,  Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia and in 1988 – 1989 session 
Chairman of the Collective Presidency of Yugoslavia  
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accepted the policy of full equality of Albanians and a stronger position of the provinces 
in the federation. Part of the Serbian leadership, has always had a unitaristic tendency for 
a centralised Serbia. Thus in fact the autonomy of Kosova and Vojvodina was understood 
formally rather than factually by them. (www. rferl.org)95  
 
However, such voices were rebuked by Kosova’s officials, supported by Tito who, after 
dismissing Ranković, was certain that Serbian nationalists had been weakened, 
particularly since even in Serbia some people wanted decentralisation. In this context, 
Fadil Hoxha warned that “we will not allow anyone to destroy what we have built so far.  
Those who have chosen destructive missions are nothing but bureaucrats and 
chauvinists”. Hoxha argued that the expected constitutional changes were “for the 
development of the interests of the Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, Roma etc”.  
Hoxha also raises a difficult problem in the region that of introducing bi-lingual usage in 
administration, education, culture and so forth. Aside from technical complexities of this 
policy, there was overt and covert opposition to it mainly from Serbs and Montenegrins. 
Hoxha concludes that “Language is what makes an individual, and a nation, and as such 
it must be respected, and perspective must be cultivated through revolutionary socialist 
patriotism, but we must avoid glorification and illusions” (www.rferl.org).96  
The Communist Party had no official line on the use of the Albanian language, and 
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everything related to it was encompassed in the rights of the minorities. The Albanian 
language never held a primary position or exposure in Kosova, and it was always used in 
the context of Albanian nationality as a whole.97  
Meanwhile, Miško Sekulović, Chairman of the Commission of the Regional Committee 
for ideological problems in culture, education and science, claimed that:  
Up to the Brioni Plenum, the cultural policy for various nationality groups in this region 
suffered greatly under the harmful influences of etatism and bureaucratism. Their by-
products, integration and great-Serbian chauvinism, have negatively affected the 
Albanian and Turkish cultures. Albanian language and culture must be advanced and 
respected, not tolerated as some are suggesting.98  
 
The issues put forward for discussion during this period are of a very complicated nature, 
but the fact that they were presented in a new manner was a positive development that 
pertained to other problems of the province. 
However, not everyone was of the same opinion. In a lengthy editorial published by the 
journal Praxis, Velimir Rančić, a Kosovan Serb head teacher of a secondary school in 
Eastern Kosova, and a member of the provincial assembly, markedly asserts what he 
calls, “the open instrumentalisation of society in the province. Serbs are asked to stay as 
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 Ecejaket e gjuhes Shqipe. (The developments of the Albanian language. Novelist Anton Pashku . 
Bouletine of the “Migjeni” Society. Ljubljana . March edition 1992 
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12th Plenum of the Kosova-Metohia League of Communists deals with the Issue of "Culture". Rilindja. 
Prishtina 20.11.1967.) 
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passers by in the great surge of Albanisation, and observe our Negros outreaching us”99” 
It is very interesting to notice that such declarations were ignored by the regime, which 
turned them latterly into a kind of dissident stance against Yugoslav communism and live 
ammunition for conservative and nationalist sentiment.  
 
The party session of the Serbian LC, held in May 1968, directly dealt with the issues 
concerning Kosova, further decentralisation of the federation, and Serbia’s position 
within the common state. Some of the members of the session “actively tried to create 
rather then respond to threats to Serbs, by purposefully provoking tensions along ethnic 
lines” (The Washington Post. 24 August 1992, p1).   
As in most cases, there were two groups with different points of view. They argued about 
how far decentralisation must occur in Kosova and how much authority Serbia should 
command from Yugoslavia. During the prolonged session, many delegates “expressed 
their fears of observing Kosmet move towards consolidation of ethnic Albanian identity”. 
Power, they argued, “is resting in the hands of dangerous individuals who, hiding behind 
the claim that Kosmet doesn’t have a republican authority, are venturing to forge a 
society where Albanians are the dominant factor” (Ćosić D 2000, p 134-137).  
 
However, conservative and orthodox thinkers were in the minority, because many 
delegates felt the need for devolution.  The minutes of the session show in the archival 
material that more rational voices argued, “that decentralisation must happen, because it 
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will benefit the whole country”. ðurica Jojkić, the prime minister of Serbia, argued for: 
decentralisation as a means of achieving, economic, social, political and ethnic 
equality…Some of the comrades here argued for decentralisation towards municipalities, 
which is good enough, but Kosmet and Vojvodina must have some kind of political 
framework whereby the social, economic and cultural rights of the nations and 
nationalities there can be materialised. I do not see the need as to why the Serbian 
assembly must be consulted when a new rural road is about to be asphalted in Kosova or 
Banat, let them deal with such small trivia (www.arhiv.sv.gov.yu).100    
 
A speech by Prvoslav Knežević, a former partisan of the famous Kozara battle101 and a 
deputy to the federal assembly from Serbia, was of similar nature. He argued that, “based 
on the values of our joint struggle for liberation…we should all share the same rights and 
freedoms…Kosmet is no exception” (www.arhiv.sv.gov.yu).102  The Albanian 
representative, physicist Gani Efendia, argued that, “It is time for change. No civilised 
society can function if it lives in the past. Kosmet must enjoy the same rights as the 
Yugoslav constitution guarantees” (www.arhiv.sv.gov.yu).103  
                                                 
100
 Drug ðurica Jojkić o domaćim zbivanjima. (Comrade ðurica Jojkić discuses internal developments) 
PcT 117-8-9 
101
 The Battle of Kozara was fought in 1942 on and around the mountain of Kozara in north-western 
Bosnia. It was an important battle of the Yugoslav partisan resistance movement in World War II. It later 
became an integral part of Yugoslav post-war mythology, which celebrated the courage and martyrdom of 
outnumbered and outgunned partisans and civilians. 
102
 Ljudi ujedinjeni oko centralizacije se ne predaju lako. (Those united around centralisation don’t give up 
easily) PcT. 1-16.17-20. 30.05.1968. 
103
 Drug Gani Efendija pervenstveno prestavlja Kosmetske probleme. Comrade (Gani Efendija primarily 
represents the problems of Kosmet). PcT. 39-44-50. 30.05.1968. 
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As a reaction to such meetings and with feedback taken from them, the provincial 
authorities formed a fifteen-member council to deal with proposals for the federal 
constitution.  It was led by Fadil Hoxha, the chairman of the Provincial Parliament, and a 
member of the federal Central Committee. The committee presented the final draft on 25 
September 1968, where the first demand directed to the federal authorities was that the 
new constitution of Yugoslavia, “should express openly the historical genesis of 
Kosova’s autonomy” (Rilindja 27 September 1968).104 The proposals presented Kosova 
as a political, social and territorial community, a historic reality, which according to its 
national basis, had been confirmed as a political entity during the Anti-fascist National 
Liberation War.105 In terms of internal organisation, the committee argued for a greater 
role by Kosova in the development of economic, foreign, defence and security policies.106 
Rrezak Shala, Kosova’s prosecutor general, even questioned, “was Kosova created to 
cater for the needs of all nationalities or the minority population for whom the provincial 
administration was originally created?” (Rilindja 8 November 1968).107  
 
This air of optimism was cut short at a meeting with the highest authorities from Kosova, 
at Karañorñevo108, Tito conclusively declared that a republic would not solve problems 
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for Kosova (Rilindja. 4 November 1968).109 It was a bitter pill for the Albanian political 
elite. Nonetheless, it was a premeditated move by Tito considering that, if Kosova had 
equal status with Serbia, the dissatisfaction amongst Serbs would have been enormous. 
Besides, Tito and Kardelj deemed the current political framework to be working well in 
the distribution of power.110  
Furthermore, creating another republic in the federation would have required a 
constitutional overhaul, and it would have prompted a negative reaction by the Albanians 
in other parts of Yugoslavia, who were only in the border regions of Kosova and 
considered themselves a natural extension of Albanian northern territories.  
A massive problem here was that border redefinition was not exclusive to Kosova. Other 
federal units had parts of their nations outside their borders. In addition, what would have 
been the reaction of the other federal units after another region was made equal to them, 
since the increase of one group’s security is at the same time perceived as a threat by 
other actors? (Wolf S. 2006, p76).  And finally, in Vojvodina, would they also call for 
their province to become a republic? 
 
Tito presented himself as the fearless leader111 and “sided with Serb national interests in 
                                                 
109
 Shoku Tito paraqiti çendrimet e veta. (Comrade Tito presented his standings)  
110
 Tito and Kardel believed that the existence of six centres and two semi-centres of power with the 
ultimate centre resting at the federal level was a progressive way of arranging the federal structure, because 
none of the units could outdo one another, at least when two thirds of the votes needed for fundamental 
political changes were concerned.. Muhamed Kešetović. Kontrarevolucija na Kosovu pokšuaj i 
sprčeavanje: Politčiki esej p9-11. (Counterrevolution in Kosova ways to prevent it.). ( Beograd , 1984) 
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 During a state visit to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1974, Tito caused much controversy with an 
answer given at Bonn International Airport. His visit coincided with the finals of the European football 
championship to be organised in Yugoslavia that year. Two years before, West Germany had won the 
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the rows about economy, tourism and Kosova” (Tanner.M. 1997, p188). He favoured a 
Kosova within Serbia for political reasons, since he needed support from the Serbs on 
consolidating his authority, thus he ‘gifted them Kosova’.112  
There is no evidence to suggest that Tito acted against Kosova’s interest because he was 
a Slav. However, it remains unexplained that even if he had acted in concordance with 
the Albanian wishes for republican status, why did he fear that Kosova, geographically 
the smallest unit of the federation, and economically the weakest, would become a factor 
in the internal politics of Yugoslavia?   
Regarding such an idea, David Lake and Donald Rothchild argue that the “fundamental 
causes of ethnic friction/conflict are strategic interactions between and within groups 
themselves” (Lake D.A. & Rothchild D. 1998, p8). If they fail, then the fear factor takes 
hold and distrust plagues the political process. Nevertheless, there is also another school 
of thought, which argues that, “only a true and proper functioning national union can 
make a viable multinational union” (Maximilian H.1995, 41-2). With hindsight, 
Maximilian’s idea is very intriguing. One can only fantasize about a Yugoslavia where all 
nations lived in their own units, without significant minorities in them, and equal to one 
another. In such a case, would the terrible wars of the 1990s have ever happened, and 
would the destruction of Yugoslavia have ever occurred?   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
World Cup and was one of the favorites for the tournament. Tito was asked by journalists if Yugoslavia 
were to play in the final against Germany will they win the game and consequently the whole tournament? 
Tito replied “sure we can win against Germany, we defeated them in the war, we can also defeat them on 
the pitch”.  (Tito’s home page.  http://www.titoville.com/speeches-mp3.html) 
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 Vladimir Gligorov: at “A Tribune of political and ethnic activism in Yugoslavia ” Skopje . 16.12.2006  
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After that meeting with Tito, the Kosova officials immediately changed their tune to 
coincide with the words of their mentor.  Speaking at the provincial parliament, Fadil 
Hoxha declared, “at this moment we are not oriented for a republic, the current political 
framework of the province is functioning appropriately”. In an almost prophetic remark 
while stipulating the official stand of the KCP for further devolution within the 
autonomous status, Hoxha exclaimed that “when political changes next happen, we will 
raise the debate: since autonomous provinces are entities which develop accordingly as 
other republics do”. Hoxha subsequently modified his opinion to follow the popular tide: 
“we were not imposed on Serbia …we are associated with Serbia for the benefit of both 
nations. Provinces can’t be isolated from the process of political change for they too are 
territorial entities created during the National Antifascist Liberation War”.113  
The belief amongst high-ranking communist officials was that problems about the union 
should not come from Kosova, and that the province, because of its complex mixture of 
politics, history and culture, should not be exposed to anything traumatic, which Serb and 
Albanian nationalists could do easily. (Ibid)  
 
Taken from this perspective, nothing can explain the cold shoulder given to such 
demands by a people who after all were part of Yugoslavia and who had taken the 
courage to protest exactly because of the unfair treatment, The level of devolution that 
Kosova registered with 1968-9 changes was superficial, considering for example the fact 
that Slovaks or Russians of Vojvodina were allowed to use their national banner (Vukas 
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B. 1978, p 31), even though their number was far smaller than Albanians.  However, if 
the1968-69 constitutional changes had been as comprehensive as those of 1974, then 
criticising Tito would have been a sin. Such changes were far-reaching and wide, even 
though they did not bring Kosova the status of a republic. 
Indeed, all the party leaderships, including the Serbian, enthusiastically supported this 
decentralization. By the summer of 1971, there was also discussion of decentralizing the 
party, a topic that was addressed at a party meeting in November 1971 (Bilandžić D. 
1979, p427). If undertaken, the effect would have been to institutionalize reformism in 
each republic, remove all power from the conservatives who dominated the centre, and 
reduce the possibility of a conservative comeback. 
The goal of the reforms had been in part to broaden the legitimacy of the communist 
party by building a base amongst the wider population.114 This meant, however, that 
conservatives were faced with leaders who could mobilize the population in support of 
irreversible radical changes in the structure of power.   
Facing considerable political frictions, Tito decided to approve some concessions. The 
most important for Albanians was the free use of the Albanian flag and bilingual equality 
in the province. A handful of judicial and legislative rights, which alongside the existing 
powers gave the provincial courts a wide array of activity, were also promulgated, and 
both autonomous provinces gained direct representation in all five chambers of the 
federal assembly.115  
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The autonomous provinces were now defined in constitutional and legal terms as socio-
political communities.116 Kosova was given greater priority in the distribution of central 
economic funds, though the results of such acts were uneven, because of a tendency to 
concentrate economic activity in large towns. Kosova was also given the right to create 
its own central bank with limited power, since fiscal policy, money and interest rates 
were exclusive to the People’s Bank of Yugoslavia.  
The Supreme Court of Kosova was established with limited competences.  
In 1970, a law ordered amalgamation of the faculties that Belgrade University had 
opened in Prishtina and created a bilingual (Serb and Albanian) University of Kosova.117  
In a further psychological concession, the name of the province was changed simply to 
Kosova, removing Metohija118, a pejorative name for Albanians, from official use. In a 
similar category, the belittling and disparaging term Šiptari, which was also used 
offensively, was removed in favour of a more politically and grammatically correct 
Albanian, which after all was in use internationally.  
The federal and provincial institutions were encouraged to take further steps to promote 
                                                                                                                                                 
the federal chamber for social and health policy and the federal chamber for socio-political issues, were 
divided so they could solve better problems of the each dedicated field.  
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 Such term was also used to define the federation and six republics but never before the provinces. 
117
 The Yugoslav educational system had built in various cities all over the federation some college-type 
two-year-long schools, where a student could attend an undergraduate degree after finishing high school. 
Along with the University of Prishtina, seven such institutions were opened in the major cities of the 
province. 
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 The term Metohija comes from the Greek word metoh, meaning church. Metohija implies that the land 
of that region is in the hands of the Serbian Orthodox Church and thus is offensive to Albanians.  The name 
Metohija does not cover the entire Dukagjini plateau in the western Kosova, but only a small proportion of 
land in between the Deçan monastery and Serbian patriarkana at the city of Pejë. 
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the use of the Albanian language in public institutions, and publishing Albanian books 
and materials was to be increased, not only for academic use.  
Along with the Serbo-Croatian Prishtina newspaper Jedinstvo, the only Albanian daily in 
Yugoslavia , Rilindja, was extended from eight to twelve pages a day.119  In the 
educational sphere, at the beginning of 1970-71 school year,  Albanian-only secondary 
schools were allowed for the first time, and the school curriculum was revised in Kosova 
by the  ‘Committee of advisors in charge of education’, which made teaching the 
Albanian language in all primary and secondary schools a norm. Literary and historical 
developments of the language and the nation were also included. Past periods of history, 
including the Albanian national renaissance movement120, were now part of the 
curriculum. Albanian folklore started to become commercially available.121  
 
Although all these prerogatives appear grandiose, they were not nearly enough to bring 
equality for Kosova in the federation. The political process that had started in 1945 had 
already accommodated the demands of other nations of Yugoslavia which, by the time 
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Albanians were calling for a republic, were calling for a confederation.   
Precisely because there was only superficial constitutional change, and none of the 
federal units was satisfied with the 1968-9 amendments, the 1974 constitution occured  
Arguments about how far devolution should progress formed the main debates of that 
period. The content of such debates are the main themes of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES AND REACTIONS IN AND ABOUT KOSOVA 
FROM 1968 TO 1974 
    
The1968 demonstrations epilogue in Kosova requires practical and careful consideration. 
In Yugoslavia, there was investment and development, but still not enough to satisfy the 
needs of all ordinary citizens.  
Communism as a regime did not necessarily like free liberal thinking, which is 
effectively regulated by a political conception of justice (Rawls. J. 1996. p16), therefore 
only the official state and party line was discussed.  There was considerable speculation 
with notions such as freedom, brotherhood and equality, but they were never applied in 
their true meaning as Marxist theorists explained them (Nikolov. N. 2004, p12). Hence, 
one must consider all these issues when debating the internal arguments in any given 
Communist society, not only Kosova or Yugoslavia.  
Communists were not even realists. Realism is to insist that despite difficulties there must 
be something that needs to be done (Gellner. E. 1959. p180). The reason for this is that, 
by 1970, Yugoslavia was being suffocated by growing bureaucratisation of the economic 
system because of the fragmentation of the economy into many thousands of self-
management units, each supported by its own brokers and technocrats. As a political, 
economic, and social order, self-management released some of the human potential in 
energies and initiatives (Lydall. H. 1989. p239), but it also slowly created a whole army 
of dependent workers. By the end of 1970, there were over two million self-management 
bureaucrats (Lane. A. 2004. p145), with a concentration of power and authority in the 
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hands of the few who ruled over their republics and provinces as their personal fiefdoms 
(Pavković .A.2000, p70).  
Prior and especially after 1968, the subjects for whom the system was created – the 
working people – became ever more sceptical spectators in everything that was 
happening around them (Thompson. M. 1992. p38).  
 
Despite an air of liberalism, investments in economy, and development in agro-industry, 
education, culture and infrastructure, Kosova was still a backward underdeveloped 
region, with the Albanian factor ‘facing negative treatment’ (www.rferl.org).122 Speaking 
in an interview for the Belgrade Vreme newspaper about his attitude and determination in 
persisting with political demands towards the Serbian and Yugoslav federal authorities, 
Adem Demaçi  described the historic struggle of Albanians under Serbia and argued that 
“Albanians wanted nothing more than to be a free and self-ruled people within the 
federation”.123 However, the wretched situation was not only happening because of their 
ethnic repression, it was also due to the fact that the communist ideology betrayed 
Albanians in Yugoslavia.  
They were thrust into the amalgamated Yugoslavia, and since the beginning of 
communism in their region, they had been treated as second-class citizens, i.e. a 
nationality. Their disapproval of communism lacked substance and organic factorisation. 
Dissidents like Demaçi argued for the overhaul of communism and a return to true 
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Marxism and Leninism, which meant that Albanian national demands became diminished 
in the eyes of political activists and ordinary citizens. These groups also failed to 
establish a true and meaningful connection with any dissident groups in other parts of 
Yugoslavia, which would have given them much stronger political muscle.    
 
However, “national equalisation and cohesion have harmed a lot of negative nationalistic 
tendencies by forcing interests of their own ethnic groups onto other ethnic groups” 
(Šuvar S.1970, p154). A remark like that, where Albanians were treated as second-class 
citizens, fits perfectly not only with the time since Serbia annexed Kosova, but also the 
time prior and after the 1968 demonstrations, when martial law was declared in the 
province, which mirrored a classic military occupation: 30000 troops were deployed from 
federal units. To many people they looked foreign; not only for the different languages 
they spoke, but also for the brute force they exercised. They were more than both the 
Italian and German occupators had ever managed to send to Kosova. According to 
witness accounts, nearly 1000 civilians were killed (Vickers. M.1995. p205).  
 
In so doing, the security forces wanted to show that no provocation would be tolerated, 
and that despite Ranković’s dismissal, they were powerful as ever. In a shivering idea, 
they also wanted “to teach irredentists and separatists a good lesson to remember for a 
long time” (Rajović R.1985, p 114).  
The constitutional amendments of 1969 were only designed to calm the situation and to 
bring popular euphoria into a position where it could be controlled by the state security. 
At face value, such changes were ridiculous. Italian and German regimes had allowed the 
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Albanian language and flag, even though they were occupators, whilst Yugoslavia, a 
country that Albanians had fought to liberate, suppressed such demands with violence.  
What followed manifested itself gruesomely with the political dissatisfaction of the 
Croatian Spring124 and internal political turbulences. Again, the high authorities were 
responsible, because “It lies in the nature of things that the beginnings are slight but, 
unless great care is taken, the rates of inconvenience will multiply rapidly and finally 
reach a point that no one could foresee”. (F. Guiciardini. Ca 1538).125  
 
Of particular importance was the establishment of the first collective presidency for 
Yugoslavia in 1971. In addition to providing direct representation for both provinces in 
the highest political body in the country, this act made Serbia the most powerful unit in 
Yugoslavia by giving her three votes – its own, and those of Kosova and Vojvodina 
(Doucette. S. & Thaqi. H. 2004. p133). However, most of the votes in this body were 
ideological, inclined to follow Tito’s agenda.  
Although provincial institutions chose political representatives from both provinces, they 
were nearly always obedient to Belgrade, for “power is the ability to make sure that a 
second actor will do that which in other circumstances he would have not done, or to 
make sure that the same actor will not do that which otherwise they would have done” 
(Dahl R. 1970, p12). Alternatively, in line with Kristo Frashëri’s argument, the chosen 
individuals were members of the group that liked what was offered to them by the 
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government - even if it meant serving someone else’s needs and wants.   
 
The Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA), one of the most important pillars of the state, 
symbol of unity and factor in legitimising the regime, there to maintain the political order 
and keep Yugoslavia from disintegrating (Gow. J. 1992. p26-62), was also affected by 
these changes. An order was promulgated to locate the military away from the inner 
cities. There was a constant stream of complaints from the people who lived near the 
military barracks, stating that conscripts did not respect local traditions and were 
misbehaving especially while drunk.  
 
In generally terms, the 1968 protests were not entirely in vein. They brought some 
relative changes, and they were manifested at international level. After the occupation of 
Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact, a period of normalisation of relations with the 
Soviet Union followed. It began in 1969 with the Soviet premier visiting Yugoslavia, and 
a follow-up visit to Moscow by his Yugoslav counterpart in June 1970.  
By August of 1970, diplomatic relations with the Holy Sea were established, after the 
bitter split following the imprisonment of the Croat catholic archbishop in 1946. In 
September that year, President Richard Nixon of the USA visited Yugoslavia.  
  
This quasi liberalism encouraged debate in Kosova and Yugoslavia, particularly about 
internal relations, and especially between Prishtina and Belgrade. Debates between 
provincial politicians, and Kosova representatives in Serbian or Yugoslav institutions, 
were about objectives. The provincial politicians wanted betterment. Others were keen to 
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agree with whatever they were told, thus pleasing their officers, and they never really 
bothered with the demands of their constituents, except to safeguard their employment. 
Many such cases of servilism occurred across Eastern Europe. The prevailing axiom of 
the system was that “once you become somebody, keep silent about things around you 
(i.e. things that go wrong) and you will have your superiors tap your shoulder”.  
Outside Kosova, the official state policy kept a close eye on internal provincial relations. 
The Serbian institutions were always first to react to whatever movement was happening 
in the province. The federal institutions on the other hand, were slower to react. They did 
not want to be involved with problems of federal entities, because they always hoped 
things would settle down, before the need to intervene could arise, thus creating a 
situation where the regime fixed and moved anything, including punishment, according 
to its needs (Qosja R. 2005. p56).  
 
Another group worth mentioning is the ever-growing intellectual elite of Kosova, who 
dared (and consequently paid for it) to question the official policy framework. 
The Writers League of Kosova was forced to abandon two meetings during May 1968, 
because some of the members persisted in adopting a resolution for greater political 
powers to the cultural stream (Rilindja 27 May 1968).126 As a result, the chairman of the 
League, academic Esad Mekuli, explained the meetings by calling them a “manifestation 
of unhappiness that exists amongst the members who advocate furthering national rights 
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for the Albanian nationality”. In elaborating his argument, he explained that: 
The true values of the National Liberation War guarantee that every nation and 
nationality should be the economic, social and political factor in running their units and 
institutions…In Kosova, Albanians are yet to become political factors”. 127 
 
There were of course political demands in other federal units for extension of freedom of 
expression, freedom of movement and so forth, which were partially met by the federal 
authorities. However, the Serbian politicians were particularly involved with the 
assessment of the post-demonstrations situation in Kosova. They even held a special 
plenum of the Serbian Communist League.   
Marko Nikezić, the chairman of the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party, 
responded to the question of how the situation in Kosova was to be resolved. “He 
intended to pursue vigorously the battle against the conservative standpoints which were 
stirred up by the recent nationalist demonstrations”. He rejected outright various voices in 
Serbian and Yugoslav authorities, which maintained that events in Kosova had been a 
result of a rapid democratisation and decentralisation in the province, thus requiring a 
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return to the old order and the policy represented by Ranković (Meir. V.1999, p29).  
Serb nationalists argued that “borders of present day Serbia are neither national nor 
historic borders of the Serbian nation…they are inappropriate, arbitrary and untenable” 
(ðurić. M. 1971. p 230-3). Nikezić, however, was adamant that the political and party 
standpoint set by the Brioni Plenum should continue on its prescribed course.128  
The Serbian republican reaction was also addressed by a number of other high Party 
functionaries, who provided equally interesting contributions. Latinka Perović, member 
of the Central Committee of Serbian Communists, linked the recent events in the 
province to the current uneasy international situation:  
The political damage resulting from the latest events in Kosovo and Metohia must be 
evaluated in the international context. The country’s foreign adversaries, (i.e. USSR) who 
always try to exploit and manipulate tensions in Yugoslavia, have welcomed these 
events. Such situations offer them opportunities to increase their activities in the internal 
affairs of our country...Following the Czechoslovak events, it has been stressed more than 
once that the threat to the security of the country is not only a military threat to our 
frontiers, but that our enemies aim at attacking and destroying our system from within. I 
need not remind you that lately a political "theory" has been launched, which claims that 
because of the nationalities issue, Yugoslavia is threatened with disintegration and 
destruction through a weakening of its internal cohesion. (www.rferl.org)129  
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Not everybody was of the same opinion. Zvezdan Stojičić, deputy justice minister and 
member the Serbian parliament, objected to “the frustrating protracted leniency and 
extensive Albanisation of the province of Kosova and Metohija” and asked for a political, 
constitutional and legal overview of the provinces’ new status, which to him meant 
“preventing the creation of a little Albania inside Serbia”130 (www.arhiv.sv.gov.yu).131  
 The reaction by the Serbian mayor of Prishtina, Jovan Pečanović, also a member of the 
provincial central committee, was along the same lines. At a meeting of the city’s 
assembly, he asked for the revision of the post-Brioni policy, erupting “What do 
Albanians want, haven’t they not got enough?” (Rilindja. 30 March 1969).132 
 
Generally, many in Serbia objected to manifestations of freedom and equality for 
nationalities, “because such happenings were having discriminatory effects for Serbs and 
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Montenegrins in the province” (Kešetović. M. 1984. p46).  
 
The 1968 constitutional arrangements, issued for both of the autonomous provinces, as 
well as other federal units during spring and summer of 1969, were the focal point of the 
internal political debate within Kosova.  
Here is worth noting, as the main argument of this thesis proposes, that although 
constrained by the political environment, debate nonetheless existed in Kosova.   
With a very keen eye, high officials of Kosova observed and implemented the extension 
of the autonomy of the province. They were adamant and quick to point out that any 
possible political implication of the status of the province would benefit the strengthening 
of the federal union (Rilindja. 27 August 1968).133  
However the debate amongst the political elite tended to be ideological. Almost the entire 
leadership of Kosova’s institutions and party rejected Albanian nationalism, which had 
suddenly erupted, although a wave of nationalist affiliation was also noticed during 1967 
in Serbia and Croatia. Meanwhile, the liberals were gaining terrain as counter-forces to 
nationalism. Calling liberalism ‘a destructive force against the state system’, high 
officials were reacting more out of surprise, since a lot of them had really started to 
believe that society was experiencing comprehensive progress.  
Veli Deva, the chairman of the Provincial League of Communists, switching his 
discourse to adjust it to the dominant ideology (Prunier G. 1995. p247), exclaimed that 
                                                 
133
 Shoku Veli Deva i drejtohet plenumit të dytë të Komitetit Qendrore të Lidhjes së Komunisteve të 
Serbisë në Beograd . (Comrade Veli Deva addresses the second plenum of Serbia’s Central Committee of 
the Communist League.) 
 
117 
 
the situation created after the Brioni Plenum, and after the 1968-69 constitutional 
arrangements, resembles a “national awakening with many progressive elements”.  
According to Deva, “only Yugoslavia was able to promulgate and support changes that 
are of vital importance for Albanians and their needs in the federation”. Notwithstanding 
the official position of the party and state, he called the demonstrators “an uneducated 
bunch who lack teachings in the breath of socialist self-management and…don’t 
appreciate the values of brotherhood and unity”. Deva, however, made the distinction that 
developments in the province during the past two years had been felt only in the social 
field and had not been equalled by a similar process in economic development. By this, 
Deva invokes that Kosova’s leadership had accomplished its internal tasks and that it was 
important now for the country to give greater economic attention to the province, and not 
to the political changes the demonstrators had wanted. 
 
On the question of ‘unhealthy nationalist positions in the province’, which came into 
being as a political concept during the December 1968 emergency plenum of Kosova’s 
CP, Deva, from the perspective of a communist provincial leader, blamed both Albanian 
and Serbian extremist positions. The ‘Albanian chauvinists’ were criticized for 
considering everything that had taken place during the post-war period in the province as 
‘defamation’ against the Albanian nationality group. The representatives of ‘great-
Serbian chauvinism’ were criticized for maintaining that ‘nothing bad’ had happened in 
Kosova since liberation. According to Deva, anti-constitutional and anti-reform elements 
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received their greatest support from Serbian chauvinism throughout the world134, and 
among the strong and widespread anti-Brioni and anti-self-management reactionary 
forces outside the province.  He urged a form of social control that would act as a critical 
element in constructing symbolic frameworks to operate at societal, organisational and 
personal levels (Kramer R.C.1992. p217).  
 
Nonetheless, all this was happening in a wider context of debate within the CPY. There 
were different lines of division, such as those between communists and nationalists, and 
liberal versus conservative and revolutionary hardliners. Their arguments were directed 
towards the strong political lines that the party defended but with markedly considerable 
differences according to their ideological interpretations. Therefore, this period of 
plausible internal, and some might say democratic, debate was not restricted to Kosova.   
 
In the context of criticism of the post-demonstrations period, Veli Deva engaged in some 
idiomatic and translucent self-appraisal by stating that it is to (and for) the merit of the 
Provincial Committee of the League of Communists that they succeeded in preventing 
deeper national division in the province.   He also warned, “that demonstrations might 
have a stagnating effect on further affirmation of nationality rights in the province, 
because federal and republican institutions will think twice before extending devolution. 
The process of devolution that had started will stumble in the hands of centralists” 
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(Rilindja 10 December 1969).135  The more distinct the nationality issues became within 
the ranks of the League of Communists, continued Deva, the greater the polarization of 
the positions of nationalist elements became. This led to the containment of anti-socialist 
activities, confining the occurrence of still graver political actions. In an effort to stave 
off the blame that inevitably was up and coming for the Kosova communists, Deva 
concluded that it was precisely the erosion of the influence of these elements that had led 
to the desperate demonstrations of November 27. Such demonstrations, according to him, 
were “directly affected by propaganda from Albania, manifestations that had occurred in 
a multinational environment, and in a socially and economically underdeveloped area, 
where the rural element is predominant and where the ideological influence from the 
working class and other progressive elements of our society is small (Ibid).  
Such remarks by Deva made the demonstrators look outdated, backward, and at times 
even primitive and of rural roots.  During his interview with the author, Simon Kuzhnini 
described remarks by Deva, who after all was suppose to represent the will of the people, 
as appalling, anti-Albanian and suffering from the self-centred phenomenon.  
This is a ‘technique of neutralisation’ applied by Deva. It implies an awareness of 
infringing a rule, i.e. using offensive and abusive language towards the demonstrators, 
that the actor at some level accepts as legitimate, i.e. the protestors to accept his claims as 
correct (Sykes G & Matza. D. 1957. p664-670).     
In general terms, his account can be understood as a promotion of a continuous line of 
                                                 
135
 Shoku Veli Deva i drejtohet plenumit të dytë të Komitetit Qendrore të Lidhjes së Komunisteve të 
Serbisë në Beograd . (Comrade Veli Deva addresses the second plenum of Serbia’s Central Committee of 
the Communist League.) 
 
120 
 
thought that was seeking to secure as many political and constitutional gains for the 
province as possible.  However, due to the risky situation he was in, Deva did not want to 
upset his political republican and federal mentors; bearing in mind that he could very 
easily be labelled as a nationalist and a reactionary neo–Stalinist, hence he was treading 
on a very thin ideological line.      
 
Reactions from Albanian officials were more or less the same, exemplifying the situation, 
blaming the demonstrators and praising the communist leadership and ideology for 
‘surviving the crisis’. Ali Shukriu’s account was of just such a tone, imbued in anti-
nationalistic rhetoric. At that time, he was a member of the Yugoslav Federal Executive 
Council and known as a hardliner. He examined the characteristics of the demonstrations 
from a strictly ideological angle, putting the blame for nationalist-inspired disturbances 
on the intellectuals. According to him, through their non-participation in the recent 
excesses, the best support for the province's leadership came from the small working 
class of the region, which comprised seventeen to eighteen percent of the social 
composition of the League of Communists. Shukriu had the following to say about this 
social stratum: “The intelligentsia136 which is presently growing too fast is of peasant 
origin. This social element possesses all the petty-bourgeois characteristics in particular 
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with regard to the nationality issue and socialist relations”, thus not only making the 
demonstrators part of feudalism, an eradicated social order which “communism had 
defeated”, but also insulting them with connotations of regionalism and provincialism. 
“We must square accounts with the representatives of this group. Investigation of the 
people who took part in demonstrations has shown that they represent those with whom 
we have always had problems on the nationality issue”. He adds,  
Such groups come from a predominantly peasant environment with a conservative and 
religious mentality toward the question of socialist relations. Hundreds of these people 
with a complete lack of working class background are represented in the League and are 
employed by the militia, in commerce, collective farms, education and so forth.  
 
To remedy this picture, Shukriu proposes a long-term policy of greater concentration on 
the economic development of Kosova and speedy incorporation of a larger number of 
direct producers in the social activities of the province.137  
In this debate, the prevailing idea of urban versus rural was a position identified by the 
high political officials. Such an idea is very far-fetched, since both of these individuals 
were in high party and state positions, which meant that they could change the situation 
for the better if they wanted to. Their argument also had another bearing. If such an idea 
had been accepted, then the demonstrations would have looked more or less like chanting 
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by a mob, which would have decreased their political significance. To further such an 
aim, Deva openly criticised the Yugoslav press in general “for misinforming the public 
and for fostering a sort of specific anti-socialist line which threatens the internal political 
order of the country”, thus showing that in a Yugoslav-wide platform, debate was 
encouraged even in the media, which after all were censored, for they had to adhere to the 
official state propaganda and ideology.   
 
Very much the same answer was given by Tito to the Bosnian daily newspaper 
Osloboñenje. He agreed that problems had arisen since the demonstrations in Kosova and 
acknowledged that the general prevailing situation in the province was “problematic”, but 
he thought that the situation was not bad”. He criticised the provincial leadership for not 
seeing it coming, but concluded that “everyone concerned must engage in self-criticism”. 
Discussing what was to happen next, Tito thought that “some constitutional amendments 
are necessary, but what we have planned to grant Kosovo is nothing more than what we 
think is just and right” (Tito J.B. 1984, p93-5, book IV). 
 
Petar Kostić, Secretary of the LCK PC Presidium, claimed that the results achieved up to 
that point warranted modest optimism, observing that "dissatisfaction remains, and the 
results of the political campaign launched against nationalist deviations and irredentism 
in the province are not very high”.  In his account of the measures taken, he reported that: 
534 party members have been expelled, while an even greater number has been dropped 
for inactivity. At Prishtina University alone, 364 party members have been expelled. To 
date, 260 students have been expelled from middle, higher, and high schools, and from 
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the university. They have also lost their scholarships and credit status. At the same time, 
about 210 teachers have been dismissed from their positions in the province.”138 
 
This attack would come to haunt the communist officials in Kosova for “history has 
internal logic and moral significance” (Soloviev.V.S. 2000, p101).  In 1981, when the 
episode of “Kosova Spring” happened, a number of the organisers and demonstrators 
were affected directly or indirectly by the actions that Kostić described earlier. 
Furthermore, through such actions aimed at reducing the influence of educated people on 
the masses, the official stance of the Communist Party proved that only those who were 
willing to act according to the ideological teachings would progress further. This also 
raises the question of whether the Communist Party was ready for a well–educated, 
forward-looking Albanian intelligentsia in Kosova, or would such an elite have formed a 
political, ideological, individual and ethnic threat.  If it was otherwise, the development 
of intelligentsia surely was to be encouraged. 
 
Justifying the reaction of the security services against demonstrators in a prolonged 
campaign “of eradication of all hostile elements”139, Bahri Oruçi, President of the 
Executive Council of the Province of Kosovo, said; “In the last few days increasing 
hostile propaganda is evident. The enemy responds to all our efforts with a counter-effort, 
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the security service is very slow in discovering such hostile activity”.140 Oruçi here 
directly blames the protestors for upsetting the present situation, while indirectly blaming 
the security service, who appear to have been caught off guard by the protestors.  
For the first time, he acknowledged that the Committee for the Liberation of Kosovo, an 
opposition group, was operating in Llap, and that they had led the hostile activity.141 In a 
frank admission about the popular support for such a group, he explained that “many of 
the 1,000 students in Podujevë still defend the hostile standpoints and demonstrations of 
1968 and regard the organisers of such illegal groups as heroes”. (Ibid) 
Oruçi said that in some villages in central and western Kosova the enemy is "active 
underground, while in others it acts openly" (Ibid).  
Both these cases show a certain measure of desperation from the party and state officials. 
Support for the nationalistic activity had come as a surprise to them, and they appear to 
have forgotten that, ideologically, communism had not taken root amongst the masses. 
Since a considerable number of the population were still uneducated, they continued to 
foster the tradition of folk and mythological figures that had defended the Albanian 
nation, some of them fresh from the open clashes with the Yugoslav partisans in the 
aftermath of the Second World War.    
 
Fadil Hoxha followed more or less the same line which came to be the official party and 
state explanation for the situation, when, speaking in a session of the YCL of  the 
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‘Trepça’ mining complex, he said: The problems in the province are rooted deeply in the 
mentality and beliefs of the people. Unfortunately, I am aware that in your collective the 
number of Albanian members of the YLC is no more than 27%. This is a problem 
because there is an incorrect attitude held by Albanians about the Communist party, for 
they still associate the party with many Serb and Montenegrin politicians in the province. 
It is our duty to explain this and help those who don’t know about the benefits of party 
membership, and our duty does not end here amongst the miners, but it must be extended 
to farmers, soldiers and especially students who can be prone to deviations. The country 
has a real and true perspective, but to this some choke up, those who do so are our 
enemies. He concluded: We must convince everyone that we will not allow anybody to 
destroy that what we have built so far, because those who have chosen destructive 
missions are nothing else but bourgeois bureaucrats and chauvinists. We have built our 
life during the periods of greatest deformations, and now we must not wither away but 
built the socialist society with greater enthusiasm.142  
 
Such a description was true to a degree. The Committee for the Liberation of Kosovo that 
had helped in organising the 1968 protests was not entirely eliminated, although its 
leader, Adem Demaçi, and a few other collaborators were subject to confinement.  
In an interview for the Tirana daily Shekulli, while describing his personal bleak fate as 
the destiny of Albanians in former Yugoslavia, Demaçi argued that political and 
propagandistic activity still continued by his group, and his imprisonment only increased 
                                                                                                                                                 
141
 The region of Llap named after the River Lap in north eastern Kosova 
126 
 
the resolve of other members to carry out their activities. He claimed that there was no 
valid counter-argument that the CP could present against their arguments, “for all our 
demands, merely mirrored the true situation on the ground”.143  
 
However, some members of the Kosova provincial assembly had declared otherwise, and 
they provided an opposition. They claimed that “demonstrators did not take to the streets 
only so the student problems of accommodation and poor canteen service could be 
discussed at the state and party level, they took to the streets so that political tendencies 
shown by the protesters were heard”. Shani Sadiku, for example, stated that “before 
blaming the students, wouldn’t we be better off investigating their modest claims?” At 
the same time, Rukije Mavriqi, from the women’s association, voiced concerns about 
“the impact on the internal structure of the state, the opposition shown to the system, and 
the reaction shown to the opposition by the system” (Rilindja. 1 April 1969).144      
                
Meanwhile, in a typical communist format, the intellectual elite of Kosova were arguing 
prolifically that nothing but change could settle the present crisis. Bona fide, Professor 
Gazmend Zajmi, argued that alongside the improvement of political status for Kosova, 
there was a need to improve the position of the Albanian language in the province and 
beyond, as “this issue is not treated with much of an interest because equality of 
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languages brings about equality of nationalities” (Përparimi. 1971.Nr 7. p559).145  
Dr Rasim Ademi, from Kosova’s chamber of advocates, welcomed new constitutional 
developments and called them “a step towards achieving and strengthening the bonds 
with the federal institutions”, while Kosova’s chief justice Ramadan Vraniçi, argued from 
the legal point of view that “Kosova must be an equal and separate federal entity. The 
adopted semper edem modus must not block the much-needed developments. This is an 
imperative of our time” (Mišović. M. 1987. p 155).  
 
Regarding this argument146, the distinguished Albanian academic and historian, Professor 
Ali Hadri, wrote that, looking at this objectively, Kosova was the most underdeveloped 
region of Yugoslavia. In truth, Serbs viewed the province as some sort of colony, and not 
only in the old royal Yugoslavia. Under the discriminatory economic and cultural policy, 
normal life in Kosova had been suffocated for many years. The liberation had brought 
considerable advantages, but such advantages did not extend as far as they should to 
bring equality with other federal units (Hadri. A. 2003. p320-2).  
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Considering such reactions to the political demands made by protesters and their leaders, 
they appear essentially economic, and nationalistic. Supporters of a republican status for 
Kosova saw the solution to their national question through the attainment of their own 
republican entity/state, perhaps even in the present provincial borders “against a statist 
Serbian movement” (Krstič B. 2004, p159) that refused such changes outright. However, 
the position of an ethnic minority or a nationality did not fulfil all their demands or 
dreams, since ethnic minorities/nationalities are groups of people who, because of their 
physical, cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and territorial specifics, are subject to 
collective discrimination by the majority of that given territory (Wirth L 1945, p347). 
 
Reviewing these debates, one can observe a tough stance against the demonstrations, 
manifested by Kosovan politicians, as well as a questioning of whether protests were the 
best way to achieve more autonomy for Kosova.   
  
The federal and Serbian authorities were also involved. Constitutional changes and the 
amendments of 1968-69 were an orchestrated manoeuvring to show “the positive face of 
Yugoslav socialism which reacts whenever necessary to further socialist self-
management’ (Tito J.B. 1984, p109, book IV).  
Evoking “fears for problems of sovereignty and indoctrination by alien factors”147, Tito 
became directly involved. After hosting Pierre Werner, the Prime minister of the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg, at his presidential palace in Dedinje, he commented ex officio: 
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Sovereign states hold dear the rights of non-interference in their internal affairs of state 
by other factors or organisations”. Tito went further to condone the reaction by his 
guest148 of the violation of human rights in Yugoslavia, when he said:  Nobody knows 
better the political situation of its state than the people of that state. Kosovo was 
mentioned many times by prime minister, but in the eyes of the people of Yugoslavia, is 
not the most important issue, we have other battles to fight, and other wars to win, with 
economical and political development of our country (www.arhiv.sv.gov.yu).149   
 
Tito commented on the issue of demonstrations in Kosova and gave his personal account 
about the protestors’ demands. In an act of pure ‘cognitive dissonance’ – a condition 
where one is aware of the incompatibility between what one is doing  and the kind of 
person one assumes oneself to be (Hinton. 1996 p818-831) – Tito ventured to explain the 
prevailing state of affairs. While celebrating the 25th anniversary of new Yugoslavia in 
the town of Jajce150, Tito tried, while comparing them with similar protests in other 
European countries, to present the demonstrations as the usual disorder caused by rowdy 
students, which should not be dramatized and must not be given the front page (Rilindja. 
1 December. 1968).151  His reaction could have been justified, especially since the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Yugoslavia, had blown up a plane over Sweden, and killed a Yugoslav ambassador overseas.   
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 The Luxembourg Prime Minister was also speaking on behalf of the European Community.  
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 Document no 2/31.35/07. Minutes of the joint press conference at the Dedinje residence by Tito and 
Pierre Werner. 19 May 1969.  
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 Jajce town where the consolidating session of new Yugoslav government was held for the first time in 
1943. Many foreign dignitaries and journalists had gathered for the occasion. 
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 Të rinjët gjëjnë mynyra të ndryshme argetimi. (The young find various ways of entertainment)  
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international situation was becoming radicalised by the day, but he avoided the 
nationalistic demands of the students for greater autonomy in Kosova, opting for only a 
few superficial concessions. 
Later, while strongly condemning such acts, Tito said that the objective of the 
demonstrators was to threaten and endanger Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity (Rilindja. 
13 June 1969).152  He was most probably reacting to the very left-wing rhetoric echoed 
during the demonstrations, which in some circles in Belgrade were even called 
Enverism.153 Consequently, such words made demonstrations the talk of all Yugoslavia 
and resulted in speculation and conspiracy theories about possible involvement of 
Albania’s or even the USSR’s secret services in their organisation. Such accusations were 
groundless, no doubt. All the demonstrations had been organised by student and 
underground Albanian nationalistic groups that acted in Kosova and, as documented 
above, the Committee for National Liberation of Kosova. Forty years later, no one from 
the organisers, even though they live in a system where freedom of speech is guaranteed, 
has come forward as a witness of such involvement. And forty years later, neither the 
Albanian secret service, nor anybody from the former Soviet KGB, has come forward to 
document such involvement.     
In view of the powerful and omnipotent security service in Yugoslavia, which was still 
heavily dominated by the Serb and Montenegrin elements in the province, it is very hard 
to imagine that anybody from Albania could have slipped the net and placed themselves 
in such danger by organising popular protests in Kosova. Even in an official communiqué 
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released by the government of the Peoples Republic of Albania, official Tirana refutes 
with austerity any suggestion that it was involved and asks: “Why is Yugoslavia unable 
to provide any official proof or even the slightest shred of evidence for Albania’s so-
called involvement? All they do is conjure up and fire speculative propaganda”.154  
In fact, such a conclusion is very possible, for at that time Albania had descended into a  
political crisis caused by the rift with China.  After it had gained a place at the United 
Nations under a proposal sponsored by Tirana, China had soon terminated almost all 
relations with Albania and withdrew the status of preferential economic, military and 
cultural partner given to Albania.  
 
Edvard Kardelj, one of the closest confidants of Tito, argued: The 1968-69 and 1971 
amendments to the federal constitution brought changes to the political system, but those 
changes were noticed in only a few fields, thus comprehensive changes did not 
materialise due to various shortcomings. The implementation of those changes from the 
very beginning faced difficulties that couldn’t be overcome at that stage in the state’s 
development, for  various political and regional reasons (Rilindja 3 April. 1973).155  
 
Kardelj is arguing that when the provinces were debated, he supported further 
                                                                                                                                                 
153
 Reference to Albania ’s leader Enver Hoxha and his harsh dogmatic Stalinism 
154
 Revista. “Nëntori”, Tiranë N/8 1969 , f.17-29. (The eighth edition of Periodical “November”) 
 
155
 Speech by Edvard Kardelj at the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of YCL.(quoted by Ana Lalaj. 
2000, p91) 
 
132 
 
decentralisation and liberalisation of the system. However, centralisation forces of the old 
school were against this step, as well as some in Serbia’s conservative circles who did not 
like extension of provincial autonomies, fearing they would erode Serbia’s authority and 
lose political territory. In other words, to safeguard Serbia’s collective political emotions, 
they would not be swayed in a destructive and disorderly direction (Scheff. T. 1994, p17). 
 
The Yugoslav Prime minister of the time, Mika Špiljak, commented that “such changes 
were not only a demonstration to international factors how far the people’s democracy in 
Yugoslavia has gone, but they also show that the federal state in its aim to consolidate 
people’s power is willing to extend decentralisation, so everyone can benefit”.156  
 
Ivan Stambolić, who in spring 1968 began his rise to power in Serbia as soon as the 
demonstrations happened, argued that “implicated and indoctrinated Albanian youths in 
Kosova, who were hoping to be living in the fairytale land that Radio Tirana painted 
Albania to be, are the problem”. He added that the national security of Serbia was put 
into question, “and the common federal state founded on the values of partisan struggle 
for liberation was in doubt”.157 He further stated that “the situation in society cannot be 
unsatisfactory, while members of the YCP are satisfied” (Stambolić I. 1988 p21), thus 
                                                 
156
 Interview by Mika Špiljak. Radio Belgrade 20 April 1969. Cited by Radio Prishtina two days latter.  
(Published in “Bujku” Prishtina. 16/04 1995) 
 
157
 Изнад свега pавноправни допринoc интелигенције y политици. Дpyг Иван Стамболић y Осечини. 
“Politika” Belgrade 12.02.1969. (Above all an equal contribution of intelligentsia in politics. Comrade 
Slobodan Kercun in Osecina)  
 
133 
 
articulating Slavenka Drakulić’s argument that some communist officials were living an 
aristocratic lifestyle while the rest of the population were not that well off.  
 
No doubt encouraged by nationalistic feelings and considerable hardship, people who 
protested on the streets of Kosova’s towns were exactly the group that in Kristo 
Frashëri’s argument lived under communism but did not agree with what they were told 
and given. Something which inadvertently cements Professor Frashëri’s argument is that 
such a group were in the minority under communism, and that two other groups – those 
who enjoyed the privileges of power, and those who stayed silent and did nothing – were 
the largest groups in any given communist state. 
 
The constitutional changes of 1968-69 did not produce the desired outcomes, but they 
had their own logic, and since they were applied all over Yugoslavia, one cannot assume 
that they were triggered only by demonstrations on the streets of Kosova.  They brought a 
loosening of the political strings, especially in the accommodation of nationalities. They 
appeared positive and substantial, but the overdue need for more constitutional changes 
made them look hollow and superficial. The situation in Kosova was used to fire up not 
just the obvious Albanian nationalism, but also the great Serbian nationalism too. By 
reducing their problematic group history towards Kosova into a single episode in history 
(Wolff S. 2006, p79), i.e. linked to the 1389 medieval battle158, the Serbs indiscriminately 
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provided a basis for friction in the future. 
Other nationalist movements in Yugoslavia exploited the situation in Kosova as well. The 
Slovenes and Croats used Kosova to convey their fear that they could lose their position 
in the federation because of the dwindling numbers in their population. The other, smaller 
nationalities also tried to toe the Albanians and obtain for themselves what they had 
achieved in political or constitutional terms, even though they did not enjoy the political 
recognition that the provincial status offered Kosova (www.rferl.org).159  
By 1974, the Yugoslav authorities had revised the constitution entirely. The state was 
declared more or less a confederation of semi-independent quasi–states, though quod erat 
demonstrandum. They used Lenin’s theoretical approach that “to curb all ethnic 
disparities, a core of socialist production with a democratic organisation of the party and 
state structure is needed” (Lenin V.I. 1958, p251). With the intention of deepening the 
self-management structures and holding strongly to the classical Marxist belief that 
                                                                                                                                                 
happened to be the oldest amongst the princes on the day, thus was respected by others for his age. There 
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earlier on the banks of the River Maritsa on 26 September 1371. The Serbian army was heavily defeated 
and many nobles accepted Ottoman vassalage. According to Ottoman historians, these included Prince 
Lazar making the 1389 campaign, to Ottoman eyes, one of justified retribution.  Serbian historians claim 
that Vuk Branković (Lazar’s son in law) abandoned the field at a critical moment during the battle, 
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manifested itself in brutality. The battlefield is situated near Prishtina in modern Kosova. The Kosova plain 
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crossroads in medieval times on the trade routes north-south (Belgrade to the Aegean) and east-west 
(Danube plain to the Adriatic ports)  
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problems of a national and ethnical nature will no longer exist when economic problems 
are resolved, the Yugoslav authorities embarked on a period of reluctant change, reluctant 
because such changes were part of a political process initiated by the party or state 
officials and intended to lead towards a withering away of the state. 
 
Despite tourists from Europe and trade relations with Mediterranean and Persian Gulf 
countries, the economy was stagnating, international debts were accumulating, and the 
level of exports was still lower than imports. By 1971, Yugoslavia owed more than $2.6 
billion, while the level of foreign trade was only able to cover 58.7% of this debt 
(www.nbs.yu).160 To this burden was added Tito’s desire to help financially countries of 
the Non-Aligned Organisation who for their part were doing their bit to entrench 
corruption.161 Between 1965 and 1970, the Federal Executive Council paid $512 million 
in aid to newly emerging postcolonial independent states (www.nbs.yu).162  
  
The state comprises an ensemble of institutions, which do not necessarily share a single 
set of interests, objectives and goals (Jessop. B.1982), thus republican and provincial 
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apparatuses gained substantially with the new constitution in their drive towards 
decentralisation, but they lacked commensurate economic powers. In Kosova, despite the 
reforms following the 1968-69 and 1971 amendments, the feeling of dependency on 
Serbia remained a major source of friction (Repishti. S. 1986. p255).  
During 1968-69 and 1971 constitutional provisions, the Communist League maintained 
the leading position in the political structure. Considering that the party was in essence 
the state, the LCY generated goals, and altered, changed, and intermingled policies 
(Adamson.L. 1987/8 p320-329).  By 1968, Yugoslavia was a country of eight constitutive 
units, seven neighbouring countries all with various agendas, six almost-independent 
republics, five nation-like nationalities, four official languages, three subdued religions, 
two used alphabets and one political party. Satisfying all of these was nearly impossible.  
 
The politics of conflict resolution in Yugoslavia was characterized by the maxim ‘jail the 
troublemakers, but grant their non-disintegrative demands’ (Ramet. S. 1992. p192).  
Consequently, for example, during the seventies a number of showcase trials were held 
across Kosova. The federal security service announced that it had infiltrated nine student 
groups that had begun to operate underground activity. Seven of these groups were made 
up of citizens from Kosova and two were made up of Albanian citizens from 
Macedonia.163 They were all given lengthy prison sentences. Tanjug reported that 
between 1974 and 1980, 618 Albanians, most of whom students, were accused of 
separatist plots, and over a hundred of them received one hundred and sixty three years 
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and nine months of gaol combined. It is always the case; the stronger party decides what 
is right according to its needs (Plato. 1955, p13). 
 
In this period, it is worth noting a drive by Serbs and Montenegrins to migrate from 
Kosova. Most of them left the province because of the fear of political factorisation of the 
Albanian element.  During 1969-72, over two thousands Serbs and Montenegrins 
emigrated from Kosova (Bulatović Lj 1999, p 104-7).  
In the economic sphere, most of the investment money was going towards expenditure on 
social capital for schools, hospitals medical centres, but infrastructure was absent in both 
rural and urbanised areas.  Funds for less-developed regions were welcome in Kosova, 
but problematic for other federal units, and Slovenia and Croatia in particular, as 
contributors to such funds, often opposed them with resentment. Dragutin Haramija, 
Croatian Prime Minister, declared: “the hard-earned cash of our hardworking proletarians 
must be directed to improve the lives of citizens of our socialist republic. Only then 
should the remaining money go to the southern regions”.164  Danilo Škocjan, deputy 
minister of infrastructure and urban planning in Slovenia, was of the same opinion. At a 
meeting in the municipality of Ptuj, showing considerable lack of solidarity, he 
exclaimed: “hand on heart, that money should stay and develop Slovenia further. Don’t 
know the reason as to why we must push forward the economy of one region, if the 
people of that region are not willing to work as hard as we Slovenes do”. He however 
resigned himself to the fact that, as a law adopted by the federal institutions, it applied 
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also to Slovenia, when he concluded: “instead of encouraging more capital investments, 
we help the underdeveloped…this is life in a federal state”.165 This was a potentially 
explosive thought, which, if articulated by politicians in another region, especially 
Albania, would have caused havoc in Yugoslav politics. However, Škocjan’s declaration 
was lost in the mundane politics of Slovenia and the wider federal debate on 
contributions to such a fund.   
ENTITY URBAN 
INVESTMENT 
RURAL 
INVESTMENT 
FLDR166 
 
Slovenia 39.74% of GDP 47.52% of GDP None 
Croatia 39.11% 44.23% None 
Serbia 32.07% 51.99% 11.7% 
Vojvodina 31.12% 57.04% None 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
21.94% 40.71% 23.75% 
Macedonia 29.91% 37.21% 19.02% 
Montenegro 29.27% 32.19% 18.39% 
Kosova 29.04% 30.55% 18.32% 
 
The table above shows financial contribution from FLDR to budgets of federal entities.167 
  
The autonomy that Kosova gained first of all revoked the 1963 political humiliation, 
whereby dependency on Serbia had made provincial institutions but a décor in the 
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political establishment. However, as part of the usual Yugoslav political game, such 
changes were nowhere near the political and constitutional demands of the demonstrators, 
illegal groups, or the intellectual circles. The importance of such actions is that they were 
the first that openly expressed dissatisfaction with the internal structure and arrangements 
of Yugoslavia. Moreover, this was not a small issue.  
  
From 1969 onwards, following relative liberalism after the Brioni meeting, the 1968 
demonstrations in various capitals of Yugoslavia, and with the demonstrations in Kosova 
and the 1971 political movement in Croatia, the federal state was moving towards 
resolving the existing political and economical impasse. A substantiated assessment of 
the situation was performed with a complete revisiting of the political structure of the 
state, which happened in1974. Such changes are the focal point of the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 THE APPROVAL OF THE 1974 CONSTITUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
  
In the history of Yugoslavia, February 1974 was the month that heralded and formatted a 
new style of life (Klein N. 2000. p23). Affected by political, economic, social and ethnic 
demands, the Yugoslav leadership adopted one of the lengthiest, almost teleological 
constitutions in any country to date that sanctioned and regulated the organisation of life 
in Yugoslavia with workers councils at its core (Schuman M. 2004. p34-35). Although it 
did not go as far as Rousseau would have wanted, when he proposed that “people being 
subject to the laws ought to be their authors” (Dent N. 2005, p371), and although it has 
been criticised as “crippling the institutional and material power of the federal 
government” (Gowan P. 1999. p89-90168), the constitution nonetheless promoted the 
indissoluble friendship among nations, and respect for national cultures and people’s 
dignity. It aimed to create ‘homo yugoslavicus’, a new social and international 
community cemented by the same economic interests, ideology and political goals, with 
the core concept that people should look towards the union more than they do towards 
their individual entities.  
Such a concept derives from fairly mixed ethnicities and common ancestors of major 
nations of the federation that descended from diverse smaller ethnic groupings, which 
have intermarried with their neighbours (Guibernau M & Hutchinson J. 2001. p208).  
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The constitution “assured the continuation of the dictatorship of the proletariat by putting 
selected individuals from labour units at the core of power-sharing and constructing a 
system of proposed and selected members as the cornerstone of socialist democracy” 
(Wilson D. 1979, p215-6). The internal structure of the federation was also amended in 
order to accommodate many of the political demands that federal units were advocating: 
“The six constituent republics entered into a contract in the common structure that really 
loosened the ties of federal government” (West R. 1994. 295-9). Kosova and Vojvodina 
became almost equal members of the federation, with but a few privileges left to Serbia. 
The only constitutional vestige that the provinces lacked, but that the republics had, was 
the right to secession which remained guaranteed only to the nations of Yugoslavia. Tito 
opposed Kosova becoming a republic. He thought that “the federal structure could be in 
danger if one nationality is to be elevated to the status of a nation, because this will 
present problems of deciding where Albanians actually are a nation, i.e. in Kosova or 
Albania. He also feared other smaller nationalities would demand national recognition 
too” (Radio Prishtina.16 November 1974).169  With such a declaration, Tito put the one 
and a half million Albanians in Yugoslavia on an equal footing with about 1290 Çerkez 
minority, considering that the autonomy of Kosova was not exclusive to the Albanian 
population, and that the autonomy did not include the entire Albanian population in 
Yugoslavia. This example shows that Yugoslavia internally acted selectively  when 
‘nations’ were concerned, but comparably with ‘nationalities’, perhaps as a 
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demonstration of the silent brand of pan-Slavic nationalism. Many nationalities in 
Yugoslavia were of non-Slavic origin (Albanians, Hungarians, Italians, Germans, Roma), 
therefore their treatment was obscured when the defence of Slavic nations was at stake. 
 
The rights of nationalities were further expanded, which “in practice meant important 
changes for ordinary people”. The nationalities were to be represented more in the 
institutions of the state and party, although the Serbs were proportionally in a higher 
percentage than other nationalities (Glenny M 1996, p13). The educational and cultural 
profiles of the minorities were to be increased, with further investment in such fields, and 
more people from minorities were to be allowed into the security and defence forces. 
This meant that from employing only seventeen in 1966, the number of Albanian officers 
in the YPA increased to 291 by 1978170 (Komunisti 2 April 1979).171 
For the first time, the annual budget of Kosova had a lump sum of money dedicated to 
education and culture, which made a considerable difference to these spheres, as projects 
in those areas were previously only randomly financed.  
The provincial government, assembly and party were now stronger in decision-making. 
Only areas that remained in Tito’s prerogative, i.e. defence, international affairs, the 
pension system and judiciary were outside their domain.  
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Apart from Albanian, other languages gained state approval in Kosova. Turkish became 
an official language in Kosova, although the Turkish minority were very nominal in the 
province, representing only 12244 people according to the 1971 census.172 Apart from the 
free use of their national flag, the Turks in Kosova also gained a daily newspaper173, a 
folkloristic national ensemble, a daily TV program, and a sizable fund for Turkish 
emancipation from the provincial ministries of culture, education, and interior. 
The Roma minority was the first ever to have a TV show in Europe in their language, 
prepared and shown by Prishtina RTV station. They also gained political representation 
guaranteed by the constitution.174 Considerable efforts were also made to lift them from 
penurious economic condition.   
Commenting on such changes at a meeting with a group of students from Titograd 
University, Marshal Tito said:  
 
‘This is a true triumph of socialism and self-governance. This is a real triumph of the 
working class. This is a magnificent triumph of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia ... 
you the young of our country will reap the benefits of the new constitution the most’. 
(Pobjeda 29 June 1974)175  
 
Most of Kosova politicians were enthusiastic too, since “for the first time in history the 
people of Kosova had their own government, their constitution and their language at all 
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levels of the state” (Horvat B. 1989, p175). The chairman of Kosova’s presidency, Veli 
Deva, called the new constitution “a masterpiece of ingenuity” (Rilindja 7 June 1974),176 
while the Turkish minority representative in the Kosova assembly, Harun Nevzat, 
exclaimed that “the new constitution sets workers at the forefront of political activity by 
making equal all who speak different languages” (Rilindja 8 November 1978).177   
The reason why Kosova’s political leadership was so joyful about the document is that it 
went a long way to improve life for the better.  The energetic complacency and 
enthusiasm was best summarised in a directive to county and district courts made by 
Kosova’s provincial assembly.178 The document reads: 
 ‘The Communist League of Yugoslavia, and the state, republican and provincial organs, 
are forwarding to the people this outstanding and flawless document which from now on 
and for the rest of time will properly and accordingly regulate relations between the 
party, the state, the working masses and the people, with utmost regard for each and 
every, social, cultural, political, ethnic, and economic group.  The document provides 
unshaken belief in the rule of the Communist League and its practising ideals, 
unmistakably and poignantly showing to the people that the state and the party are 
people and workers alike’.179 
     
Certainly much of discussion was true, for after 1974 Yugoslavia could breathe more 
easily. All this considering that, since the 1968 protests, many officials were thinking that 
“it was a case of either reform or communist orthodoxy.” (Pryce Jones D. 2001. p76).  
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The decentralised economic competences were being used to great advantage all over the 
federation, especially in the northern republics. Economic development was seen as a 
factor of further national affirmation.180  
A positive attitude by international sports bodies choosing Yugoslavia to host major 
events helped these developments, as well as contributing to “national character and an 
out-of-proportion status to economic and political clout” (Horne J, Tomlinson A & 
Whannel G,  1999, p 195 – 197). 181 Such developments were very welcome by the 
regime, since sport has been used both as a resource and as an arena for political action 
(Coakley J & Duning E. 2000. p213), and it can promote nation-building and an 
international image (Alison L eds. 1993.p97). 
 
In the border between the two northern republics, Yugoslavia built a nuclear power 
station, something that put the country in an elite block of nuclear capabilities club.182 
The economic growth allowed the public sector to increase the number of employed, thus 
helping to reduce unemployment and make a modest contribution to the semi-middle 
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 They were a European football championship (for which the ‘Marakana’ stadium in Belgrade was 
renovated to be one of the largest in Europe), a basketball championship, and several global individual 
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class of Yugoslavia as the table below shows:  
 Annual growth in social sector employment for the 1971-75 period 
 
Schrenk M  Ardalan C & Tatawy E A N. 1979, p100. 
Kosova recorded more economic growth than any other federal entity. The constitution of 
1974 opened the doors for a greater release of the political and security grip on the 
people, which consequently allowed greater economic development.  In fact, Kosova did 
not get republican status, but an extended autonomy for the province in the true meaning 
 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
5.5% 
 
Montenegro 
5.3% 
 
Croatia 
3.7% 
 
Macedonia 
5.4% 
 
Slovenia 
4.4% 
 
Serbia 
4.0% 
 
Vojvodina 
3.5% 
 
Kosova 
6.7% 
 
Yugoslavia 
4.8% 
147 
 
of the word (Clinton B 2005, p850).  
Following the creation of the fund for less-developed regions, the province gained 
considerable economic clout and, for the first time, Kosova donated funds in the summer 
of 1963.183  By 1970, Kosova was also contributing to the fund for international 
developments, and by 1978 funds from the province were helping less-developed 
countries of the third world, with a contribution of 1.6% of provincial GDP.184  
During 1976 after granting the Albanian language status, from 67 that existed the number 
of secondary schools in Kosova increased to 133, for the first time including specialised 
branches such as medicine, economy and legal practice (Jeta e Re 1977).185 In 1974, the 
first gymnasium with official school curricula outside Croatia was opened186 in the 
historic town of Janjevë.187  
In 1970, after a Hungarian language department was opened at university level in 
Vojvodina, where medicine and other sciences were taught (Parenti M. 2000, p187), and 
after much wrangling at the federal level about arguments for and against, the bilingual 
University of Kosova was opened, which changed the perception and attitudes that 
existed about Kosova. The number of students was high, and they were achieving a good 
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success rate.188 The University became the third largest university in Yugoslavia in terms 
of student numbers, a proportion of them foreign.189  
In April 1975, the University of Prishtina issued the first ever honorary doctorate to Tito. 
The province also attained the Academy of Science and Arts, the main centre for research 
of Albanians in Yugoslavia.  
A radio and a TV station ‘RTP’ was opened in Prishtina, with shows in Serbo-Croat, 
Turkish and Albanian languages, with the latter taking over 65% of the broadcasting. 
This institution became the cell of cultural and educational activity, although the city of 
Novi Sad for example spent more in one year on its cultural budget than Kosova had to 
spend as a whole (Lalaj A 2000, p286). Kosova also got the people’s provincial chorus, 
the people’s provincial theatre190, and ‘Kosovafilm’, the movie production and 
distribution company that created a number of prize-wining projects.191  
By 1980192, for the first time in Yugoslavia, the Bible was translated into Albanian.193 By 
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1982, the Qur'an was also translated in Prishtina194, thus showing some tolerance by the 
atheist regime towards religion.   
 
The province also attracted investments in transport improvements. The rail network was 
first developed in 1874195, and it had not progressed much since then, but by 1978 the 
international line between Salonika and Munich led through Kosova.  
 
In financial terms, wages were increasing, while credits were issued by the companies for 
individual needs. Because these credits were issued for terms of 3-10 and 25 years, many 
did return very small amounts of money, for the dinar often devalued. It was through 
such benefits that many new privately owned properties appeared in cities. The estimates 
of the federal ministry of finance showed a growing trend of borrowing. For example,  
273.7 million dinars were loaned for a 10-year return period in 1965, but by 1976 the 
figure had risen to 1.95 billion dinars.196  
 
In internal structure, the fourteen communes that existed in Kosova in 1968 had increased 
                                                                                                                                                 
inaugural civil flight was made in 1975, when Tito visited Kosova. Civil flights in lines with Belgrade 
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to twenty-five by 1980. 197  
 
In political terms, the provincial assembly secured more competences, and the executive 
council was strengthened, even in the field of justice and security, including the official 
provincial organisation of territorial defence forces. The supreme court of Kosova, as 
well as the central bank received limited but fairly reasonable duties, decentralised where 
matters of regional importance in their fields were concerned. A general air of positive 
opinion began to flow amongst the masses (Hoxha H. 1984, p 83-6).  
This manifests what John Allcock calls the” accommodation of political definitions, in 
the course of social reality and social transformation (Allcock J. 2000. p170). That is, 
political ideology had started to find a way of popularising itself, after the economic 
power of the people started improving. Communist units of republics and provinces 
began to function increasingly independently from the centre because of the devolution of 
power (Lane A. 2004, p143), and communist parties increased their memberships 
considerably, especially after 1974.198  This proved that decentralisation was the way 
forward, and even in a communist society devolved power was the main principle with 
which local and regional problems could be addressed. Henceforth, this was a victory for 
liberal forces that had a great deal at stake if devolution were to falter. Such forces were 
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then in a position to criticise centralists who were set against decentralisation and to 
minimise their strength in decision-making for the time being. 
 
Finally, the army was further strengthened in its power, so it had become not only one of 
the most powerful in Europe, but it had become “a state within a state”, in view of the 
number of people that served and were employed at the YPA and the amount of financial 
contributions it was receiving. 
 
Aside from the political elite in Yugoslavia, the people were also enjoying new changes. 
In a petition posted to Tito and signed by 357 citizens, workers and intellectuals of Nova 
Varoš, a city in southern Serbia, the Marshall was “praised for his aptness, prudence and 
realism and is wholeheartedly thanked for achieving the supreme internal political 
organisation in the country”. A similar correspondence was received from workers of the 
pharmaceutical collective ‘Farmakos’ Prizren in Kosova. In their telegram, they “bow to 
Tito for giving the nations and nationalities of Kosova the chance to truly better their 
future” (Komunisti.14 October 1974).199  
 
An overview of the general situation in Yugoslavia shows that the state and party 
apparatus had not relinquished their powers. Despite devolution there was no doubt about 
who held the reigns of power (Sibler L & Little A 1996, p28).  Things that were deemed 
excessive, such as overemphasis in national folklore and tradition that did not have 
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common life as its base, were also harassed, because as always for communists, the 
history of the partisan struggle even if it was small and not important was exaggerated 
and swelled artificially (Evans D. 2005, p158).  
 
The situation was moving fast and nationalism, the one problem that the political 
authorities feared but had not directed, was raising its head. In its name, the Yugoslav 
ambassador to Australia was assassinated, and an airplane full of Yugoslav seasonal 
workers was blown up over Sweden, probably by the Croat nationalist diaspora.  
In Kosova, the group led by Adem Demaçi200 was helped by another small ideological 
group which moved its activity to the Federal Republic of Germany from fear of 
prosecution. Led by Jusuf Gërvalla, a novelist, literary critic and journalist of Rilindja, 
the group advocated equal status for Albanians in Yugoslavia. They argued that: 
‘With the 1974 constitution, the national question of Albanians was far from being 
resolved because, not only did Kosova not get a republic, but also the borders of the 
province were not moved to include all Albanians in Yugoslavia and thus create a strong 
political unit of all Albanians in Yugoslavia’.201 
 
 Gërvalla’s activity was cut short when, in January 1981, he was assassinated, together 
with his younger brother Bardhosh and their close friend Kadri Zeka, probably by the 
Yugoslav security (Lalaj. A 2000, p340).   
 
The nationalistic forces in Kosova, were dealt four major blows after 1974.  The first was 
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concerned with the 1974 constitution. It was true that the document had not elevated 
Kosova to a republic, but the competences that were given, and how much the province 
was connected to federal institutions, provided an alluring sense of equality. Secondly, an 
issue inextricably tied to the first is that the number of communist supporters in the 
province was increasing, especially amongst the majority Albanian population, and they 
were not willing to risk the newly acclaimed status.202 Thirdly, the political activists and 
underground opposition groups were unearthed and incarcerated, so their activity was 
virtually paralysed. And finally, though never supportive of claims for Kosova to merge 
with Albania, official Tirana completely erased these hopes when Enver Hoxha, 
Albania’s state and party leader, said at a meeting in Tropojë203 in 1975, “Albania does 
not harbour any territorial pretensions towards Yugoslavia” (Lalaj A. 2000, p345). 
 
Nonetheless the constitution had its enemies. The academics were arousing the public 
with claims about rights of their nations, as well as diverse political, military, 
informational, economic, social, ethnic and ecological factors (Bucklet M & Cummings S 
2001, p 238). As early as 1975, the Serbian presidency organised a working body with 
the aim to re-examine the implementation of the highest law of the state.  However, the 
new constitution had not really had time to be proven in practice, and this body did not 
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find much support in the other republics and only limited support in Serbia. Nevertheless, 
the conclusions of that working body were composed in a special publication called ‘The 
Blue Book’ during 1977 (Bogdanović D. 1985, p242). Amongst other things, The Blue 
Book attacked the ‘severity of influence and power’ that both provinces had gained, and 
it called for removal of the direct constitutional links that the provinces had with the 
federation. It also called for placing both provinces under the full jurisdiction of Serbia, 
reducing their autonomies to a minimum and reviewing the position that non-Serb 
ethnicities had gained in the provinces, i.e. the reduction of their influence and power. 
With offensive but diplomatic language aiming not to infuriate heads of state and party, 
the document also called “for Serbia to be leading with financial and economic resources 
of the provinces and for return of the provinces into the hands of the Serbian people”.  
 The Blue Book also called “for decentralisation of power of republics, and a deciding 
voice in matters of foreign currency that tourism was bringing”. The document ended 
with the always popular call, “to strengthen further the position of the Yugoslav People’s 
Army as the guarantor of stability and peace in the region”. Although it was originally 
meant for internal use in Serbia, because of its strong inflammatory language the 
document was never published (Malcolm N. 1998, p340), but it remained an internal 
document of Serbian policymaking. However, parts of it were leaked to the press and it 
did not all go to waste, for the Serb Academy of Science and Arts in 1986 produced ‘The 
Memorandum’, a document widely counted and judged as “the platform to ruin 
Yugoslavia” (BHTV. 14 April 2001).204  
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Mihajlo Marković and Dobrica Ćosić, two distinguished academics of political thought in 
Serbia, helped the debate. The former organised ‘The Free University’, a talking shop, in 
private flats, while the latter was “against minorities becoming nations through powers 
they were attributed”, and maintained that “Slovenes and Croats were stopping reform in 
Yugoslavia for they were nationalistically oriented” (Judah T. 2000, p157).  
 
Soon after 1974, enthusiasm had withered away, and problems of day-to-day life 
resurfaced. Prishtina University was producing “a small army of intellectuals”, but many 
of them had no job prospects, as economic development in Kosova was oriented towards 
heavy industry (Malcolm N. 1998, p339). Another problem was that with unemployment 
increasing,205 “the number of those hunting for a first-time job was the highest” 
(Berković E.1986, p65). The gap between balances of payment ranged from 29% to 53% 
of earnings for professional and semi-professional workers (Korošić M.1983, p476).206 
 
Problems started after Tito’s death, when people begun to feel apprehensive about the 
future. Aware of his age, and various comments, while visiting the Serbian city of 
Negotin in 1978, Tito in a wholehearted expression of the Yugoslavist agenda cried:  
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‘We have spilt an ocean of blood for brotherhood and unity in this country, and we shall 
not allow anyone to destroy it from within…We were all one people, that's how it was, 
and I think it must stay today and forever’.207  
 
This poetic, belligerent, interminable, unimpeded, expedient, intransigent statement, 
which reveals great awareness of internal dissent, was perhaps Tito’s frankest gesture, 
marked by a display of deep sincerity about the problems of nationality, “ones that 
everyone knew in their heart of hearts were going to bring down Yugoslavia after Tito 
had gone”.208  This question, which never truly went away during Tito’s time, shows that 
political debates were not only based on hearsay, but were rooted in the work mentality in 
Yugoslavia. Never has there been such an open admition from the leader of the state, for 
example in the USSR, about the future of the country. Tito’s heartfelt remarks present a 
clear picture of the relative debate that existed in Yugoslavia, because he uttered such 
emotional sentences as a reaction to the debate that existed all over the country.   
 
There was considerable talk about issues related to cultural development in Kosova. High 
natality amongst Albanians was described as ‘natural nationalism’.209  By 1980, the 
average natality rate amongst Albanians was 6.7 children per couple210, but the rate in 
undeveloped and urban semi-developed regions was 4.2 children less for every couple 
compared with a decade ago. Nonetheless, the issue of birth rates amongst Albanians 
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soon became a political hot potato of biased speculation, though the purveyors of such 
questions never asked for better family planning – which was non-existent – or why the 
number of educated rural women was so low, or why one of the most basic rights of 
humans ( i.e. the right to have a family of their own) was irresponsibly questioned when 
Albanians were concerned, but exuberantly promoted in the case of the Serb and 
Montenegrin populations in Kosova.      
The Percentage of Natality by Nationality in Kosova per Couple 211 
 
  
The women of Yugoslavia, despite having witnessed a near-complete change in their 
lives, were still the most unemployed, the least politically represented, and always 
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underpaid in comparison to men (Ramet S. 1999, p95).  
 
Due to such a situation, Ivan Stambolić, Serbia’s prime minister, warned in 1977 that 
“Serb national feelings have increased, while amongst Albanians they already exist” 
(Stambolić I. 1988, p26). Branko Horvat was of the same opinion, blaming “feudal 
masters in shape of local political oligarchs” for the stagnant situation in the province 
(Horvat B ,1989 p185). Because of the undemocratic, elitist, and clientelist political 
system, the state was unable to confront the political and social crisis which resulted from 
then onwards (Thoumi. F. 1999, p131).   
 
In spring 1981, students of Prishtina University again conducted demonstrations of an 
economic, cultural, and political character influenced by nationalistic feelings, this time 
assisted by dissatisfied workers and intellectuals. Most probably fearing the power 
vacuum left by Tito’s death, and feeling the heat from the ensuing economic and political 
crisis, the demonstrations in the streets of Prishtina, which this time round were much 
larger than those of 1968, were signalling the bleaker days for Yugoslavia  
To summarise this chapter, the 1974 constitution brought political changes. They were a 
contributor to the prevailing mood of political liberalism and the tendency towards 
further decentralisation. In other words, Yugoslavia was initiating the decline of the state 
(Neal F.W. 1958, p19).  Despite their opposition, the constitutive units of the federation 
seemed satisfied with the highest state document, for it guaranteed a sense of 
individuality. For the Albanians in Kosova, the 1974 constitution came as a surprise. 
Many political figures had not anticipated a change in the political terrain that would put 
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Kosova on an almost equal footing with other republics.  
However, broader political changes were deemed impossible for several reasons. First, 
eroding the power of the state further would have been “a dangerous incentive for 
unilateral actions of self-determination by composing units” (Bataković D. 1994. p 79). 
Secondly, the economic crisis of the 1970s provided some room to manoeuvre. 
Weakening the federal structure through devolution would have placed economic 
stability into question. Thirdly, Tito’s advanced age was a problem. Many political 
players were often trying to envisage a Yugoslavia without Tito, and asking what would 
happen to Yugoslav solidarity, how strong were the ties and bonds of the union under 
brotherhood and unity, and Quo Vadis Yugoslavia? (Allcock. J. B. 2000, p 411).  
Expectations by republics that they would become true nation-states were not met.  For 
example, as a province, Kosova had thwarted Serbia’s expectations of political 
aggrandisement, much as Serbia had stood in the way of Kosova’s political objectives.  
Therefore, for all these reasons, the re-examination of political and constitutional 
achievements started once again soon after 1974.  Various colliding groups such as 
separatists, secessionists, nationalists, centralists, liberals, the army and the veteran 
organisations, began to question how much room there was for self-appraisal. Who ended 
up satisfied and happy with such changes? Why were they finding discrepancies and 
disparities between what they wanted (in some cases even verbally promised) and what 
they received by law? Such political friction soon erupted to the surface, and it shook 
Yugoslavia to its core.             
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CONCLUSION 
  
Despite the fact that from 1945 onwards, Yugoslavia was a communist society, and 
regardless of the propositions that in autocratic regimes freedom of speech is censored, 
this thesis has proved otherwise.  A relative measure of freedom existed Yugoslavia 
albeit coerced and ideologically imbued. Such freedom was observed by academic, 
intellectual and workers’ circles soon after the 1948 break-up of  relations with the USSR 
as the political mentor of the new world order. The movement from statist, political and 
economic system, into self-management that prioritised workers and their needs made 
Yugoslavia interesting, firstly because many observers had predicted its slide into 
capitalism, and secondly because of its persistent survival from capitalism or Stalinism.  
However, by advocating workers’ issues, other problems emerged, specifically those 
concerned with the ethnic composition of the state, constitutional antagonisms, and 
devolution of power. Such problems were centred on issues of delegated power to the 
federal units, devolution of power to such units, and the position of nations and 
nationalities in those units. The case of the Albanian population is a particularly 
important one, for they represented an autochthon people who, despite the fact that they 
lived in a compact territory, were divided between four federal units. This issue, and the 
political demand that Albanians should have a republic inside Yugoslavia, after the union 
of Kosova with Albania was disallowed, are the points that brought the most friction in 
relations between Albanians and the Serbian and federal authorities.  Therefore debate 
waged all over the Albanian regions of Yugoslavia, and the desire for the expression of 
political will can be observed from 1946, with the trial of Professor Marije Shllaku and 
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her companions, the 1954 trial of high-party officials of Kosova, and the decade of the 
1960s, known as a period of relaxed communism. Characteristically, it was the political 
and economic crisis in Yugoslavia that led to adoption of bold reforms. In many ways, 
they cut through the indecisiveness of the past in favour of freer economic relations. By 
running ahead of other communist countries, Yugoslavia became the symbol of the 
‘liberal’ trend in dealing with problems they all faced, including the Soviet Union. From 
1965 onwards, Yugoslavia was immersed in a long battle for decentralisation, market 
economy, material incentives, participating in the world economic institutions, trade 
redirection, and a changing or even a declining role of the party, as opposed to 
centralism, strict party control and the bureaucratism of the Old Guard.  
In Kosova, this period is manifested with debates about the status of the province and the 
national question. Vladimir Bakarić said that “Yugoslavia had two main problems – the 
economic reform and the nationalities question. If the first could not be solved, the 
second would immediately become problem number one” (Borba 06/03/1966).212 So the 
problem of nationalities in Yugoslavia, undoubtedly one of the most intricate in Europe, 
was bound to bring political crisis.  
After the cutting of ties with Stalin, Yugoslavia began to develop its own political and 
economic institutions, and differences based on nationality began to grow within the 
party and agencies of government, especially those with economic connotations. This 
shows that there never was a true identification with Yugoslav nationality which for 
many was very different from their separate national and regional identities. Tito’s 
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communists could not change the situation merely by proclaiming socialism (Bromke A 
and Rakowska Harmstone T. 1972, p 191), even though socialism appealed to many as a 
child of enlightenment. As an ideology, it sought to fashion a new just and prosperous 
society, based on a Marxist eclectic mix of morality and materialism, but in Yugoslavia 
the relations between nations were not based on durable foundations. They depended 
most of all on the monolithic CPY holding monopoly of power.    
In Kosova, groups of students, workers and intellectuals alike even protested against the 
system at a time when in other student campuses of Yugoslavia demonstrations were 
making headlines, more so due to the comprehensive international threat following the 
Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. However, the prevailing era of positive optimism 
manifested in constitutional amendments of 1968-’69, which elevated Kosova’s 
autonomy higher than ever before, to culminate in the 1974 constitution that  had styled 
Yugoslavia as a semi-confederation of fairly independent nations - ‘nation states’ - with 
Kosova gaining near-political autonomy from Serbia.  
The study of constitutional debate shows that people are a factor of change even in the 
worst of conditions. It shows that political changes were promulgated to save the existing 
political framework, to help the main political demands for internal and external 
factorisation, to adapt to the ever-growing needs of institutions, the party and the people, 
and to differentiate from political processes in other countries of the same dogma. The 
constitutional process also points to the flaws of previous constitutions, and the 
recognition that they had to change, even though at the time of their approval they were 
strong and pedantic in nature; it exemplifies the factorisation of decentralisation as 
achieving direct political representation and affiliation of the people with the state.   
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The problem of constitutional amendments was interpreted accordingly in each of the 
political units. The issue of national relevance always played a significant part in such 
discussions that linked constitutional changes to internal factors, national frictions and 
economic and political decentralisation, thus illustrating that the great conundrum of 
nationalism, i.e. “ethnic nation understands an ethnic society supposed to be politically 
organised in a nation state and exclusively identified by it” (Krejčí, J & Velímský V. 
1981, p 35) was not defeated. By and large, the national tendencies were powerful in all 
federal units, and they showed relative preponderance in action.  
The role of the party in the decentralised, self-managing society still remained a problem. 
The party, which was increasingly becoming a group of national communist parties, was 
often in a precarious position when trying to assert itself from the centre. For the most 
part, the communists wanted to retain the monopoly of political power that the system 
guaranteed, but the creation of other institutions to serve the system such as the workers’ 
councils, the complex federal arrangements, and the relationship between party and the 
government only increased the battle for power. This and the scramble prestige by the 
new class deepened the gap between doctrine and reality, and made it so difficult to 
implement the most logically conceived reforms in practice.  This prompted John C. 
Campbell to ask whether what was happening in Yugoslavia was a socialisation of the 
Balkans or the Balkanisation of socialism (Jelavić B 1963, p 396). 
Amongst all these issues is the illustrated idea which began to be voiced with 
octogenarian Tito’s increasingly frail health, when more developed and industrialised 
federal units in the north began to question the need to help less-performing federal units 
of the south through the fund for undeveloped regions, something that touched the very 
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existence of Yugoslavia. This gave rise to the troubled politics of the late-1980s, when in 
Slovenia for example the burden of funding underdeveloped regions was only cementing 
their argument for secession, whereas in Kosova the economic benefits from remaining in 
Yugoslavia were in steep decline, since they had fallen to 26% of the Yugoslav average. 
There is also a scholarly debate related to this idea which argues that the failure of 
interwar Yugoslavism during King Aleksandar’s dictatorship, where the joint state was a 
typical construct of the Serbian kingdom that never truly dismantled to become a 
Yugoslav kingdom, left a distinct impact on the politics of Tito and the Yugoslav 
Communists during the post-war period. This was mirrored in various forms on the issues 
of dominance by Serbia in the federation, or the equality of other entities and nations in 
the union with Serbia. This interesting idea begs the question that if Yugoslavism had 
continued to exist as an increasing number of people wanted (indicated by population 
censuses, where those calling themselves Yugoslavs were on the increase), how far 
would Yugoslavia’s destruction in the 1990s have gone? 
Another issue is the peculiar internal relations that existed vis-à-vis Belgrade and 
Prishtina. Serbia tended to view Kosova as an integral and inseparable area with the 
political status of a province, but there primarily to accommodate the needs and demands 
of the Serbian and Montenegrin population present, as well as the majority Albanian 
population and other minorities. The Albanians on the other hand viewed Kosova as the 
only home they had, hence their arguments for complete secession from Serbia. This 
issue produced a number of debates in Kosova and Serbia about how far these political 
units should be tied to each other.  However, neither of the fringe arguments won the day, 
which leaves a lot of disparities in the issue of autonomy, for the issue of what kind of 
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autonomy did not satisfy Albanian political demands, and Serbian controlling tendencies.  
These issues are linked to the wider implications of Kosova as a case study, beginning 
with the historical preconditioning of the country, the political, social, economic and 
constitutional development and related issues linked with nationalism, decentralisation, 
federalism and communism. Kosova as a case study brings forth most of these questions, 
but all with different representation, since the politics of Kosova was very different from 
traditional conventional politics in Yugoslavia or Europe. The difference occurred 
because nationalistic tendencies shaped the politics of Kosova, they played an integral 
part in the debate about federalism, and decentralisation, and they were concomitant 
factors in the wider understanding of the general situation. The issues of who was the 
main political subject in Kosova (the Serbs in minority, but empowered by Serbia, or the 
Albanians in majority), how far did factorisation extend, was there relative freedom or 
subdued freedom in comparison with other entities in the federation, was Kosova the 
centre of the Albanian universe in Yugoslavia, were the rights of Albanians (and other 
nationalities in Yugoslavia) deliberately violated due to the non-Slavic origin of the 
Albanians (which would explain the fact that most of the federal units saw Kosova as 
trouble) or to historic antagonisms between the two nations (which would explain the 
uneasy relationship between Albanians and Serbs in the federation), all pertained to the 
wider political life in Kosova. Other arguments along the same lines relate to the issue of 
nationality as a factor of devolution, for all the constitutional amendments were attempts 
to solve the national problem as the primary factor of possible dissatisfaction. In so 
doing, the economic issues of Yugoslavia were sometimes ignored. These were, however, 
inseparably linked. By giving in to the demands for economic factorisation (the concept 
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of self-management was above all an economic dogmatic construct), the constitutional 
amendments inevitably raised both the ethnicity and the economic questions, but also the 
problem of Yugoslavia as a whole. The primary impacts were on the issues of the 
economic clout of Kosova as a provincial political organisation, and the political clout of 
Kosova and the Albanians as a political entity, as well as other nationalities, given that 
the 1981 census showed 27 different nationalities in Yugoslavia and only six of them had 
a federal unit dedicated to them. 
Finally, important implications in the findings about Kosova include the fact that 
Yugoslavia was regulated as a country with ethnic minorities scattered all over the 
federal units. Only Slovenia had a smaller and less significant problem of that nature. 
This issue made the concept of solving the minorities’ problems very tricky, for some of 
the federal units were demanding greater rights for their compatriots in other federal 
units, but they were not always willing to act accordingly in solving the problems of 
nationalities that existed in their own republics. The case of Serbia asking for equal 
treatment of Serbs in Kosova, Croatia and Macedonia is the most evocative. The 
Belgrade government however never showed any interest in solving the issues of 
Albanian, Croat or Macedonian populations in the Peoples Republic of Serbia. 
The umpteen numbers of original sources from the Serbo-Croat and Albanian languages 
in this thesis have made an invaluable contribution and illustrated precisely the main 
argument, that debate in Communist Yugoslavia not only existed but was to a 
considerable subjective degree tolerated and incited. They have proved that Kosovan 
Communist leaders themselves were part of such debates, for they often articulated 
popular demands of their constituents at federal level and became the locomotive which 
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moved things further, though not to the desired outcome.  
Nevertheless, Yugoslavia was a case of many issues, and only a few of them have been 
discussed properly at length. It was for many a cunning experiment that took place at the 
right time (a neutral political body that adopted communism but did not close the doors to 
capitalism), hence its existence. 
And lastly, the Yugoslav case is important if we are to consider the future of the region 
and the common collaboration and integration into the joint European institutions. For 
now, after Yugoslavia has dismembered, seven new independent states have emerged all 
of whom have very peculiar problems, where the nationality issue is one of the strongest. 
However, they all strive for prosperity and better ethnic relations. It will be very 
interesting to observe whether various ethnic minorities within these states, who are in 
most cases part of the nation from a neighbouring state, will be used as a bridge for better 
relations or as a cause for further drama and conflict. Therefore, the challenges for 
Kosovo and the rest of the region are to reduce high levels of poverty and unemployment, 
to manage political instability and the risk of conflict, to develop more effective and 
accountable government, and to realise the opportunity of joining the European Union as 
an umbrella group that offers political, economic, and social stability.   
In the last passage of his novel, The Count of Monte Cristo, its author Alexander Dumas 
confides that ....all we can do is wait and hope for the best.   
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Interviews 
 
8 March 2007, telephone interview with Mr Simon Kuzhnini 
19 March 2007, telephone interview with Dr Riza Sapunxhiu. 
 
Newspapers consulted 
“The Washington Post”. Washington DC. USA. 
“Borba”. Belgrade. Serbia. 
“Politika”. Belgrade. Serbia. 
Praxis” Belgrade. Serbia. 
“Vjesnik”. Zagreb. Croatia.  
“Rilindja”. Prishtina. Kosova. 
“Kosova Sot”. Prishtina. Kosova. 
“Zëri”. Prishtina. Kosova. 
“Përparimi”. Prishtina. Kosova. 
“Jeta e Re”. Prishtina. Kosova. 
“Bujku” Prishtina. Kosova. 
“Komunisti”. Prishtina. Kosova. 
“Jedinstvo” Prishtina. Kosova. 
“Zëri i Popullit”. Tirana. Albania. 
“Nëntori”. Tirana Albania. 
“Shekulli”. Tirana Albania. 
“Osloboñenje”. Sarajevo. Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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“Fakti”. Skopje. FYRO Macedonia 
“Tanjug” The official news agency of Yugoslavia now Serbia. 
“Alternativa”. Bulletin of the Albanian community in Ljubjana Slovenia.  
Pobjeda. Podgorica. Montenegro. 
 
 
Archival material. 
The archive of Yugoslavia, now the archive of Serbia. http://www.arhiv.sv.gov.yu/ 
Vase Pelagića 33,11000 Beograd, Srbija 
The Archive of Kosova. Rruga ”Muharrem Fejza”pn, lagja e Spitalit. Prishtina. Kosova. 
Radio “Free Europe” archives. www.rferl.org. 
The Archive of the Communist League branch in Gjakovë. Kosova 
The archive of the municipality of Istog. Kosova. 
The archive of the chromium mine “Deva” Gjakovë. Kosova. 
The archive of the Composers Society of Kosova. Prishtina.  
The archive of the Islamic Union of Kosova. Prishtina. Kosova 
The archive of the Kosova Catholic Archdiocese. Prizren. Kosova 
“The Sports House”. The archive of the Kosova Olympic Committee. Prishtina. Kosova 
The archive of the Council for Defense of Human Rights and Liberties. Prishtina. Kosova 
The Archive of Kosova’s Society of Veterans of the National Liberation War. Prishtina. 
The archive of “Kosovafilm” Prishtina. Kosova 
The Archive of “URA” city of Gjakova club of intellectuals. Kosova. 
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Archives of the Prishtina commune. Kosova 
Riinvest Prishtina’s institute for development research. Kosova. 
The archive of the Peoples Bank of Yugoslavia. Belgrade. Serbia. 
The “Open Society” Archives. www.soros.org 
A Tribune of political and ethnic activism in Yugoslavia ” Skopje . 16.12.2006 
Një kafe me Labin. Interviste me Ramiz Këlmendin. (“A coffee with Labi” show 
Interview with Ramiz Këlmendi) TV channel 21. www. Rtv21.net. Prishtina. Kosova 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. www.osce.org 
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